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WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2023		
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Reported by:		
Elise Hicks		

## APPEARANCES

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Brandon Serna

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1 P R O C E D I N G S 2 WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 15, 2023 10:00 a.m. MS. RAITT: Good morning. Welcome to today's 3 4 Commissioner Workshop on Load Modifier Scenario results. 5 I'm Heather Raitt. I'm the Director for the Integrated 6 Energy Policy Report or the IEPR for short. This workshop 7 is being held as part of the CEC's proceeding on the 2023. 8 So today is a remote only workshop and so we're using Zoom. 9 It's being recorded and we'll post a recording of the 10 workshop shortly afterwards. And then a written transcript 11 will follow in about a month or so. And the schedule for 12 today's meeting and all the slide decks are posted and 13 docketed on the Energy Commission's IEPR web page. You can 14 find it there. We'll have a number of staff presentations 15 today. And then following the presentations, we'll have 16 some opportunities for comments or excuse me, questions 17 from attendees. You can use the Zoom Q and A feature if you 18 have a question you want to type in. 19 MS. RAITT: And then if you see a question there 20 that looks like one that you had, you can also just upvote 21 an existing question, hit that thumbs up icon and it'll upvote it. And then finally, at the end of the day, there's 2.2 23 an opportunity for public comment and we welcome comments. 24 We'll be limited to them to three minutes per person, one person per organization, please. And we will not be 25

responding to comments or questions from public comment,
but we look forward to hearing them. And then finally, also
written comments are welcome and they are due on December
1st. And with that I'll pass it over to Vice Chair Gunda,
who is the lead for the forecast. And then Commissioner
Monahan has also joined us and she's the lead for the 2023
this year. Thanks.

8 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Thank you, Heather. I just 9 want to begin by welcoming everybody that joined the call 10 today to get through the forecasting draft results. Just want to acknowledge the participation of the interagencies 11 12 in what we call the Joint Agency Steering Committee that 13 really brings together CPUC staff, CEC staff and CARB staff 14 on a regular cadence along with CAISO to really think 15 through the modeling improvements and the assumptions that 16 we put in and such. So just want to give a big shout out to 17 the interagency team that supports this work at CEC. And 18 specifically at CEC, I would just like to recognize the 19 distributor generation team, the self-gen team that does 20 the forecasting on the self-gen side. Just a couple of 21 people there, Alex, Mark Palmere, Bobby Wilson and Sudhakar 22 Konala who really work on those areas. And the fantastic 23 job that Alex is doing in taking leadership and 24 implementing this huge number of changes. On the 25 transportation team, most of you who are regular to that,

1 to our work now. Our core team, Aniss Bahreinian, Maggie 2 Deng, Jesse Gag, Liz Pham, Namita Saxena, Elena Giyenko and 3 Farzana Kabir, just want to recognize their work on the 4 transportation side that we'll also hear.

5 MS. RAITT: One of the critical changes this year 6 is around the additional achievable energy efficiency and 7 the additional achievable fuel substitution. We have been making incremental progress on really understanding the 8 9 demand modifiers as it pertains to building electrification 10 and efficiency and really synchronizing with CARB's scoping plan, the state implementation plan and other initiatives 11 12 and policies that the state has. So I really want to 13 highlight the leadership that we have there in Ingrid 14 Neumann, Nick Janusch, Ethan Cooper, Usman Muhammad, 15 Cynthia Rogers, and Brian Samuelson along with Mike Jaske.

So just a big thank you there to all the people. So this year some of the core elements that we're continuing to navigate is how do we protect the system planning in terms of really understanding the variability around not just the weather, but the demand modifiers and the load modifiers that we're going to discuss today.

I made some huge changes in terms of implementing new modeling in terms of the self-gen forecast, but also continuing to pay attention to the liability and affordability. So I think it's kind of a balance that we

1 need to do as a state to plan for high electrification 2 future with ensuring that we're building the right levels 3 for reliability and affordability. So really looking 4 forward to the conversation today. Again, a big thanks to 5 the IEPR team for their work. Big thanks to all the 6 interagency team and participants, the stakeholders who 7 regularly work with the team, with the CEC team on developing the assumptions and modeling. So big thanks all 8 9 around and also to Commissioner Monahan for the CS 10 leadership. With that I'll pass it on to Commissioner 11 Monahan.

12 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Well thanks, Vice Chair 13 Gunda. And I just want to say the one person who didn't get 14 acknowledge in that long list was you for your leadership 15 in terms of really helping the Energy Commission improve 16 our forecast and be proactive in evaluating the impact of 17 regulations that have not yet been passed but are still 18 under development. And I would say in some way 19 transportation was the camel's nose under the 10th in the 20 electrification world, and now we're seeing sort of the 21 same phenomenon play out when it comes to buildings and 22 potentially, eventually industrial applications as well for 23 electrification. So I think it has been - I was appointed, 24 I was thinking about this in terms of my trajectory here at 25 the Energy Commission. So I was appointed by the Governor

in 2019. That was the first year I would say that the
 forecast started to show a future of increasing
 electrification.

4 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And then every year since 5 then, of course, the demand forecast has projected more and 6 more electrification going forward as a key climate 7 strategy. And it's just been really amazing actually to see 8 in my short time here at the Energy Commission, how the 9 work of our forecast has deepened and strengthened.

10 Transportation is the area that I'm tracking most closely, and it has been just really amazing to see how the 11 12 team has deepened our understanding of what transportation 13 electrification is going to need for grid planning. So just 14 looking forward to this workshop. Thanks to Heather for her 15 leadership on all things IEPR and really looking forward to 16 the conversation. Thanks also for switching the agenda. I 17 have to say that I have to leave in the afternoon, so the 18 morning is going to be transportation, which I really 19 appreciate the flexibility on the agenda. And I'll pass it 20 right back to Heather.

MS. RAITT: Thank you, Commissioners.

22 So our first presenter is Quentin Gee. He's the 23 Manager of the Advanced Electrification Analysis Branch. 24 And so he'll be kicking us off. Thank you, Quentin. 25 MR. GEE: Great. Thanks, Heather. Hi, everybody.

21

1 My name's Quentin Gee. I'm the Manager for the Advanced 2 Electrification Analysis Branch and also acting supervisor 3 for the Transportation Energy Forecasting Unit. And maybe 4 before we get started with this, maybe we could go back one 5 slide and we'll stay on this slide for a little bit and 6 I'll provide a little bit of context for the overall load 7 modifier discussion that we're about to have today. And 8 then I'll jump into transportation in a bit.

9 But to start off today, today's the 15th where 10 we're doing the load modifier results workshop today. We 11 will discuss transportation electrification, building 12 electrification and distributed energy resources. And then 13 we will also, in December, that's when we'll discuss the 14 final workshop forecast. That's where we'll go more 15 thoroughly through the hourly results and then also the 16 statewide or CAISO wide, statewide type results and dive 17 deeper into that.

18 But for now, we're going to focus on some of the 19 parts of the forecast that really add a lot of new and 20 interesting effects, have a lot of new and interesting 21 effects on the forecast overall. In January 2024 is when we 2.2 target the forecast adoption. And so we'll be, as Heather 23 mentioned, we'll be accepting comments now and then also 24 accepting comments at that December 6th workshop on the final forecast for integration into the final forecast for 25

1 adoption.

2 For those of you who aren't aware and you you're 3 also interested in some of the forecasting work, we do have 4 what's called a Demand Analysis Working Group or what we 5 call DAWG. That is a working group where we go into more 6 technical detail on some of the work and have more nuanced 7 discussions on some of these issues, diving into the 8 details. So if anyone is interested in that, feel free to 9 reach out to me or contact the IEPR team who can put you in 10 touch with us about getting on that Demand Analysis Working 11 Group list.

12 But overall, the forecast, and we'll discuss this 13 more also in December, but just sort of as a high level on 14 the forecast, this is a foundational document for a 15 foundational set of data that's foundational for procuring 16 and system planning in the State. This is used by the 17 California Public Utilities Commission for Integrated 18 Resource Planning. It's used by the California Independent 19 System Operator for transmission system planning. It's also 20 used by utilities and the CPUC for resource adequacy 21 requirements and utilities use them also for planning and 2.2 so on and so forth. We do this at a 15 plus year system 23 level forecast for electricity and gas demand. It used to 24 be a 10 year forecast, but now we have extended it out to 25 15 and we're going an additional year out this time. And we

report the annual electricity and gas consumption for a
 sense of the overall resource needs.

3 We do what are called 8760 hourly electricity 4 loads where we are assessing the load on the system overall 5 for each hour of each year, primarily focused on that peak 6 hour. We do scenarios for energy efficiency, building 7 electrification, transportation electrification. And we also have what we call 1-in-2, 1-in-5, 1-in-10, and 1-in-20 8 9 year net peak electricity and net peak electricity demands. 10 Sort of evaluating primarily what happens on say a hot summer day, like what's the probability, a 1-in-10 year 11 12 that we are going to peak out a little bit higher than we 13 might expect.

Every two years during odd number years, we do a full refresh of the forecast, which is what we're doing for this year, and then in even number of years we do updates. We don't update all components of the forecast, which gives us opportunities for the team to make some model improvements. So that's the overall kind of take on the forecast for the IEPR.

Next slide. With that, we can jump into the transportation results. I'll present the top line results and also a little bit of information on the light-duty transportation side, and then I'll hand over to the mediumand heavy-duty lead. So next slide.

This is sort of our best practice. We're going to 1 2 use a lot of acronyms, initialisms, et cetera throughout this. I think that there has been, yeah, these slides are 3 4 posted online already, so you can go and download them and 5 if you're worried about an acronym or initialism that you 6 see in these next slides, you can go ahead and just jump to 7 that slide or keep that open if you're not familiar with 8 some of this. But it saves us some language or some 9 character space on the rest of the slides where we'll try 10 to focus more on the data. Next slide. So I'm going to present, yeah, statewide 11 12 electricity for transportation and also some of the light 13 duty results and a little bit on Off-Road as well, which is a new and emerging sector that we're really going to want 14 15 to pay more attention to in future years now that we've

16 covered a lot in developing light-duty and medium- and 17 heavy-duty forecast scenarios. Next slide.

18 So basically transportation is kind of simple. 19 This diagram makes it look simple, that is. It actually is 20 a very complicated set of models that we have a 21 sophisticated set of economic models and other models that 22 really help us understand the transportation energy demand. 23 But sort of roughly speaking, we can say that basically 24 you've got a certain number of vehicles in the population. Those vehicles travel, they drive around the state and 25

1 those vehicles to do that travel, they need a certain 2 amount of fuel to do it, and their fuel economy tells you 3 how much energy you'll need overall. So vehicles, times the 4 amount of travel, times the fuel economy basically gives 5 you the transportation energy consumption. We tend to break 6 it down into light-duty, medium- and heavy-duty, and we are 7 also thinking more about off-road vehicles as well. But 8 yeah, that's the gist of how it works overall and more 9 detail is available in this year's and previous IEPR's and 10 always open for questions as well during this and our 11 Demand Analysis Working Group meetings. Next slide.

Just to give you a little bit of updates to the light-duty models that we had this year. We do have personal vehicles, which are the dominant form of lightduty vehicle ownership out there, people that just own a vehicle and drive it around for their own personal needs.

17 MR. GEE: You have commercial vehicles. The 18 personal vehicles and the commercial vehicles. Those are 19 choice models where we have probabilities of new vehicles 20 or used vehicles being purchased by different entities, 21 either people or households or fleet operators, and they choose based off of desired characteristics that are 2.2 23 informed by our California Vehicle Survey, which we're 24 actually doing an update to in the next couple of years. 25 We also have government, rental cars. They're a

1 little bit different than commercial vehicles, which are 2 more like fleet oriented versus rentals where people just 3 do rental stuff with those. So we have government, rental 4 models.

5 We also have a neighborhood electric vehicles. 6 You can sort of think of golf carts or other small, small 7 vehicles that really don't go on highways or anything like 8 that.

9 So those are the general models that we have for 10 the light-duty forecast. We have the baseline forecast, 11 which is updated with the latest economic forecast from 12 Moody's. We have Department of Finance household forecast. 13 We revise our fuel price forecast. Vehicle ranges, we 14 update those, update the vehicle prices. We have a new 15 approach to updating the incentives. As one might imagine 16 with the recent Inflation Reduction Act that was passed last year, there have been some changes overall to the 17 18 incentive structure. We integrated that in last year, but 19 did make some additional updates based on new announcements 20 that were made earlier this year.

21 We also have the AATE Scenario 3 that's 22 Additional Achievable Transportation Electrification 23 Scenario Three. We didn't do a Scenario 1 and 2 this year, 24 which are defined in different ways. But Scenario 3 really 25 captures the latest and greatest of the light-duty vehicle

regulations. That includes Advanced Clean Cars 2 or ACC 2,
 and also the Clean Miles Standard.

3 The Clean Miles Standard is a regulation on 4 transportation network companies, such as Uber and Lyft. 5 And requires them to, for the vehicles, the vehicle miles traveled of the vehicles for their services have to be 6 7 increasingly electric at an accelerated rate compared to 8 simply what we would expect under the Advanced Clean Cars 2 9 regulation. One little caveat here, I know this is 10 something that can come up and it's a little confusing, but 11 the Class Two B vehicles, this is kind of an interesting 12 little category here that is a little bit strange for 13 analysis, but roughly stated, we count Class Two B - so 14 Class Two B vehicles, these are gross vehicle weight rating 15 of 8,500 to 10,000 pounds. That is the car loaded to its 16 typical recommended maximum capacity. The gross weight of 17 that whole thing is about 8,500 to 10,000 pounds. You can 18 imagine here we've got the little cutouts of what is a Ford 19 E-Transit that has a gross vehicle rate rating of 9,500 and 20 then we have, I think that's a silhouette of a Ford F-250 21 or something like that.

So not quite the standard pickup, but a little bit of more the heavy-duty ones. Those count in our models, those count as light-duty if their gross vehicle weight rating is less than 10,000 pounds, but greater than 8,500

pounds, that is treated by the California Air Resources Board differently, that is treated as a medium-duty vehicle. So it could be counted under the California Air Resources Board Advanced Clean Fleets rule, but it could also count under the Advanced Clean Cars 2 rule.

6 It's a little bit tricky. For our modeling 7 purposes, we found it most efficient to just treat them as 8 light-duty and have them superseded by Advanced Clean Cars 9 2, which is in many ways a stronger regulation in terms of 10 getting more zero emission vehicles on the road. Next 11 slide.

12 So here are the results overall. In the dashed, 13 you can see the last year's ATE 3 Scenario and in the 14 orange you can see this year's scenario. It's a little bit 15 lower.

Then in the blue you can see the baseline forecast. The baseline forecast does not, as we saw in the previous slide, it does not capture Advanced Clean Cars 2. It's kind of like how we might envision zero emission vehicle adoption to occur without that requirement being operative. So pretty similar, although it does look like there's fewer ZEVs overall.

I should note here, I think I mentioned Advanced Clean Cars - excuse me, AATE 2 and 1. You'll notice that the distance or the gap between the baseline and AATE 3 is

1 pretty small, and if you've seen previous year's forecasts 2 that that gap is a little bit bigger. Because these two 3 were so close, it didn't seem like AATE Scenario 1 or AATE 4 Scenario 2 would've been particularly informative because 5 there's just such a close band in between those two. So 6 looking at AATE 3 in the comparison, as I mentioned before, 7 we do have the difference quite a bit of or reasonable difference between AATE 3 for this year and also AATE 3 8 9 from last year, particularly 2035. It looks like there's 10 about a million, a million and a half fewer Zero Emission 11 Vehicles on the road.

12 Each forecast year has different inputs. Things 13 change in the models, but one thing I should point to is on 14 the next slide, we think is probably one of the leading 15 drivers, not just for our results but also for the forecast 16 as a whole. But on the next slide we can see sort of a 17 leading driver in the ZEV difference. The big issue here is 18 that there's just fewer households. Basically, you can see 19 that dash line showing the household forecast going out 20 through 2035, and then you can see this year's it's 21 actually gone down by guite a bit, 800,000 households. So 2.2 that's one of the leading drivers of the reduction in 23 vehicles. There's just fewer households out there that 24 demand vehicles and that builds up over time. Next slide. 25 Sort of zooming out, looking at transportation

overall. Here are the electricity demand results for all of 1 2 transportation. I should clarify here that this is not 3 exactly what goes into the hourly load models. There's a 4 little bit taken out here, but I'll describe that in a 5 second when we break it down. But this is just generally 6 sort of to give the folks here just a broad sense of how 7 much electricity we anticipate to be used for 8 transportation purposes. Pretty close to what we had in the 9 previous year. The leading driver here is that we do have 10 the Clean Miles Standard that has more electric or Zero 11 Emission Vehicle miles traveled. And we also had some 12 additional updates. Maggie will be able to talk about those 13 with the freight forecast, et cetera. But overall pretty 14 close to what we had in the previous year and growing 15 electricity demand quite a bit that we'll need to be 16 planning for, but not a huge change from last year. Next 17 slide.

18 So here's another way of looking at more or less 19 the same thing that we had before. And here of broken it 20 down a little bit in terms of the different components that 21 make it up. So basically broke down the commercial, 2.2 government, rental light-duty, put those in the blue and 23 then in the orange you can see the medium- and heavy-duty 24 freight. In the green we have personal light-duty. You can 25 see that that's the major source of demand for electricity.

1 We also have trail transit, rail and other buses making up 2 a small but noticeable portion. And then, finally, I could 3 draw your attention to this, what we call off road 4 electrification. This is something that's been a part of 5 the forecast, but I will, that is not a part of the load 6 modifiers. So the off-road electrification currently is 7 treated as just sort of a component of the baseline demand that goes into the baseline forecast and is not treated 8 9 differently compared to say the personal - excuse me, the 10 light-duty vehicles or the medium- and heavy-duty vehicles.

And I think it might be worth us taking a closer 11 12 look at that. So on the next slide we can take a look at 13 the breakdown of the off-road electrification. This is an 14 area where we're going to need a lot of development in the 15 future on this. We do have an off-road model and have been 16 using it for several years now. We're pretty happy with it, 17 but overall we do need to really expand some of the areas 18 that we're looking at, update some of the work here, and 19 also integrate some new regulations on this front. But we 20 think we've got a pretty good sense of it right now, but 21 just looking to improve this in the long run.

But we have construction, other off-road equipment, agricultural equipment, shore power. That's basically when a ship docks in harbor that they rather than continuing to use their engines to generate electricity for

1 their needs that they plug in at the port and we'll use 2 electricity there rather than running engines and creating 3 pollution from that.

4 There's also port cargo handling equipment, 5 things like forklifts and sort of pallet lifters or trailer 6 lifters or I can't remember what those things are called at 7 the ports. The container ship, the container lifters, those 8 sorts of equipment. And then also forklifts overall. 9 Electric forklifts are expected to increase as well. 10 There's a lot in use already, but we anticipate even more 11 in the future. We want to get a closer read on these and 12 longer term we are thinking about ways in which we can 13 integrate the forecast results here into other looks or 14 other assessments of different segments of the economy. In 15 particular agriculture and the ports are things that we 16 want to take a closer look at in the future to help inform 17 some of the grid work that's necessary in those areas.

With that, I think we can hand over to the next person. That is Maggie Deng. She is the MDHD forecasting lead. Maggie.

MS. DENG: Hi. Good morning, everyone. So as Quentin mentioned, I'll be presenting on the updates and results for the medium- and heavy-duty component of the IEPR Demand Forecast. Next slide.

25

So just to set the stage with some definitions,

1 here's an overview of all of the different weight classes 2 and general vehicle categories that we define as MDHD for 3 the forecast. Simply put, MDHD for our forecasting purposes 4 is anything from gross vehicle weight rating three up to 5 eight. As Quentin mentioned in his presentation, many of 6 CARB's policies such as Advanced Clean Trucks and Advanced 7 Clean Fleets include Class 2 B, but for our models, Class 2 8 B is considered light-duty and therefore handled by our 9 light-duty models. All of the boxes here in light blue are 10 included in our Freight and Truck Choice Model, which I primarily work on and all of the boxes in white are 11 12 included in our travel choice models, which is led by my 13 colleague Elena Giyenko. For the HD trucks, I wanted to 14 note here we have some classes broken out by application 15 such as delivery trucks and vocational trucks. This is a crucial distinction since the Vehicle Miles Traveled, or 16 17 VMT, and travel patterns of these MDHD trucks will vary 18 greatly depending on their application. Just as an example, 19 a class eight tractor trailer combination truck that 20 operates only within California will typically have a lower 21 annual VMT than a tractor trailer truck that's registered 2.2 to travel for interstate.

MS. DENG: Finally, on the rightmost column we also have different types of buses broken out with some falling under what's called the urban under city model and

the rest being included in the other bus. 1 2 Can you all still hear me clearly? Not sure if there is an audio issue. 3 4 MS. RAITT: Yeah, Maggie. This is Heather. We can 5 still hear you but you did get quieter, so I'm not sure if you can just maybe speak up a little bit. That'd be great. 6 7 Sorry, is this better? MS. DENG: 8 MS. RAITT: That's better. Yep. There we go. 9 MS. DENG: That's better. Okay, great. Thank you 10 so much for pointing that out. Okay, next slide. Alright, so here's a quick summary of major 11 12 updates to our MDHD models starting with the baseline 13 forecast in the middle column. I won't read off every 14 bullet point here, but generally speaking for all of our 15 MDHD models, we incorporated the latest economic forecast 16 from Moody's Analytics, updated key inputs such as fuel 17 prices and truck prices and calibrated to historical fuel 18 consumption. For AATE Scenario 3 on the right hand side 19 here, no changes to baseline forecast were made for buses, 20 which again are modeled under our other bus in urban inter 21 city models. However, for the freight and truck choice 22 model shown here in the top right. This year's AATE 3 23 includes the recently formaly adopted CARB ACF ZEV 24 requirements and, most importantly, for the first time this 25 year, we've incorporated a cutoff of internal combustion

engine vehicles beginning in 2036 in order to reflect the
 manufacturer ZEV sales mandate under ACF. I'll talk a
 little bit more about that later. Next slide, please.

4 Here we provided more so as a reference for you 5 all, a summary of policies, programs, incentives, and 6 regulations for MDHD vehicles that we include in our 7 models. For our baseline forecast, I wanted to note that we do model Advanced Clean Trucks as part of our baseline. We 8 9 include the Inflation Reduction Act, Commercial Clean 10 Vehicle Tax Credit, as well as the HVIP incentives. And on 11 buses, we have Innovative Clean Transit California electric 12 school bus program as well as we are modeling some recent 13 regulations for commercial harbor craft and California's 14 in-use locomotives. Again for AATE 3 we're adding on in 15 addition to what's already included in baseline forecast. 16 The key addition here is Advanced Clean Fleets with the 17 fleet ZEV requirements and then again that a hundred 18 percent ZEV sales requirement beginning in 2036. Next 19 slide.

So now here's our first look at results for this year's IEPR. This line graph is showing total MDHD ZEV stock, so this is a sum of both MDHD trucks and buses for both battery electric and hydrogen fuel types. The baseline forecast is represented here in blue as the lowest line on the graph. This year's AATE 3 in orange at the top and last

year's AATE 3 in the green dash line. As you can see this year's AATE 3 ZEV stock generally follows the same growth trend as last year with minor differences here I would attribute to the updated economic forecast being used. In 2040, there are a little over 735,000 MDHD ZEVs for AATE 3 and for baseline there are about 455,000 ZEVs in 2040. Next slide.

Now let's take a closer look at just Zero 8 9 Emission MDHD trucks for our AATE Scenario 3. On this bar 10 graph, I've broken out the zero-emission freight truck stock. Again, for AATE 3 into the fuel types with electric 11 12 stock in blue and the orange being hydrogen stock. So 13 starting in 2036 ACF ZEV sales mandate for manufacturers 14 kicks in, meaning that new ICE trucks are no longer 15 available in our truck choice model. In other words, 16 electric and hydrogen compete directly with each other for 17 market shares beginning in 2036. This results in about 18 10,000 hydrogen trucks in 2036, growing to about 65,000 19 hydrogen trucks in 2040. That means in 2040 hydrogen is 20 about 6 percent of all freight trucks and about 9 percent 21 within ZEVs. Next slide.

So before I move on to further results, I wanted to highlight some key points regarding hydrogen trucks in this year's AATE 3. As I mentioned, the higher level of hydrogen truck proliferation for this year's AATE 3 is a

1 direct result of our implementation of ACF's a hundred 2 percent MDHD ZEV sales requirement. When battery electric vehicles and fuel cell electric vehicles become the only 3 4 options in the truck choice model from 2036 onwards, that 5 allows FCEVs to enter the population, particularly for our 6 heavy duty long haul truck classes. Additionally, this 7 year's fuel price forecast was updated to reflect recent 8 spikes in hydrogen price for the earlier years of the 9 forecast.

10 It's also important to note that currently based 11 on staff and previous consultant market research, our 12 freight model has FCEVs as a fuel type for only class six 13 and long haul class eight trucks. We're keeping an eye on 14 FCEV market developments and welcome feedback for future 15 modeling.

Lastly, the model currently assumes that hydrogen fuel infrastructure will be available, when FCEVs are commercially available, but, of course, this is something that we're going to keep our eye on for future modeling as well. Next slide.

So returning to our results here, I provided another bar graph looking at AATE trucks only, but this time with the breakdown of ICE trucks in blue versus the zero-emission trucks in orange. In 2030, there are about 168,000 ZEVs and they grow pretty rapidly in the 2030s,

1 arriving to about 708,000 zero-emission trucks in 2040. Or, 2 in other words, about a 70 percent zero-emission share of 3 total truck stock in 2040. And, as was the case last year, 4 our ZEV population here should be pretty close to CARB's 5 projections of ZEVs under both ACT and ACF. Next slide.

6 Alright, one final bar graph here. We're taking a 7 look at AATE 3 stock again, but this time it's total MDHD, 8 meaning it's trucks and buses together here. As you can see 9 with MDHD trucks in blue and buses in orange, the majority 10 of our forecast of the state's MDHD stock are trucks, with about 643,000 electric MDHD trucks and about 23,000 11 12 electric buses in 2040. Next, we'll take a look at the fuel 13 consumption resulting from these MDHD electric vehicles. 14 Next slide.

15 So I'll conclude here with a line graph showing 16 the electricity demand or fuel consumption resulting from 17 the electric MDHD stock that we just saw. The trends here 18 look very similar to the line graph that I had at the start 19 of my presentation of total MDHD ZEVs shown in blue. The 20 lower line here are the gigawatt hours resulting from the 21 baseline forecast with the little over 10,000 gigawatt 2.2 hours in 2040. Shown here in orange again, AATE 3 23 electricity demand follows closely with last year's AATE 3 24 results. The growth of electricity demand in AATE 3 results 25 accelerates in the later years of the forecast, arriving at

1 about 19,000 gigawatt hours in 2040 for all MDHD and AATE 2 3. That concludes my overview of updates and results for 3 MDHD in this year's IEPR. I look forward to any questions 4 and comments, but I'll pass it off to my colleagues Liz 5 Pham for load shapes and regional energy allocation.

6 MS. PHAM: Hello, everyone. My name's Liz Pham. 7 I'll be going over the regional energy allocation and load 8 share. Next slide, please.

9 MS. PHAM: So what Quentin and Maggie just 10 presented are the statewide energy consumption. What I do 11 for the regional energy allocation is I further break down 12 the statewide to forecast zones. We have 20 forecast zones, 13 but we only focus on 15, which we then aggregate up to the 14 five planning area.

MS. PHAM: as or what I like to call utilities. So PG&E is forecast zone one through six, SCE is seven through 11, SDG&E is 12, SMUD is 13, and LADWP is 16 and 17. And then the other forecast zones that are shaded in black, those are the other utilities. I also linked an arcGIS map of the forecast zone if people want to explore. MS. PHAM: So essentially for the regional energy

22 allocation, I'm answering the question where are people
23 consuming energy at the forecast zone level and how much?
24 Next slide, please.

25

MS. PHAM: In terms of energy allocation, Maggie

1 does the medium- and heavy-duty and I do the light-duty 2 vehicles. So for this I'll just be going over the light 3 duty vehicle. I actually wanted to go over the inputs first 4 before the methodology. Here, I wanted to just point out 5 the differences in the inputs compared to last year. Our model uses vehicle miles traveled from EMFAC 2021 and this 6 7 was updated to the newest version. For DMV registration, 8 last year we used 2021 vehicle population. This year we're 9 using 2022 vehicle population. And, in terms of economic 10 demographics, we used the updated household and income 11 forecast that was produced by the CEC. For the methodology, 12 I quickly want to go over how the regional model works. The 13 gist of it is that it uses DMV registration data to 14 determine where energy is consumed at the forecast zone 15 level. So we do assume that where someone registered their 16 vehicle is also where the vehicle was charged.

17 MS. PHAM: So this would be mostly home and in-18 city charging and this is something important to note 19 because - next slide, please - for improvements because we 20 use DMV registration data to determine where energy is 21 consumed, this caused the allocation to be heavily focused 2.2 on city. So last year when we presented the regional 23 allocation, stakeholders commented that CEC should consider 24 charging along highways or enroute charging. So that's 25 exactly what we did this year. We considered allocating

1 based enroute charging. According to the National Renewable 2 Energy Laboratory EV modeling work known, as EV road trips, 3 about 10 to 12 percent of the VMT constitutes what they 4 define as a road trip likely to need DCFC charging. 5 Therefore, we took 12.5 percent of the statewide energy 6 consumption and allocated using highway traffic data and 7 population density. We will continue to monitor road trip 8 modeling efforts to improve this allocation process, but 9 essentially how this works is we look at major highways in 10 California and where there are more highway traffic but less population density, those areas get more of the 12.5 11 12 percent.

MS. PHAM: 13 Whereas for high traffic areas, with high population density, so highways going through cities, 14 15 those areas get less up to 12.5 percent. Again, our 16 regional allocation was heavily skewed towards cities and 17 city charging. So now by doing this, it allowed us to shift 18 load from cities to highways in more rural areas that would 19 be used for enroute charging. For assumptions, we are 20 assuming that 12.5 percent of the statewide will be due to 21 enroute charging and this percentage will stay the same 22 throughout the forecast year. It's possible that this 23 percentage could increase in the future due to various 24 reasons like autonomous vehicles, but for now we don't have 25 much data so we just kept it simple and kept it constant.

MS. PHAM: Another assumption is for DMV, we do assume that people are charging or using their vehicles where they're are registered. So there could be instances where people are registered in one city but they're using their vehicles in a different city. Next slide, please.

6 MS. PHAM: Okay, so for results. Here we are 7 looking at energy consumption for light-duty plugin electric vehicles for each of the utilities. This slide, I 8 9 wanted to compare what it would look like with and without 10 enroute charging. In the orange column to the right, this is where the energy consumption would have been in 2040 11 12 without enroute charging. So this is mainly city charging 13 in the blue to the left of that is the result with enroute 14 recharging. So this essentially decreased the energy 15 consumption for LADWP, SCE and SDG&E and reallocated to 16 more rural forecast zones which affected PG&E, SMUD and the 17 other smaller utilities. So with this improvement for 18 LADWP, energy consumption decreased about 300 gigawatt 19 hours. PG&E increased about 800 gigawatt hours. SCE 20 decreased about 900. SDG&E decreased about 300. SMUD 21 increased about eight and the other utilities increased 2.2 about 700 gigawatt hours. Next slide, please. 23 MS. PHAM: Now we are moving on to the EV load

24 model, which produces our load profiles. So for the 25 regional allocation we wanted to know where people are

1 consuming energy. Now for the load profiles, we want to 2 know when people are consuming energy and how much. For 3 anyone who's not familiar with 8760, this is essentially 4 how many hours there are in a year. So 24 hours in a day, 5 times 365 days equals 8760 hours in a year. Next slide.

MS. PHAM: For the EV load model, just a reminder of how it works. It essentially takes our base load shapes that we got from ChargePoint and Lawrence Berkeley National Lab and this shifts the load according to TOU rates, elasticity factor, so this is how responsive customers are to TOU rates and TOU participation, so this is the percentage of customers that are on TOU rates.

MS. PHAM: For the inputs, again, I just want to go over what is different compared to last year.

15 MS. PHAM: For TOU rates, every year I update the 16 TOU rates for each of the utilities. I generally use EV 17 specific TOU rates, but if utilities does not have EV 18 specific TOU rates, then I would use the regular TOU rates. 19 And then usually there's an EV credit or EV discount that 20 can be applied to certain hours. So that's generally true 21 for SMUD and LADWP and those are updated as of September 2.2 2023.

MS. PHAM: For load shape, the LDV, the lightduty vehicle uses 2017 ChargePoint data and the medium- and heavy-duty uses load shape that we got from Lawrence

Berkeley National Lab and those stayed the same as last
 year. Elasticity factor and TOU participation that these
 both stayed the same as last year as well. Next slide,
 please.

5 MS. PHAM: In terms of improvements this year we 6 added seasonality. To do that, we used quarterly averages 7 of monthly gasoline and diesel sales tax from the 8 California Department of Tax and Fees Administration.

9 MS. PHAM: Here we have index charts of the 10 gasoline and diesel sales that we are assuming is 11 indicative of energy consumption. On the left side is an 12 index chart for gasoline sales tax that we're assuming will 13 inform light-duty energy consumption and on the right is a 14 index chart of the diesel sales tax that we're assuming 15 will inform medium- and heavy-duty energy consumption. So both have similar distributions. You'll see lower energy 16 17 consumption in the winter month. So month one, two and 18 three, which is January, February, March. And then more 19 energy consumption in the summer months, so months seven, 20 eight, and nine, which is July, August and September. So 21 essentially adding seasonality will shift more load to the 2.2 summer months from the winter months. Next slide, please. 23 MS. PHAM: Assumptions again, we are assuming 24 gasoline sales tax informs light-duty seasonal electricity

25 demand and diesel sales informed medium- and heavy-duty.

1 Other assumptions to be aware of our load shapes,

2 elasticity factor, TOU participation. They're all the same 3 in all forecast zones. So we recognize that there could be 4 regional differences for these inputs. We just don't have 5 enough data to better inform them.

MS. PHAM: We are hoping to improve these inputs using AMI data or Advanced Metering Infrastructure data, but that is still to be determined if it's actually possible.

MS. PHAM: Another assumption is that TOU rates are assumed to stay the same throughout the forecast. So we don't actually know what the TOU rates will be in 2030. Next slide, please.

14 MS. PHAM: Okay, so for results I wanted to 15 compare what it would look like with seasonality and without seasonality. Here we're looking at a load profile 16 17 from 2035, a weekday in September for the CAISO system for 18 the light-duty vehicles. So the CAISO system is essentially 19 PG&E, SCE and SDG&E added together. In the blue is what the 20 profile would look like without seasonality, and the orange 21 line is with seasonality. Adding seasonality resulted in 2.2 about a 7 percent overall increase for September in 2035. 23 Next slide, please.

24 MS. PHAM: And for this slide we are comparing 25 the load profile for medium-heavy duty. Again, we're

1 looking at 2035 a weekday in September for the CAISO
2 system. Blue line is without seasonality, orange line is
3 with seasonality. For medium and heavy-duty vehicles,
4 adding seasonality resulted in about a 9 percent increase
5 in the overall load in September. Next slide, please.

6 MS. PHAM: Here is the overall load profile for 7 both light-duty and medium and heavy duty for the CAISO system. Again, we're looking at results for 2035 a weekday 8 9 in September. As you can see, there's a lot of nighttime 10 charging peaking around midnight through 1:00 a.m. and the 11 load dipped around early morning around 5:00 to 6:00 a.m. 12 and then peaks again around 7:00 to 11:00 a.m. and then 13 load decreases during peak hours from 4:00 to 9:00 p.m. 14 when TOU rates are more expensive.

MS. PHAM: In general, the overall shape of the load did not change much from last year. Adding seasonality enroute charging mainly affected the magnitude of the profile. Next slide, please.

MS. PHAM: So this concludes our presentation.Thank you very much. Heather, I'll hand it back to you.

21 MS. RAITT: Thank you, Liz, and Quentin and 22 Maggie.

So now is an opportunity if Commissioner Gunda or Commissioner Patty Monahan would like to have any questions of our presenters.

1 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Well first of all, thanks 2 Maggie, Liz, Quentin, that was really great. And, like I 3 said, it's just been very - to be part of this or at least 4 to see it happening in front of me, it's just really 5 amazing to see how much deeper, more sophisticated the 6 analysis has become with time.

7 And I'm wondering, COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: 8 Quentin, I'm going to put you on the spot just to talk 9 about this intersection with our AB 2127 report, which 10 highlights the charger needs in 2030 and 2035, and has an intersection - growing intersection with the IEPR. I wonder 11 12 if you could just talk about it so that others can 13 understand how these analytical products dovetail and don't. 14

MR. GEE: Yeah, great. Thanks, Patty. Really happy to talk about that.

17 For folks that aren't familiar with the way that CEC is - sort of broken down with the different work 18 19 products, the IEPR forecast is done by the Energy 20 Assessments Division that is a different division than the 21 Fuels and Transportation Division, which is tasked with the 2.2 Assembly Bill 2127 EV Charging Report. And, as two 23 different divisions, two different approaches. We have done 24 a pretty good job, I think, over the years of being in 25 alignment in discussion with each other in consultation

with each other. I think that for our work on system
planning or that informs system planning, we've been really
sensitive to things like TOU rates and behavior around
that. I think Fuels and Transportation Division has been,
and the 2127 report has been really interested in learning
more about how to assess funding for priorities, charging
priorities, those sorts of things.

8 MR. GEE: I think - so one thing I should say, 9 where we do align, I think generally speaking we align, if 10 you look at our load shapes, they're pretty consistent but they're not perfectly aligned and we're not using them 11 12 directly. I should point out for the medium and heavy-duty 13 loads - load shapes, what we do is we took an older version 14 of the 2127 Reports, HEVI-Load model shapes, and we use 15 those in the load model that we have that kind of pushes 16 load down a little bit during the peak hours of say 5:00 to 17 8:00 p.m. or so. That's when we expect peak hours to 18 usually be when we're looking at system peak or peak within 19 a given utility area. And so I wouldn't say that there's a 20 huge, once we push down the rate, once we push down the 21 demand a little bit, it's not like it's cut in half or 2.2 something like that.

I don't even think it is reduced more than 30 percent at that point in time for medium and heavy-duty loads. There was an update that I think the latest 2127

1 report did incorporate, which was new load shapes that were 2 more county, geographically sensitive and load shapes that 3 had a slightly different pattern than what we would've 4 expected or than what we had previously.

5 We got those load shapes a little bit late in the 6 cycle and we weren't able to integrate them and fully sort 7 of vet how we were going to approach it. But we're looking forward to continually working together with the HEVI-Load 8 9 team to really integrate those load shapes. I think long-10 term, our goal throughout this next year is really to what 11 the HEVI-Load shapes are will be what our medium and heavy-12 duty load shapes are. Like the HEVI-Load model that FTD and 13 AB 20, that will be our medium and heavy duty load model 14 results as well.

We still need a lot of coordination there. We need to make sure that we're thinking through Time Of Use rates in the same way to where we're in good alignment there, but we're hopeful that we'll be able to make a lot of progress in aligning it and maybe making them identical.

20 On the light-duty side it's a little bit 21 different. There are differences. I think the 2127 report I 22 think does explore a lot in terms of potential differences 23 based on maybe like scenario results. What do we expect if 24 there's a lot of direct current fast charging going on? I 25 think there's a gas station model type scenario that is

1 discussed and we're I think trying to be a little bit more 2 conservative in our approach and not wanting to pull too 3 much or to use a scenario that is using that much kind of 4 daytime peaking. If you look at the load - I mean the load 5 shapes that Liz just presented, there is a lot of load 6 happening during the day for EV charging and it does dip a 7 little bit, but we want to be careful not to make it dip 8 too much or not to use assumptions that will say that it is 9 going to dip too much.

10 I would say in the long term our hope is to use advanced metering infrastructure data to know well how are 11 12 people charging today? What is their actual behavior? And 13 that could be useful I think to inform the AB 2127 work and 14 our own work because right now we are using sort of pre-15 time of use rate, sort of big picture charging data and 16 sort of modifying that on the basis of Time Of Use rates 17 based on economic studies that have been out there. But 18 actual data of how people like every meter or lots of 19 meters in the state would be much more helpful to see how 20 are people actually behaving. Because there's a lot of 21 dynamics that can occur around that. But I think maybe I'm 2.2 saying it more than necessary at this point.

COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: That was great, Quentin. I do think the more we can get real data, real world data and the more we can integrate, as you know, what's happening in

the fuels and transportation division, what's - what's happening in EAD and have just build off each other because this is a period of learning. We don't have all the answers and we're just trying to do the best analysis possible with the information that we have. So it's always going to get better, it's always going to be more refined.

7 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And I would say just to 8 comment and maybe I'm not sure Liz or Maggie actually maybe 9 want to comment on this, but in terms of projecting fuel 10 cells and hydrogen demand going forward. As we move to an all ZEV future for medium and heavy duty hydrogen prices 11 12 really figure very prominently, right, in the choice of 13 what vehicle is going to emerge from our vehicle choice 14 modeling. I wonder if you can just talk a little bit about 15 that aspect of our modeling.

16 Sure, yeah, I'll chime in here. So for MS. DENG: 17 our freight and truck choice model, it is true that the 18 final field types in our stock results is very sensitive to 19 fuel price as an input. I think that on the light-duty side 20 it's a little bit less sensitive to fuel price. They have 21 other inputs informing the market shares there. But for 22 freight and truck choice, definitely. I think that's why in 23 previous IEPR results hydrogen trucks were quite low and 24 that's due to high FSSAT truck prices and also higher fuel 25 prices. And also that's why I was highlighting in my

presentation that hydrogen only really begins to
proliferate once that ICE cutoff occurs. In this case in
earlier forecast years prior to that 2036 ACSF mandate,
when hydrogen is competing against all the other fuel
types, the cost of ownership in terms of the truck price
delivered truck price and the fuel price make it a little
less competitive in our truck choice model.

8 And so I think that speaks to how hydrogen fuel 9 price, especially, will I think be a key factor in whether 10 FZEVs, how much FZEVs will be part of the ZEV transition. 11 And I do also I guess want to highlight that I think our 12 model supports what I think a lot of research is saying, 13 which is that FZEV is more - or hydrogen as a fuel type is 14 more suitable for long haul trucking where they might have 15 constraints with charging time, fueling time, et cetera. 16 And I think that our model supports that because even 17 within the FZEVs that do proliferate, they're primarily in 18 those class eight long haul applications

19 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And there is an 20 intersection here with the hydrogen hub that California was 21 just designated a hub federally. And the goal of that is to 22 produce clean hydrogen at scale and to cut prices. So if 23 actually we're successful, that will have an impact in 24 terms of our modeling of hydrogen fuel prices and the 25 uptake of fuel cell vehicles.

1

MS. DENG: Yes, absolutely.

2 MR. GEE: Thank you. Thanks Commissioner Monahan. 3 Also, to add on to what Maggie said, yeah, I think the 4 hydrogen hub is a critical component that we want to take a 5 close look at and see how things evolve.

And I think what also is great about the hydrogen hub is it's not just in California, it's all over. I think as Maggie kind of alluded to that our fuel models at this point really just do kind of assume that the fuel is easy to access. You're 30 miles away at any time from a station on the highway, it's just a quick mile, a quick drive or in town it's just down the corner.

That assumption doesn't necessarily hold at this time for things like hydrogen. It also kind of doesn't hold for DCFC like for long haul trucking certainly doesn't. So we want to pay close attention to those factors as they evolve.

18 But I think the hydrogen hub, having different 19 ones scattered throughout I think is going to be something 20 really critical for us to think about and make sure that we 21 have good data inputs going into there. And our hydrogen 2.2 forecast, we do want to update the hydrogen forecast. We did a slight update this year compared to last year's 23 24 results in light of some of the increases in price that 25 we've seen. But longer term that the prices tend to come

down and stabilize in the forecast and we're hoping that they can come down further or they certainly will not stay as high as they are now because that's going to be critical to seeing the adoption that the choice models are currently saying.

6 On light-duty, the hydrogen, the vehicles don't 7 seem to be really taking up a lot of the vehicle adoption 8 there. They represent less than 1 percent of all zero-9 emission vehicle sales. So the continuing, they're not 10 going down to half a percent or a third of a percent or 11 something like that, but still not able to see any 12 sustained growth in penetration at that point.

13 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Vice chair, I don't want 14 to take up all the airspace. Did you have a question? 15 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I do have a couple 16 questions, if you're good with it. But I also want to make 17 sure you have time to discuss all the questions you have. 18 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I have one more, but I 19 want you to ask questions and then we'll see if there's 20 time.

21 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Okay, awesome. So I think I 22 just want to begin by just extending my gratitude to you, 23 Quentin, Maggie, and Liz. I really, as Commissioner Monahan 24 said it, the evolution of the forecast and the more rigor 25 and not just trigger the clarity and accessibility of the

forecast has improved so much over the last few years. I'm 1 2 just really grateful for your continued work and all the 3 staff on making it more and more accessible and rigorous 4 and really bridging the gap between a pure planning work 5 and policy work, right? And how are we trying to both 6 incorporate policy uncertainty into the planning but also 7 using the models to help shape the policy. And I think that's where EAD sits and the Energy Assessment Division 8 9 sits and CEC sits. So I just am incredibly grateful for 10 your continued work on this.

11 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: A couple of formatting 12 comments, just wanted to say. I love what's happening again 13 with accessibility and all. Quentin, it has been raised 14 over the last several years of just having the historical 15 data as a part of the charts along with the forecast.

16 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So just as a way to show the 17 shape because people don't really see it, especially new 18 people. So if you could just make sure we kind of develop 19 that as a standard process. And also where does it start 20 becoming a forecast along the right? Because some of our 21 assumptions are a couple years old or last summer, whatever 22 right. So just want to make sure that you really put that 23 so people understand how those things are changing. Really 24 appreciative of the seasonality model. I think that's a 25 really helpful thing.

1 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So I want to first go to 2 slide number - sorry, I'm almost there. Okay, slide number 3 30, 31 and 32. Just kind of wanted to make sure that I 4 uplift the importance of this work in terms of, I think the 5 shapes are broadly the same. Liz, I think you mentioned, 6 the shapes are the same, but the magnitude slightly 7 shifted.

8 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Putting on the reliability 9 lens even a hundred megawatts during evening periods is 10 scary to me. So just wanted to, especially in the summer, if we go back to 30, and just one more slide up to 30, we 11 12 are beginning to see that, I think it's probably 3 - 400 13 megawatts. And then the next one is 3 - 400 megawatts. Just 14 want us to uplift those numbers in the planning, especially 15 as it goes to the RA and IRP. Let's just make sure we 16 really are paying attention to those because that really 17 changes the resource mix.

18 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So along those lines, I like 19 the idea of us using the gasoline and diesel sales as a 20 proxy. And when we look at the quarters, right. Our current 21 struggle on the Elk city planning kind of matches along the 22 7, 8, 9 months. Could you just explain to me how different 23 the 6th month and the 10th month are, because those are 24 uncertainties in demand electricity planning.

25

COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So are you seeing kind of -

1 Liz, is anything you can comment on, is it kind of volatile 2 or it's really well packed those months? Six and 10, 3 especially the shorter months is what I'm thinking. 4 MS. PHAM: Yeah, I'm not quite sure if I have a 5 good answer for that. Quentin. 6 MR. GEE: I think maybe we could go to some 7 different slides that might be helpful for us to maybe, I think it's backwards. A couple slides. 8 9 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: 28 I think is the one here. 10 MR. GEE: Yeah, there we go. Thank you. Thank 11 you. 12 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So Quentin, I think what I'm 13 thinking is right on the electricity, especially when we focus on reliability, we are focusing six to 10. Obviously 14 15 7, 8, 9 is really important. That's the most important. 16 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I'm just wondering how the 17 six and 10 as shoulder months, how different are they? Do 18 they closely match with 7, 8, 9 or are five and four, 19 right? For example? 20 MR. GEE: We could take a closer look at that. I 21 mean yeah, we took the averages. There are some surprising 2.2 dips in months. 2.3 So here what we're looking at is the quarterly 24 basis. I think as Liz pointed out before we took the 25 average of these months because the data is monthly, but

1 there is a little bit of noise in the data and we're not 2 sure what's driving it, but there's appear to be some 3 pretty clear dips in some months and we didn't want that to 4 just make it too scattered.

5 I would say that I think, yeah, we'd have to look 6 at the monthly inputs there, but I believe that six for 7 light-duty is a little bit closer to July's level, but 8 maybe not so much October's level. I think October is going 9 down, you can see October on the light-duty going down a 10 little bit. I think that's a well-established pattern, but 11 I think that that six is a little bit higher and maybe six 12 being high and I think April in particular dips a lot in 13 light-duty. So they are canceling each other out to a 14 certain degree. Yeah -

15 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: At this point, it might 16 still be, it's still in the kind of hundreds, right. I 17 think we're okay, but as the population goes up, I think 18 those shoulder months are of interest for us to kind of dig 19 into a little bit more.

20

MR. GEE: Okay.

21 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So I just want to flag that 22 as kind of an opportunity for us to dig into the second 23 piece. I wanted to just make sure, I think it goes to 24 Commissioner Monahan's comment on the hydrogen. I think 25 hydrogen is an interesting issue in terms of policy.

1 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So we can the hydrogen hub, 2 as I think Quentin knew, what I heard from you is it's also 3 kind of a more national policy and that might drive some of 4 what happens in terms of interstate transport and stuff. So 5 just wanted to see if we can run some policy sensitivities 6 that we could use to understand. I think there's a planning 7 component and I definitely like the way we are doing the planning, completely supportive of that. But could be run a 8 9 couple of sensitivities on the price of hydrogen because as 10 you go towards 2030 timeframes where I'm kind of beginning to struggle is we kind of caught off guard in terms of long 11 12 lead time resources on the electricity planning, right? 13 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Whether it's substation 14 upgrades or distribution upgrades, whether it's 15 interconnection challenges. We have to plan solid 5, 6, 7 16 years ahead of time and having those insights on what could 17 happen based on different sensitivities of prices might be 18 really helpful for us to think through some of the 19 elements. So just wanted to frame that. Happy to hear any 20 comments you might have immediately. 21 Thanks, Vice Chair. I think that we are MR. GEE: 22 to a certain degree doing some of those sensitivities in

23 Senate Bill 1075. That is not a part of the forecast but it 24 is related to the forecast work and we did do some high 25 hydrogen scenarios where we reduced the price of fuel cell

1 electric trucks and we reduced the price of hydrogen. And 2 in those results, Maggie actually was able to show that we 3 do see higher adoption in the case of class eight trucks. 4 There are some other issues that I think we're a little bit 5 - with developing those scenarios under 1075 it was a 6 little bit more just assuming just additional penetration 7 consistent or otherwise informed by what we've seen at the 8 Air Resources Board and the scoping plan work that they've 9 done. But, yeah, I think those - and then also the demand 10 scenarios work that we are going to be doing, which is a 11 follow on to this. We will also have some high hydrogen 12 scenarios as well. Those will be informed I think by this 13 1075 work that we've already done.

MR. GEE: Was there something in addition to that that you were thinking of or -

16 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Yeah, thank you for putting 17 on the record of the 1075 work and then the importance of 18 that. I see the 1075 similar to the scoping plan and other 19 elements, which is giving you an opportunity to think about 20 some sensitivities and then the next question is which of 21 those sensitivities might we want to leverage for the 22 planning itself?

COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So I think that kind of conversation is what I'm thinking about is how do we even set up that conversation given the long lead time impacts

on some of the planning issues. But I'm glad that you 1 2 raised the 1075 because that's exactly where my brain was 3 is how do you take the 1075 work and how do you implement 4 into a planning regime that allows for enough time to 5 actually plan and it doesn't just suddenly show up. And how 6 do we capture that into a planning regime is where I'm 7 going with that. So the last maybe comment but -8 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Can I add a question onto 9 that, Vice Chief? 10 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Yeah, absolutely. 11 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I mean the hydrogen 12 chapter of the IEPR does have this scenario and it 13 highlights here's if hydrogen prices drop, here's the 14 implications. Of course more hydrogen but also more 15 electricity to generate that hydrogen and thinking through, 16 I mean this also applies to the grid, about what's the 17 electricity implications and we have to make some 18 assumptions about how much of that hydrogen is being 19 produced here versus other places here in California. But 20 it is an interesting idea to think more about should their 21 in the demand forecast be this kind of low hydrogen price scenario. What it means if all the, it would kind of be, I 2.2 23 don't know it would be the high electricity case. It's 24 unlikely that all the hydrogen is going to be produced here 25 in the state of California. And we're kind of pushing the

boundaries about what we think. If the price of hydrogen got down to \$5 a kilogram, what does that mean? And it's kind of transformational I would say on the transportation side, but how that gets integrated with the demand forecast, whether there should be this kind of extreme case. I'd be curious about what your thoughts vice chair, does that make sense?

COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Yeah. Commissioner Monahan, 8 9 I'm just kind of thinking through this in the discussion of 10 some of the comments we heard around the three pillars. Or some of the conversations we've heard in SB 100 and the 11 12 change of regime in SB 100 too because SB 100 in the 13 previous discussions just assumed it's going to be all the 14 green hydrogen produced in California is going to come from 15 onsite generation.

16 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: And, to your point, this 17 could have incredible implications on good reliability and 18 even having the necessary systems in place for wires. So I 19 kind of lean towards safequarding our work to include those 20 impacts sooner than later, even if they're marginal. And if 21 we feel uncomfortable because we don't really - there's too 2.2 many uncertainties at least putting that as a part of 23 forecast to say here's kind of - I think to Commissioner 24 Monahan's point, what you might lose in electric charging 25 of the trucks will still be impacting on hydrogen

1 production.

2 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I mean in the end you might 3 actually have the same demand, not that. So if I'm hearing 4 Commissioner Monahan's perspective, too, I think we are in 5 alignment to think about at a minimum how are we going to 6 have this conversation on an ongoing basis, at a minimum. 7 And when is the right time to incorporate those elements 8 into the grid planning.

9 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Two, I mean a likely 10 slightly higher level, is there a minimum amount we can begin to bake in on the grid impacts? That seems 11 12 reasonable. That doesn't push us over because we have to 13 think about the rate impacts and the feasibility of 14 actually building, but I just wanted to put that on the 15 team. You know, by the time we adopt this, having something 16 along those lines would be helpful. A tier system of 17 approach.

18 Mr GEE: Yeah, I definitely agree both points. 19 Commissioner Monahan and Vice Chair. Yeah, I think as 20 Commissioner Monahan pointed out, the truly high 21 electrification case will be the high hydrogen case if 2.2 we're going to produce hydrogen from electrolysis, which 23 seems to be the only scalable - I don't want to speculate 24 too much, but it appears to be one of the only scalable 25 approaches to getting hydrogen at those levels. I think

1 there are some interesting questions.

2 So right now we just evaluate the hydrogen 3 demand. We're not really thinking about where or the fuel 4 demand actually we don't - in our work here, at least, work 5 on these other issues about fuel demand, gasoline demand, 6 those kinds of things. We don't really think a lot about 7 the supply issues around supply of - at least for our forecasting work, we don't think about where does the 8 9 gasoline come from, where does the electricity come from? 10 We just kind of say we need this many gallons need this many kilowatt hours. And so similarly we say we 11 12 would need or we expect to be demand that there's this much 13 demand for hydrogen kilogram, kilograms of hydrogen. 14 I think probably what we would want to do, and 15 need to talk more with the rest of the demand forecasters, is where would this come into play? It might come into play 16 17 at the industrial level, but there's also some important 18 questions about what's going to be the cheapest approach to 19 generating hydrogen because your levelized cost of hydrogen 20 could be quite low if you go completely offsite, you build 21 your little solar location. It's not tied to the grid and 22 you run your electrolyzers there because you don't have to 23 worry about transmission distribution costs or other -24 you're kind of vertically integrating your production 25 process there. So that might be one pathway.

The other pathway is to tie yourself into the 1 2 grid, maybe try to generate it on site or those sorts of 3 things. Definitely a lot of questions to get at there and 4 we're not really sure where the market's headed. I mean the 5 hydrogen hub I think is going to be really helpful for us 6 to learn about where we would be going. But yeah, we're 7 going to continue to have those conversations throughout. 8 Or begin the conversations I think in deeper, at a deeper 9 level and continue to monitor where we're headed in the 10 market with that. Because hydrogen's a particularly useful 11 point because it then becomes a source of demand and is an 12 issue, of electricity demand. So we do need to really think 13 that through. Might be something to be done in the 14 industrial area or we might need a whole new segment, but 15 certainly a critical point as we see developments and if we 16 can get the levelized cost of hydrogen down, then we 17 probably will see more uptake in the transportation sector 18 and need to be aware of the electricity system impacts. 19 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Yes, I mean - by the way, 20 I'm really glad we baked in some time because I feel like

there is so much opportunity to have these conversations in a public setting so people can then react. And we get some information and having a conversation flowing because I think the more we are able to set the stage for stakeholder input, the better it is. So thank you Quentin for, and

1 Heather, for kind of baking this time.

2 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I have two thoughts. I just frame it and then I'll defer to Commissioner Monahan and 3 4 Heather next steps here in the morning session. So I'm 5 looking at slides again. Incredible work on the regional 6 disaggregation. Thank you for that work and the thoughts 7 that's going in there. Couple of pieces on that. When we 8 talk about the regional disaggregation, Liz, I think the 9 12.5 percent allocation also on the end route, so there's 10 two elements, right? So the regional disaggregation that 11 Maggie presented and then you presented on the regional 12 allocation.

13 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Could we just expand on that 14 a little bit on the basis of the assumptions? Like, how are 15 we specifically looking at - what's the data that's driving 16 the assumption, let's say on the 12.5 percent. And,, Maggie 17 on your side in the regional disaggregation, I wonder who 18 presented that. I apologize if it was both Liz, just how 19 are we, what assumptions are actually driving our thinking 20 around that? 21 Yeah, or Liz -MR. GEE:

MS. PHAM: Actually Quentin, can you take this? MR. GEE: Sure. Yeah. So really it's DCFC charging on highway corridors I think is a particular challenge for us because sometimes people will just, as you

1 could imagine, someone you might fill up at the local gas 2 station that's near the highway and you're just driving in 3 town all the time. A similar effect could be seen there as 4 well.

5 So what we did is we used - we used the EVI PRO 6 or the EVI road trip tool that is used in 2127, actually 7 helps inform some of the work that we are some of the work 8 that we did here and I think they had about 10 percent, 9 maybe 12 percent or so. And we just decided that just to be 10 safe, we would add that in. I should stress here that we're not sort of adding additional load. We're sort of 11 12 redistributing the load regionally. And one of the reasons 13 why we noticed this problem was because there's an 14 additional product that comes after the IEPR called the 15 Load Bus Allocation.

16 And one of the big problems that we ran into with 17 that was that we conserved electricity within different 18 forecasting zones. And forecasting zones in the northern 19 part of the state and other rural areas didn't have enough 20 gigawatt hours available to them to account for potential 21 road trips. And so we used the road trip as the EVI road 22 trip baseline 10 percent, 12.5 percent or so of demand. We 23 pulled that out of everywhere and redistributed it back. 24 And a lot of forecasting zones got their load, got a lot of 25 that load back. So we're not saying it all goes into rural

1 areas or something like that, but it was just something 2 that will allow us to conduct better work on our load bus allocation. And we think also it will help the IOUs plan a 3 4 little bit better because the IOUs that do have a lot more 5 urban density, we are anticipating this still will be a lot 6 of DCFC charging there. But we're not anticipating quite as 7 much of that compared to some of the other areas that maybe 8 have a little bit more highway traffic or highway only 9 traffic. Does that get at the question?

10 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Yeah, it does. And here's a suggestion and I think at least a recommendation for us to 11 12 think through, we do have those 10,000 gas stations of data 13 that we gather and I think looking at the potential 14 gasoline consumption, I don't know if we have that level of 15 disaggregated information and maybe it's not indicative of 16 exactly what the patterns are. Just want to uplift that 17 dataset we have and see if there is an opportunity to dig 18 into some trend analysis on that as we think through next 19 year.

20 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I just want to flag that as 21 an opportunity because I'm beginning to see the equity 22 intersection here both on electrification but also air 23 quality in opportunity. So just want to uplift that 24 conversation to think about.

25

COMMISSIONER GUNDA: And before I hand off,

Maggie, I apologize. I was driving when I heard the first set so I didn't really know who slides or what, but that's why I was calling you on some of this. But thank you so much. This is great and I'll pass it back to Commissioner Monahan.

6 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Well I had a question 7 about, well I think you guys know I convened the ports 8 collaborative. We meet about quarterly and the ports are of 9 course huge loads as you're off-road data indicated. And 10 they're also very interested in hydrogen. I think for a lot of this off-road equipment that's going to be a point of 11 12 intersection, maybe much more willing to pay a higher price 13 for some of the performance characteristics that they see 14 with hydrogen. So I think there's a lot of modeling in the 15 off-road sector, especially specific to ports that is 16 interesting and maybe somewhat unique in terms of the huge 17 load.

18 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And can you talk about how 19 you're thinking about these single - maybe ports and 20 specifically because I think they are pretty specific use 21 case, but data centers are somewhat similar in terms of a 2.2 huge load to the grid and how are we thinking about any 23 analysis specific to, let's just start with ports -24 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Before you jump in. Can I 25 just add a couple points to Commissioner Monahan just as

1 you think through.

2 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I think when you were 3 talking about offload and I wanted to wait until the second 4 half of today to ask about a couple of intersecting 5 questions there. The transportation element touches other 6 sectors now, so the offload kind of touches the ports and 7 ag and we got a lot of interest from the ag sector on 8 thinking through how to support ag electrification and 9 such. So I think just uplifting Commissioner Monahan's 10 question through the broader lens. And also the 11 uncertainties of future economic growth or technology. 12 Especially as we think about data centers with AI. We've 13 heard a 10 x growth in Bay Area, for example. One 30,000 14 foot level. How are you thinking about that and more 15 specifically Commissioner Monahan's point on ports and ag? 16 MR. GEE: Yeah, great question. I would say I 17 think you probably want to have the Demand Analysis Branch 18 touch more on the issue of servers and those sorts of 19 issues that tie into there. But that is, I mean servers, 20 cannabis, these other issues are really - they can be big 21 sources of demand and that's something that they're going 2.2 to be working on. 2.3 When it comes to the transportation side of 24 things, definitely there are these kind of weird - when we 25 think of transportation, we think of people trying to get

1 somewhere, but there are these important questions around 2 moving stuff around a defined location like at a port or at 3 an agricultural site.

So the off-road model right now we do have some kind of baseline population data around the vehicles that are operating at these sites already. So we have sort of a baseline population of how many, what are they called, rubber tire gantry lifters, they lift up a shipping container.

There are also other devices that are a little bit more mobile. So there's all kinds of different devices that currently use a lot of combustion power. And we're anticipating the off-road model anticipates growth or penetration of electric into that.

15 One of the things we definitely need to make sure 16 that we're doing in the long run is finding a way to 17 integrate in hydrogen into that model and coming up with 18 feasible options there. Because right now we assume that in 19 lieu of combustion fuels it moves over to electricity. But 20 as Commissioner Monahan pointed out earlier, and I think we 21 had at the SB 1075 workshop, we had a discussion about how 2.2 some of the ports are looking into hydrogen as well.

If one of the reasons why - so the reasons might be associated with the performance issues. Hydrogen, it can be much faster to refuel. You don't have heavy batteries in

1 some of these devices or in some of these vehicles so you 2 can get a lot more bang for your buck or bang for your 3 kilogram of weight that's added onto the device. So that's 4 an important consideration there. But I think a lot of it 5 is going to come from the fact that they're concerned about 6 electricity loads as well. And, again, so onsite 7 electrolysis for hydrogen production would actually add more load because of the round trip efficiency that is you 8 9 need a hundred units of electricity could get you like 90 10 ish units of movement in a battery electric car, a vehicle. A hundred units of electricity through electrolysis, 11 12 through a fuel cell, et cetera is only going to get you 13 about maybe 40, 50, maybe a little bit more units of 14 movement or energy units of movement there.

15 So probably the ports are going to need to be 16 getting the hydrogen offsite if they're worried about the 17 grid constraints on the site.

18 But yeah, there's a lot of shore power actually 19 already going on. And shore power is the largest thing at 20 the ports. There's a lot of shore power already going on, 21 but there is a rapid requirement for 2027 for most of the 2.2 shore power adoption there. So no running your engines and 23 burning bunker fuel or whatever at the port. And then 24 there's also that equipment there, the cargo handling 25 equipment. Those, we do anticipate a lot of load there. I

1 think there's a little bit of disagreement from what we're 2 hearing from some sources versus others about what the 3 assumptions should be about what the load is going to be 4 from some of those devices. We probably shouldn't be 5 assuming that these things are going to be operating at 6 full power 100 percent of the time. So we have to come up 7 with scenarios and say, okay, well these things stop. They 8 move around, they park people take breaks. There's all 9 kinds of other activities that occur to where we don't want 10 to say that things are going to be operating at full 11 capacity. We want to make sure analysis doesn't assume 12 that.

COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Is it possible, Quentin, that we would get to a place where we could disaggregate results by port?

16 MR. GEE: Yeah, I think that's actually going to 17 be our goal. One of the things that are, so again, I 18 constantly talk about the load bus allocation, but this is 19 kind of our new thing that transportation has been a part 20 of in the last year or so, year and a half, two years. We 21 do aggregate. We are beginning to think about load more 2.2 geographically speaking. And this year I think with the 23 load bus allocation, I think I mentioned before, the off-24 road model, that big sort of donut that I showed with all 25 that load. That right now goes just into the baseline

forecast and it's just built into all the system load that the demand analysis branch focuses on. But what we want to do with the load bus allocation is at least pull the port out, the port stuff, the shore power and the cargo handling equipment.

6 And then also maybe, I'm not quite sure what we 7 can do at the early stages now, but maybe do that with aq 8 this year. We're not quite sure yet what can be done. But 9 we probably need to then just find which substation or 10 maybe there's two, are tied to each port and come up with a plausible way to allocate the load to those facilities. So 11 12 yeah, that's something that we will be working on this year 13 with our load bus allocation. It still will go into the 14 baseline forecast in terms of the overall CAISO load shape 15 and the utility load shapes or load profiles that we see. 16 But, yeah, we do want to I think build that in as an option 17 for saying, Hey, yeah, these ports also are going to be 18 experiencing some additional load here that you might not 19 have expected. It's not as big as medium and heavy duty. If 20 you look at it, it's about, I think it adds up to 1500 or 21 so gigawatt hours for ports in 2035, whereas freight is 22 closer to 12,000 gigawatt hours or 11,000 gigawatt hours. 23 So it's not as large, but it's very concentrated in a few 24 select locations. And a similar thing with ag, it's very 25 constant, so ag is not that large either, but it also is

very concentrated in a few key points. And those are also
 areas in ag where there's not necessarily a whole ton of
 capacity in fairly isolated locations.

4 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: That's great to hear, 5 Quentin. It's really exciting that you're moving - the team 6 is moving towards that approach. And I know the ports are 7 really interested in this, so we could even have a sample 8 port and they have a list of all the equipment that they're 9 planning to electrify and it would be interesting at some 10 point to work with one specific port and really triangulate what our demand forecast is, finding, what their own 11 12 analysis and see if we can come up with deeper analysis for 13 each of the ports. And I think they're so important for 14 goods movement. They're also going to be so important when 15 it comes to offshore wind development. And that's going to 16 be its own special set of analytical products that we're 17 working of course to support from another angle, but I 18 think it's a great evolution.

19 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: One comment on that thought, 20 I think Quentin and I, this is where the lines between the 21 demand forecasting, demand scenarios, DER and supply, 22 everything's kind of blurring with the work we are doing 23 right now. And also it's blurring between the policy and 24 planning, right? It's like we're in this interesting phase, 25 which creates opportunities for such good work and we can

1 dig in.

2 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: So couple of things, the 3 busbar allocation and the port electrification and I would 4 just say port electrification and broader decarbonization 5 and so tied to the supply side analysis on which power 6 plants can you retire in those load pockets. The 7 transmission potential transmission constraints. So I 8 really would like to continue to support the work you're 9 doing on the demand office is doing on the overall 10 disaggregation of busbar loads.

11 COMMISSIONER GUNDA: I want to just think through 12 a couple of elements data needs. Are we at a place where is 13 there a threshold for us to go back and update our data 14 regulations? Which ones do we want? I mean, I don't want to 15 do regulations for the sake of regulations. If we can get it through supply forms, that's great. But is there an 16 17 opportunity there? Two, the DER work that PUC has done last 18 this year with the contracts like Kavala and such who have been also adopting different analyses for distribution 19 20 level planning. And I know IOUs are looking at it too, for 21 their own work.

COMMISSIONER GUNDA: Is there a way to uplift the conversation on the way the load is happening at large and how do we continue to make incremental but valuable improvements to forecast to support that conversation? So

we don't necessarily have to duplicate, but if we can
 leverage other elements of work that's been done, that's
 probably also another way to approach it.

COMMISSIONER GUNDA: But tremendous work, team.
Liz, Maggie, just really good presentations. The way you
approach the presentations is awesome. Thanks, Quentin. And
thanks to the entire forecasting team. I have no further
guestions. Thank you.

9 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And I don't either, but 10 it's been such a pleasure to have this conversation. It's nice to be able to, with Vice Chair Gunda, be able to muse 11 12 on these issues and really it's such impressive work. I 13 just can't even tell you to see the change over the last 14 four years has just been amazing. And a lot of this has to 15 do with the fact that transportation electrification is 16 becoming so much more of an important aspect of our demand 17 forecast. So just thanks to you Quentin, and to the whole 18 team, really just amazing work.

MR. GEE: Great. Thanks both of you.

19

20 MS. RAITT: Beautiful. Thank you. We have one 21 question from an attendee and Heidi Javanhakht is available 22 to go through that with us. So go ahead Heidi.

MS. JAVANBAKHT: Hi. Good morning, everyone. So
we do have one question in the A and A from Robert Perry
from Synergistic Solutions.

MS. JAVANBAKHT: So his question is, one unmentioned aspect concerns the fact that vehicle charging refueling is critical infrastructure requiring a minimum level of energy resilience that can only be delivered with onsite adjacent distributed generation / hydrogen production. Are any resilience considerations being considered in calculating load modifier scenarios?

8 MR. GEE: Yeah. Thanks, Robert, for your 9 question. I think what I would say here is that we conduct 10 forecasting very much at a system level. I think we saw on 11 Liz's maps, on her slides, we break the state into about 20 12 forecasting zones. The utilities make up the bulk of those.

13 I would say overall, we really don't think at 14 that very, very close sort of site level resilience 15 consideration. Those are important aspects of ensuring that 16 we have reliable access. I can imagine people being 17 concerned about things like public safety power shutoffs, 18 et cetera, but we're really sort of evaluating the forecast 19 at this level where we're trying to think about system 20 planning, distribution planning, and informing transmission 21 planning. Certainly there are critical components there, but that's a little bit outside of where we focus, but 2.2 23 definitely an issue for concern when we start thinking 24 about those site level challenges.

25

MS. RAITT: I think that's all the questions from

1 the audience.

12

13

And so thank you so much Liz and Quentin and Maggie again and Commissioners for that really great conversation and presentations this morning.

5 So we are done with our morning part of the 6 workshop unless Commissioners if you wanted to make any 7 remarks. Otherwise we can break for lunch. Okay.

8 So we'll be back here at one o'clock and we'll 9 start, we'll go ahead and keep this open, but we'll stop 10 recording for the lunch break and resume back at one 11 o'clock. Look forward to seeing everyone. Thanks.

(OFF THE RECORD AT 11:39 a.m.)

(ON THE RECORD AT 1:01 p.m.)

14 MS. RAITT: All right, welcome back everybody for 15 our afternoon session on this IEPR workshop. So we'll go 16 ahead and jump in in the afternoon and hear about 17 additional achievable scenario results for energy 18 efficiency and the fuel substitution. And so Vice Chair 19 Gunda, did you, I think you said you didn't or maybe 20 Commissioner Monahan, did you want to make any remarks? I 21 know you just told me and I can't remember what you said. 2.2 Sorry.

23 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I think the vice chair is 24 going to be leading this since he's deep in the weeds on 25 this and I'm going to be having to leave pretty soon

1 actually for another event.

25

2 MS. RAITT: Okay, thanks. 3 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Thank you, Heather. You always 4 check on me so that's good. Yes, thank you all and welcome 5 back everybody. I think I just wanted to say thanks to the 6 transportation team this morning. It was a really good 7 conversation on both the elements that the transportation 8 team is able to implement to enhance the forecasting for 9 not only planning purposes but also policy options and 10 discussion. And then I believe we had some robust 11 discussion on some additional refinements we could continue 12 to foster in the forecasting.

13 And this afternoon I think is another important 14 element, specifically the additional achievable energy 15 efficiency, achievable fuel substitution and behind the 16 meter generation forecast and storage, which are all teeing 17 up the conversation on the building decarbonization. So 18 without further, without any further delay, I would just 19 pass it on to Ingrid Neumann to kick us off with the 20 additional achievable energy efficiency and fuel 21 substitution results. Thanks. 2.2 MS. NEUMANN: Alright, here we go. Let's move on 23 to the title slide. There we go. 24 Good afternoon, Commissioners and stakeholders.

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My name is Ingrid Neumann and I'm presenting the results

for Additional Achievable Energy Efficiency, AAEE, and the
 programmatic portion of Additional Achievable Fuel
 Substitution, AAFS, for the 2023 IEPR cycle. Next slide,
 please.

So the objective of these two load modifiers is 5 6 to continue to focus on firm programs and projections. 7 Since the core scenarios will be used for planning and procurement purposes. As in previous iterations, staff has 8 9 developed variations around these most probable futures to 10 show other possible outcomes given less or more effort and 11 ability to realize the potential of existing or proposed 12 energy efficiency and fuel substitution programs. As 13 developed in 2021, AAFS continues to be conceptualized 14 separately from AAEE. Next slide, please.

15 Any overlap between these load modifiers, as well 16 as any potential overlap with the load modifiers in the 17 baseline energy demand forecast are accounted for and 18 removed. Only achievable energy efficiency savings or fuel 19 substitution impacts above and beyond what is already 20 incorporated in the baseline energy consumption forecasts 21 are retained in the load modifiers. Both AAEE and AAFS 2.2 reduce gas consumption while AAEE also reduces electricity 23 consumption, AAFS increases it. Thus we call AAEE savings 24 and AAFS impacts. Both load modifier increments and 25 decrements are relative to the baseline electricity and gas

1 consumption on an annual basis. Electricity consumption is also modified by both AAEE and AAFS on an hourly basis. 2 3 AAFS may contain both programmatic inputs, which I'll be 4 discussing in my presentation, as well as technology-based 5 fuel substitution modeled by our fuel substitution scenario 6 analysis tool, which will be described in subsequent 7 presentations by my colleagues Nicholas Janusch and Ethan 8 Cooper. Next slide, please.

9 So when we design the scenarios, our general 10 approach is to start at the bottom and build Upworks. We 11 start from conservative in scenario one at the bottom in 12 red and go up to more optimistic or aggressive scenarios. 13 So here the red and orange are conservative and would be 14 the minimum impacts expected to occur. Sometimes that might 15 include firm commitments, so existing programs or standards 16 that are not yet incorporated in the baseline forecast and 17 then some newly existing programs. Now for three and four, 18 three being in green - scenario three, that's our reference 19 scenario. It's something that we like to call reasonably 20 expected to occur. So it's something where there's still 21 uncertainty, of course, around these newly developed and 2.2 funded programs, but they are expected to occur in some 23 shape. Then there's a "blue skies" or slightly optimistic 24 version of that scenario here in blue, number four. And the 25 green and blue scenarios are the ones that are used for the

1 forecast load modifiers.

2 Moving on to the next slide, please. We have the more "blue skies," or more 3 4 optimistic, are aggressive scenarios in darker blue number 5 five and violet and number six, that are policy focused. So 6 these really ratchet up, add more speculative programs. 7 These might meet some 2030 SB 350 doubling goals or other 8 mid-century type goals once we've ratcheted everything up 9 to the possible and the most optimistic view of what's 10 possible for energy efficiency and fuel substitution given current knowledge. So those are not used for the forecast, 11 12 just three and four and for energy efficiency too. So we'll 13 go into that in a second. Next slide, please.

14 So first, some general things that were developed 15 for the programmatic pieces of AAFS and AAEE in the 2023 16 IEPR cycle. We have utilized, updated and enhanced versions 17 of the savings, accounting, aggregation and extrapolation 18 methodology - methodology and tools previously employed for 19 2021. Historical data, of course, was updated and then the 20 potential savings projections were updated based on that in 21 all the existing workbooks. New workbooks were added based 22 on recent programmatic activities in the last two years. 23 And we added some capability to the tool. So we have 24 building type disaggregation and can output by forecast 25 zone, not just by utility.

1 There was an addition of some basic cost 2 calculations for each scenario so that the value of various 3 energy efficiency and fuel impacts can begin to be 4 quantified for later work this year and next year. And then 5 we also enhanced the input data as well as the software 6 tools to allow for better extrapolation of potential 7 savings to mid-century and, again, that supports some 8 future work as well as extrapolation to the forecast 9 period. This forecast goes from 2024 to 2040 and some of 10 our input data doesn't reach all the way out to 2040. So we 11 do need to do some extrapolation there. Next slide, please.

12 So we also have a more robust analysis of beyond 13 utility programs. So these are the programs that are not 14 run by IOUs or POUs and not reported by them, than those 15 that were originally evaluated in the 2021 IEPR, such as 16 the technology and equipment for clean heating or tech 17 program as well as consideration of additional programs not 18 included in the 2021 IEPR because those had not quite been 19 conceived of yet. Next slide, please.

So we also reworked our Title 24 Analysis. The Title 24 Building Energy Efficiency Standard Analysis is now based directly on measures at the sector and segment level. This measure based analysis can then be rolled forward as specific measures are likely to be adopted for future code cycles. So we know what was adopted for the

1 2022 code cycle, where we might see some impacts from that 2 this year and more next, but the 2025 are proposed and then 3 we can speculate as to what the future code cycles can look 4 like after that.

5 So that's more precise and updated than the 6 original percent better than approach that was originally 7 developed in support of SB 350 tracking and projections. We 8 also updated the compliance pathway most likely to be 9 chosen by builders to meet the 2022 Title 24 requirements. 10 That was the first time that the options included either enhanced efficiency measures via performance calculation or 11 12 electrification of one of the end uses based on climate 13 zone, so either space or water heating. And so there's an 14 electrification component there and some of the assumptions 15 that went in there as to what builders might choose was 16 updated based on new information. Next slide, please.

17 We also added some new workbooks that are listed 18 here. The really important ones would be equitable 19 electrification and so that's California-funded as well as 20 the Clean Energy Reliability Investment Plan is also 21 California-funded. It's a little bit less clear as to how 2.2 much of that might go to demand site objectification, but 23 some of those enabling technologies would likely allow for 24 additional electrification. So that small contribution was 25 estimated now, but the equitable electrification has two

1 components, a direct install and incentive piece, and both 2 of those are expected to have significant impacts. Could be as early as 2025, maybe 2026 or 2027 either if we looked at 3 4 this very conservatively, but it'll certainly have 5 significant impacts there. Same thing for the Inflation 6 Reduction Act. The IRA funding come - coming from the 7 federal government. There are two programs there HEEHRA, a High Efficiency Electric Home Rebate Act and that might be 8 9 bundled with or be applied in a similar way as the 10 Equitable Building Decarbonization Incentive Program. And 11 then separately the IRA funded whole-house Homeowner 12 Managed Energy Savings or HOMES program is an energy 13 efficiency retrofit program. Then we updated some locally 14 targeted electrification impacts like we've had local 15 government ordinances, but we've added some geographic 16 aggregation to those that's actually showing where those 17 impacts are more likely to occur as well as added many new 18 local ordinances that have been developed since 2021, and a 19 few load serving entity decarbonization programs are 20 included there as well. Next slide, please. 21 All right, so we would build up our scenarios and 22 the scenarios mostly - at least the ones that we're using

for forecasting would include all of these elements at various levels. So for the IOU programs, we rely on the CPUC's potential goal study as well as IOU data captured in

1 CEDARS on more recent fuel substitution activities. Then 2 that is something that's updated every two years, the 3 CPUC'S potential end goal study. So it really is the most 4 recent vintage of that study. The CMUA, which supports the 5 POUs and where we get our POU energy efficiency program 6 forecast from is updated every four years.

7 So we would still be using the one that we received in 2021. That doesn't include fuel substitutions. 8 9 So we did that separately after conversations with the POUs 10 in 2021, and we've made some updates to that based on subsequent conversations, which basically we'll look at the 11 12 data when we get there. So then we also include some future 13 title 20 and federal appliance standards that aren't 14 included yet in the baseline forecast. And for this time 15 around the 2022 and future building standards as well. Next 16 slide.

17 So that's the bulk of what goes in. And then we 18 have a plethora of other programs that operate outside of 19 the utility energy efficiency portfolios. And that's what 20 we've kind of bundled as the beyond utility. And there's a 21 collection of traditional energy efficiency programs where 2.2 we've updated the data but they've fundamentally not 23 changed since 2021, other than having more historic data 24 honing in on that.

25

Then the build and tech programs that are run as

1 per SB 1477, those were included for the first time in 2 2021, but we separated those because we actually do have 3 two years of historical data now for tech and we redid that 4 modeling to reflect that. Then we added workbooks on the 5 California Electric HOMES program, the Wildlife Natural 6 Disaster Resiliency Rebuild Program, which allows for 7 electrified homes to be rebuilt in areas affected by fires and such, as well as the affordable housing and 8 9 sustainability community programs. The portions or their 10 phases that have focused on electrification. So the last phase had mostly electrification and then those most recent 11 12 phase where they just closed, I want to say bids but that 13 doesn't feel like quite the right word, but they just took 14 the solicitations for those and the impacts will be seen in 15 the next few years. So then, of course, the IRA funded hura 16 and homes as well as equability decarbonization direct and 17 install and incentive programs and the piece of syrup that 18 might contribute to electrification. Next slide, please.

Then lastly, local ordinances encouraging electrification of some or all end uses as well as other target electrification including local natural gas bans. Then the last bullet here is not something that's included in the programmatic piece, but it is included in AAFS.

24 So we do the zero emissions appliance technology 25 characterization and that's modeled by the FSSAT and that

includes CARB's state implementation plan, but you'll have
 to wait for the presentations after mine to get the details
 on those. So next slide, please.

4 So this is the spectrum from red to violet here 5 of the scenarios that were developed for electricity, AAEE 6 savings and AAFS incremental impacts. You can see that the 7 AAEE values are all negative. Those are savings from the 8 baseline. They start from a small modest amount in red 9 going to a very optimistic scenario six and violet. And, 10 similarly but in reverse, for the electrification, the more 11 electrification we have, we do add a small amount of 12 electricity. We hope that it's efficient electrification 13 and the programmatic electrification is efficient. They 14 wouldn't incentivize it otherwise. So that really does show 15 you the range of scenarios that we're looking at in total. 16 Now those are not all being considered for the forecast. So 17 let's go to the next slide and look at gas, same kind of 18 spread but both AAEE and AAFS reduce gas consumption. 19 Alright, let's go to the next slide.

So now we're focusing on the two scenarios that are used for the forecast. In green, the statewide planning scenario. So this is AAEE, so energy efficiency, electricity saved on the top, gas saved on the bottom, the dotted lines and the open circles reflect the 2021 IEPR vintage forecast. And the 2023 IEPR vintage forecast is

shown in solid lines, in solid dots. So the most noticeable thing here is that the extrapolation things really change in 2030. It's less optimistic based on more recent data and updated modeling. In 2021, we only did the forecast out to 2035 and there was a lot of extrapolation after 2028, 2029, 2030. And we have updated data that informed a better extrapolation this time around.

8 So on the next slide we have the same type of 9 comparison for the AAFS, the fuel substitution piece and 10 there, so for electricity, a AAEE 3 and AAFS 3 were both 11 used for the planning forecast and then I don't mean to say 12 for electricity, but for the planning forecast, a AAEE 3 13 and AAFS 3 are used and for the local reliability scenario in blue it's AAEE 2, so that's more conservative, so less 14 15 energy efficiency and more agive fuel substitution AAFS 4.

16 So that's a little bit more electricity being 17 added. So we're definitely calling it conservative from an 18 electricity or electric grid standpoint here. And what we 19 can see here is that in the 2023 vintage, the AAFS forecast 20 and extrapolation plus 2030 as affected more than AAEE was, 21 and that's really due to the consideration of carb state 2.2 implementation plan in most of the data streams. The state 23 implementation plan was adopted in September of 2022 by 24 carb. So this was after the 2021 programmatic or the 2021 25 IEPR vintages of AAEE and AAFS were developed and CARB just

started rulemaking on that in May of this year. So Ethan Cooper will give you more information on that, but it's important to recognize that there is a drop off of impacts here from the programmatic AAFS, but some of that will be seen then in the SIP modeling or other zero emissions standards modeling from the FSOT.

7 So it's not necessarily gone. Then what we'll also see when we look at the breakdown a little bit as far 8 9 as the four main data streams is that the beyond utility, 10 which includes the IRA funded and equitable building 11 decarbonization programs. Those actually grow a bit. So we 12 really don't see that drop off in the AAFS 4, or the blue 13 local reliability scenario, which is looking at the 14 reference case of those. Whereas in the green, we're 15 looking at a more conservative version of those. But then 16 it does drop off in the long term like after 2035 because 17 that's when those programs expire and the first year 18 savings for those will cease unless they're somehow re-19 upped. So next slide, please.

So this is our process flow overview diagram for the data integration tool. Kind of shows us the four big data streams. We have the CMUA's PG study that gives us the POU projections. The one that we received in 2021 did include projections out to 2041. So we didn't have to do any extrapolation there ourselves. Then with the 2023

1 CPUC's potential end goal study for the IU programmatic 2 projections, that went out to 2034. So we did work with the 3 CPUC team on extrapolating that to 2040. And then for codes 4 and standards and the rest of the beyond utility, those we 5 extrapolate ourselves in the beyond utility workbooks that 6 are managed by the Energy Commission. So then the data 7 integration tool takes all those pieces together, makes the parts cumulative that aren't yet so that we end up with 8 9 cumulative Additional Achievable Energy Efficiency and fuel 10 substitution projections for each year starting in 2024 out to 2040. That can be presented by utility or forecast zone, 11 12 of course it can be bundled to planning area or attack. And 13 then sector now building type end use and scenario. Then we 14 have an hourly tool for the electricity portion where we 15 can apply 8760 load shapes by end use and sector to the 16 annual values to obtain the hourly values for each year at 17 that same level of disaggregation. Next slide, please.

18 So for the planning scenario. Now we have it, I 19 was going to say black on white, but it's green on white, 20 right? Because we were color coding it green for the 21 planning scenario. We're looking at the reference case of AAEE 3 and the reference scenario for AAFS 3. So this is 2.2 23 reasonable to occur but with greater uncertainty about 24 penetrations and volume of impact. And we do include newly 25 developed and funded programs.

So we have the IOU programs, the POU programs, the Title 24, we include the 2022 standards at reference. Those are happening, those are active. Then the proposed Title 24, 2025 vintage at a conservative level and some of the Title 20 and federal appliance standards that may occur in the near term future in a conservative view. Next slide.

7 So then we have the following programs in a 8 reference modeling view. Tech, right? That's existing. We 9 have two viewers of data on that, the targeted 10 electrification, a lot of the other ones that we had in 11 2021 as well and the other ones that are pretty well 12 understood. Then we have the beyond utility programs that 13 are included in a conservative modeling view on the right 14 hand side. And those include ones where some like the top 15 three asset rating, smart meter, s-ship heat pump, water 16 heating and the FPIP. Those have been around but there's 17 still a fair amount of uncertainty about the impacts there. 18 So we keep that at a conservative level. And then, of 19 course, we have the new programs which are not all fully 20 designed. There's some proposals going out, there's draft 21 for the equitable building decarbonization program, direct 2.2 install programs, comments coming in on those.

23 So those are still being sorted out, but the 24 funding is there. And they will occur in some way and I 25 expect it to have some decent sized impacts.

1 So let's move on to the next slide. So now we're 2 looking at the local reliability scenario. So we do look at a little bit more of a blue skies version of the green 3 4 reference case. So we do look at AAFS 4 there. We take the 5 potential goal study scenario, so not the one that was 6 decided on upon the goal. That's the one we use for the 7 reference, but we take something where there's a little bit more fuel substitution there. And it turns out that the 8 9 modeling actually changes between, there's a break point 10 there and there's no way to hybridize that. So there's a fairly good gap between what's in AAFS 3 and 4 for IOU 11 12 programs at least.

13 Then the other ones are a little smoother. We 14 include Title 24 standards, which include that compliance 15 pathway via electrification, right. That's proposed in 2025 16 and we expect something similar to be proposed at a higher 17 level in 2028 and we take a conservative view of what might 18 be proposed thereafter talking to subject matter experts. 19 So then we include everything that was included in AAFS 3, 20 but we take a more reference view, we're less conservative 21 about the viewpoint that we take. And really what that 2.2 means for the equitable building programs and the IRA 23 funded programs is expecting that impacts might occur 24 sooner rather than later. And that the impacts are also 25 greater per dollar spent. Maybe you can spend 15 percent

1 for administration, but then how much of the remainder is 2 spent on what type of measures versus upgrading panels and 3 things like that where you don't get a direct impact.

4 So taking a little bit more of a reference view 5 of that instead of a conservative view like we did in a 6 AAFS 3. So next slide, please.

7 So then we have the AAEE 2 went back to orange, 8 right? Because we went from our scenarios, we built them up 9 like the rainbow, the spectrum of colors are red, orange, 10 yellow, but we didn't do yellow. That one's hard to see. So red, orange, green, blue, more blue and violet. And we're 11 12 trying to stay in that green / blue area except where we're 13 really looking at a conservative picture for local 14 reliability where we want to kind of pull back on the 15 energy efficiencies and that's always been agreed upon with 16 the electricity planning agencies.

17 So for the AAEE 2, it really is just pulling 18 back, looking at something slightly less than the goals 19 scenario used in the reference taking a scaled back view of 20 POU programs, taking a conservative view of the current 21 Title 24, 2022 vintage and so on. Taking out some programs 22 and leaving the ones that were still included and looking 23 at them a little bit more conservatively.

24 So let's move on to the next slide and look at 25 some data. So we have these sort of wedges, they look like

1 wedges, but the extrapolation, it can't be linear anymore. 2 It's not what the data is showing. We have here on the 3 right hand side the electricity and gas savings for 4 scenario AAEE 3 for 2023. The three sort of wedges, if you 5 will, are in blue, the IOU programs in green, the POU 6 programs in purple, the codes and standards and in red the 7 beyond utility. So we can see if we compare to the next 8 slide, what we had in 2021 that the purple codes and 9 standards seems to have shrunk a lot and that's not because 10 anything bad happened really, they're still having that 11 energy efficiency. It's just there were a of appliance 12 standards in 2021 that were still included in the load 13 modifier and that had now being captured in the baseline 14 forecast and the rest of the pieces remain fairly stable.

15 If we look at the blue and the green and the red, 16 those sizes haven't changed so much. I mean the IOU savings 17 have dropped a little bit, but nothing like they had in the 18 previous two vintages of the IEPR. So let's go ahead and 19 move to the next slide and look at AAFS 3.

So that's our reference scenario for fuel substitution that's used for the planning scenario and it does look awfully small, right? It's not a pretty picture to look at. There's a reason behind that. We wanted to put it on the same scale as what we had in 2021. So that's already letting you know that what we estimated in 2021 in

1 the first cut of AAFS was greater than what we're finding 2 in 2023. So let's go ahead to the next slide.

And we would say that really the biggest difference here is that the IOU program - programmatic impacts drop after 2030 due to the potential end goal study considering the CARB's state implementation being active at that time.

8 So that's the blue piece here. It drops 9 significantly. And there are really two reasons for that. 10 So you see, well that also happens before 2030. So yes, after 2030 we can say everybody's considering the SIP plan, 11 12 which we didn't consider in 2021, but before that the 13 modeling was simply different even before 2030. The values 14 are smaller due to calibration to actual electrification 15 program performance now in 2023 that we have two years of 16 data for. Previously in 2021, we only had small samples of 17 unevaluated pilot program data. And the PG study, for 18 example, was directly calibrated to the more mature energy 19 efficiency programs. And, I mean, we knew that there were 20 more mature, but we didn't know that the difference was 21 going to come out like this. So we did update the modeling 2.2 for 2023 that may also affect the POU programs in the 2.3 future. We did have some conversations with some POUs and 24 we did adjust that green wedge based on those.

They didn't roll out some of the programs as soon

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25

1 as they expected, but they're still planning on doing those 2 programs. So those first year savings were pushed outwards. 3 So it was basically they're just delayed a little bit. So 4 the total cumulative value in the out years will be 5 slightly less. Then for a lot of other things. We also 6 considered that the State Implementation Plan after 2030 7 would not allow incentivizing pure electrification. You'd have to incentivize even higher levels of efficiency for 8 9 that type of electrification and then quibble about where 10 that might end up. But in a great part - some of this is 11 going to be all of these updates in 2023 are based on two 12 years of electrification data that we didn't have in 2021 13 and the impending SIP. So we do really allow for fewer 14 programmatic AAFS impacts in the forecast. But some of 15 these impacts are of course then recouped by the FSSAT 16 modeling of the state implementation plan, which my 17 colleagues Nick and Ethan will discuss in the subsequent 18 presentations. So let's move on to the local reliability 19 scenario.

This is the data for AAEE 2. So the slightly more conservative energy efficiency scenario and really the trends are very similar as for AAEE 3. Nothing dramatic here. Let's go to the next slide.

24 Compare that to what we had in 2021. It's mainly 25 the extrapolation that's changed in some of the codes and

1 standards went into that baseline there.

2 Let's move on to the AAFS 4 scenario used for the 3 local reliability scenario. Here we can perhaps see the 4 impacts of the IOU programs taking the SIP into account a 5 little bit better. We see that blue wedge or chunk really 6 change around 2029, 2030. It starts dropping. And same 7 thing with the codes and standards. They're meeting their technical limits on electrification in new construction at 8 9 some point. So the first year impacts won't be seen too 10 long after 2030.

But then the IRA and equitable building decarbonization do grow, at least during the time that they're funded. But then past 2035, they start dropping. They start dropping off. I think most of the funding the first year should go through about 2032 for most of these programs. But then unless they're extended, we would just see those cumulative values decay.

So in the next slide we can compare that to what we had in 2021 and it's not - the difference isn't as big for AAFS 4 as it was for AAFS 3, but it follows the same trends for the exact same reasons. So let's move on.

Right, okay, so this should help us segue into Nick's presentation about some of the way that we're treating the state Home Implementation Plan, other zero emissions standards. But really kind of clarifying, just

1 like Quentin said earlier this morning, these load 2 modifiers, they go through a whole refresh every what I 3 like to call a full IEPR cycle, which is every odd year. So 4 in 2021 we developed the six AAEE scenarios. And it was the 5 first time that we developed explicit AAFS scenarios. And 6 then there was the statewide planning forecast, which 7 included AAEE 3, AAFS 3, just like it does now. And the local reliability scenario AAEE 2, AAFS 4 and in some way 8 9 just like it does now, except now what goes into AAFS is 10 more.

So what happened, next slide, in 2022 was the 11 12 adoption of the sip and we knew that that would have a 13 pretty big impact on the electricity forecast. So we took a first stab at putting that into the forecast and did so in 14 15 the local reliability scenario. So we didn't update any of 16 the programmatic pieces. So all the pieces I talked about 17 today and showed you on left side comparing the 2021 18 vintage to the 2023 vintage, those were only programmatic 19 pieces, but then in 2022 we added that FSAP modeling of the 20 SIP on top of AAFS 4 for that local reliability scenario on 21 the bottom.

22 So what we're doing this time is a little bit 23 different. Next slide, please, is we're explicitly putting 24 that in both of these scenarios in the reference the 25 statewide planning forecast as well as the local

1 reliability scenario. And Ethan Cooper will give you the 2 details of those specific FSAP modeled pieces and how they 3 overlay on or how they work with the AAEE and AAFS 4 portions. And then, of course, the programmatic pieces, 5 notably the fuel substitution scenarios, those are updated 6 and they take into account the state implementation plan 7 being in effect in some way, shape or form around 2030. So 8 let's move to the next slide.

9 So a little bit more there. You're trying to 10 drive it home that both of these forecast scenarios include FSAP modeling to account for the zero emission standards. 11 12 The AAEE electricity and gas scenarios can be separated. 13 Those are savings of electric end use or a gas end use. 14 Then AAFS electricity and gas are joined. You can't 15 separate that because you're taking away gas and adding 16 hopefully a small amount of electricity in its place. So 17 when we do the final statewide planning forecast and the 18 local reliability forecast for these two load modifiers, we 19 do prioritize fuel substitution over energy efficiency 20 because the GHG impacts are approximately four times 21 greater for electrification than for energy efficiency.

Next, and the way that we do that, and Ethan will go over this and show you some really nice graphs on how this affects the baseline forecast, is of course everything here with these load modifiers is incremental to a baseline

1 forecast.

2 So we start with the baseline gas demand forecast 3 and we remove gas displaced by the programmatic fuel 4 substitution. So the piece of AAFS that I showed you today, 5 so AAFS 3 programmatic or AAFS 4 programmatic, depending on 6 if I'm looking at the statewide planning forecast or the 7 local reliability scenario. Then Ethan applies the FSOT and using the scenarios that he has defined to account for zero 8 9 emissions appliance standards which also include CARB SIP. 10 Then finally for any gas that remains after that, we can apply the AAEE, which is all programmatic, which I also 11 12 showed you today to any remaining gas consumption. 13 So the reason we have this hierarchy and we show 14 it this way is because it's not possible to look at maybe 15 the most aggressive, maybe not with the forecast, but if

16 you were looking at some sort of policy work and if you're 17 looking at AAFS 6 and AAFS or AAEE 6, there wouldn't be 18 enough gas left to apply that amount of energy efficiency 19 then.

And, in fact, we prefer the electrification to the energy efficiency on a GHG basis for these policy analyses. So that's why you'll see those definitions in Ethan's work as well.

So I think final slide here, just againforeshadowing that zero emissions appliance standards are

modeled as part of AAFS 3-6, 3 and 4 being ones that go 1 2 into the two forecast scenarios and I haven't talked about, right? That's something that's done separately. So then my 3 4 last slide where I thank you very much and I think we'll 5 all take questions at the end of course, unless someone has 6 something pressing. 7 MS. RAITT: Great, thanks Ingrid. This is 8 Heather. 9 Actually, I think there's one question that might 10 be helpful just to address right now. I'm just going to jump in, Cynthia. Thanks. You'll we'll handle the questions 11 12 later, but is there a link, this is from Alberto A., it 13 says, is there a link to the 2023 hourly file supporting 14 this data? 15 MS. NEUMANN: I haven't presented any hourly 16 work. 17 (LAUGHTER) 18 MS. RAITT: Sorry. 19 MS. NEUMANN: But that will be included with the 20 final manage forecast and when Quentin was talking about 21 the peaks and all those kinds of things. And those will be 2.2 made available, but they're not available yet. MS. RAITT: Super, thank you. Thank you Ingrid 23 24 for your presentation too. 25 MS. NEUMANN: Thank you.

MS. RAITT: So then we'll just move on to
 Nicholas Janusch and then from after him we'll hear Ethan
 Cooper. So thank you. Go ahead Nick.

MR. JANUSCH: Yeah, good afternoon. I'm Nicholas
Janusch, and I'm the acting supervisor of the Efficiency
Analysis Unit in the Advanced Electrification Analysis
Branch in the Energy Assessments Division.

8 By, along with my colleague Ethan Cooper, we'll 9 build off from Ingrid Neumann's presentation of the 10 programmatic AAEE and AAFS results and we'll discuss the 11 impacts from the inclusion of the zero emission appliance 12 standards to the AAFS. I'll be setting the stage and 13 characterizing the scenarios used for the zero emission 14 appliance standards while Ethan Cooper will discuss the 15 results. Next slide.

16 I should go back one, please. Sorry. But before 17 we get into the details of modeling these zero emission 18 appliance standards, I want to give a guick background to 19 model these zero emission appliance standards. We use our 20 Fuel Substitution Scenario Analysis Tool, also referred to 21 FSSAT for short. It is a what if policy tool that we have 2.2 used previously and it models the incremental impacts of fuel substitution at different levels of AAEE and AAFS 2.3 24 assumptions. It was first used for the AB 3232 California 25 Building Determination assessment, the 2022 Demand

Scenarios Project, and last year for the 2022 IEPR Demand
 Forecast Update where the first time we included the
 impacts from the zero emission appliance standards in the
 local reliability scenario. Next slide.

5 Let us give some context of why these zero 6 emission appliance standards are incorporated in our 7 additional achievable load modifiers. Back in 2021, the Energy Commission adopted the AB 3232 California Building 8 9 Decarbonization Assessment Report, which assessed the 10 potential for the state to reduce the emissions of greenhouse gases in the state's residential commercial 11 12 building stock by at least 40 percent below 1990 levels by 2030. 13

14 One of the major takeaways from that assessment 15 was that enormous technological transformation must occur, 16 especially in existing buildings. For the state to reach 17 its 2030 direct emission targets. Soon after the adoption 18 of the California Building Decarbonization assessment, the 19 Energy Commission recommended in the 2021 IEPR 6 million by 20 2030 heat pump goal. Soon after that, after Governor Newsom 21 in a letter to the Air Resources Board in July '22, we 2.2 stated the 6 million heat pump goal and also set a new goal 23 of 3 million climate ready and climate friendly homes by 24 2030 and 7 million of those homes by 2035. 25 So the direction is for a huge amount of heat

pumps. And last month at the building's electrification 1 2 summit hosted by the California Energy Commission and the 3 EPRI, the Electric Power Energy Institute, the top global 4 building appliance manufacturers and distributors committed 5 to help California achieve the 6 million heat pump goal. So 6 targets, goals and commitments are all well and good, but 7 they are not forecast scenarios. So what mechanism will 8 actually get California across the finish line? That's 9 where the zero and low NOx appliance standards that are 10 occurring at the state and local level matter. These standards will be enforced at the point of sale. We're 11 12 starting likely in 2027 in the Bay Area and 2030 for the 13 state where any purchase appliance for space and water 14 heating must adhere to the zero NOx appliance standard. 15 And, to be clear, these regulators target ground level 16 ozone pollution, particularly nitric oxide emissions or NOx 17 emissions.

18 They do not target GHGs but GHG reduction or a 19 code benefit of these regulations. Regardless, such 20 regulations will reduce the amount of gas combustion 21 appliances, so decrease gas demand, and increase the amount 2.2 of electric appliances. So increase electric demand. 23 Finally, given the potentially impactful adoption 24 of the 2022 state strategy for the state implementation 25 plan by the California Air Resources Board the Energy

1 Commission, incorporate these zero emission appliance 2 standards as part of the 2022 IEPR update and the local 3 reliability scenario. These zero emission appliance 4 standards has significant impacts to the forecast. So 5 looking back in that forecast, the 2035 net peak megawatt 6 impact from the standard for the 2022 local liability 7 scenario was between 2,900 and 3,000 megawatts. Next slide, 8 please.

9 So what are these various standards? Statewide, 10 the Air Resources Board is looking at space and water heating standard in 2030. They could be looking at other 11 12 end uses and may also include propane. The rulemaking 13 process began earlier this year and the a vote by the Board is expected in 2025. At the local level, the Bay Area Air 14 15 Quality Management District adopted their standard in March 16 2023, where in 2027 water heaters must adhere to the 17 standard and 2029 space heaters go into effect. For the 18 South Coast Air Quality Management District, they are are 19 in the early stages of their process, but their potential 20 standard will include both low emission and zero emission 21 appliance standards that include multiple end uses beyond 22 space and water heatings - heating. They will likely begin 2.3 for the residential sector in 2029. Next slide, please. 24 However, these standards are all well and good, 25 but they come with a lot of uncertainties. I have broken

them down to two. So first up is the regulatory 1 2 uncertainty, whether they happen and what form they take. 3 So there are uncertainties about the regional regulatory 4 differences. So in other words, what's going on at the 5 local, state and federal level. Uncertainties about the 6 timing of when the standards will go in effect. And, 7 lastly, whether the scope of the regulations, so where the 8 entire sector including mobile homes and propane will be 9 part of it.

10 The second type of uncertainty is the - I describe as the adoption and compliance uncertainty. So how 11 12 will people respond and will there be what I theme as 13 strategic avoidance. There might be a better way of phrasing it, but strategic avoidance by people. For 14 15 example, buying gas appliances right before the standard 16 goes in effect, buying appliances out of state or the 17 territory or any other behavior of trying to avoid 18 switching to a zero emission appliance.

The other type is similar as the compliance rate on uncertainty. How many people will actually comply to the standard and how prevalent will be beyond when 2030, when things go effect and in the outer years. And then finally, the readiness of the standards uncertainty. Will manufacturers be ready, and as I mentioned before, they've committed to the 6 million heat pump goal. And will the

grid infrastructure be ready for this regulation? What are 1 2 the risks and consequences from the impacts for both the 3 gas and electric systems if such rapid transformation 4 occurs? So we want to minimize risks with electric system 5 planning if the regulation is adopted as proposed. And on 6 the flip side, if there is not such rapid adoption gas 7 system managers need to minimize risks with gas reliability 8 so that it is available. Thus, we recommend a conservative 9 gas scenario with higher gas demand for gas system 10 planning. But having stated these uncertainties, staff is 11 confident that these zero emission appliance standards are 12 reasonably expected to occur in some form and thus are 13 included in our local reliability scenario and planning 14 forecast. Next slide.

15 We still do not have a crystal ball in figuring 16 out how everything will turn out, but as facts change and 17 we learn how much progress is made, we will update our 18 inputs and assumptions and how we characterize these 19 standards. For example, the Bay Area Air Quality Management 20 District have implementation working groups and will 21 require interim reports two years prior to the compliance 2.2 date for their zero NOx standards. The report should 23 include information on technology development, market 24 availability of zero NOx space heating appliances, 25 potential costs of compliance, infrastructure readiness and

1 availability of incentive programs to decrease these costs.
2 Given that their first standard goes into effect for water
3 heaters in 2027, we expect to get a glimpse and learn of
4 the readiness when the report is submitted on January 1,
5 2025.

6 Further, as I mentioned before, the Air Resources 7 Board is in the middle of their proceeding and expect to have a Board vote in 2025. Our CEC team will continue to 8 9 track the Air Resources Board regulation and if you're 10 prepared to rerun the model, if the Air Resources Board 11 proposed regulation is different than our assumptions. 12 Depending on the timing of such changes, we could adopt new 13 results mid-year if needed. Next slide, please.

14 Now let's discuss the characterization of these 15 zero emission appliance standards where I will first 16 discuss the AAFS levers for each scenario as well as the 17 assumed adoption rates. But, before I begin, I would like 18 to state that these assumptions were developed in 19 collaboration with the Air Resources Board. We are 20 reviewing these assumptions with stakeholders including 21 CPUC, CAISO, and the Air Resources Board. As can be seen in 2.2 the table, four of the six scenarios contain zero emission 23 appliance standards. AAFS 3 through AAFS 6. Each scenario 24 has different levels of programmatic AAEE and AAFS as 25 Ingrid Neumann presented. AAEE 3, for the first column,

what we're theming as AAFS 3 is there, but AAEE 2 in the remaining three scenarios. Why since energy efficiency and fuel substitutions are rival or competitive and AAEE 2 allows for more fuel substitutes to occur. So going from left to right, having AAEE 2, it allows for more fuel substitution, as you get more aggressive with the scenarios.

8 The amount of programmatic AAFS increases in 9 aggressiveness. Now how our FSSAT modeling works is it 10 takes the baseline gas forecast and gives haircuts by each 11 AAEE and AAFS scenario. So the more programmatic AAFS 12 occurs, the less residual gas is available and eligible to 13 be fuel substituted and thus be impacted by the zero 14 emission appliance standard. So keep in mind that when we 15 model these appliance standards scenarios, they're 16 incremental to the existing programmatic and incentive activities. Next slide. 17

18 Now characterizing the zero emission appliance technology standard that goes into FSSAT all include space 19 20 and water heating while a AAFS 5 and AAFS 6 include other 21 end uses like cooking and clothes drying as well as 2.2 residential propane. At the local level all have the same 23 penetration for the Bay Area Air Quality Management 24 District. But for AAFS 6 it includes residential end uses 25 for the South Coast Air Quality Management District

1 starting in 2029. Next slide.

2 The other levers are the technology and adoption 3 rates. All scenarios have the same set of technologies 4 being modeled. However, the adoption of these technologies 5 are evenly mixed where each potential electric technology 6 has an equal chance of being added. However, for AAFS 6, 7 the efficiency mix is highly weighted where more of the 8 higher efficient technologies or heat pump will be adopted. 9 As seen and read, we modified our AAFS 6 assumptions since 10 the August workshop from a scenario where it was strictly 11 the most efficient equipment in the sets that could be 12 adopted. We revised this even though it would be an 13 interesting to see this technical potential and impacts, 14 but a highly weighted mix is a more realistic and more 15 germane for this forecast.

16 Finally, the adoption rate assumes a linear 17 adoption rate of 2030, which I'll detail in the upcoming 18 slides. There is a lot of uncertainty with these rates and 19 keeping them linear has been the most agreeable path. 20 Notice that it is the planning forecast where we do a 21 slight downward adjustment in the adoption of the heat 2.2 pumps in the interim years before the standard goes into 2.3 effect. Next slide.

24 So here's basically the summary slide without 25 some red ink on it. Summarizing our assumptions. Next

1 slide, please. But to clarify the focus for today and what 2 Ethan will present our focus is mostly on the first two 3 columns, AAFS 3 and AAFS 4, which are included in the 4 planning forecast and local reliability scenario. Next 5 slide.

6 As for the adoption and compliance rates, 7 everything in white are adoption rates that do not vary 8 across scenarios. They include what is happening in new 9 construction across the state and what's happening with 10 replaced on burnout in the Bay Area Air Quality Management 11 District where for new construction is 100 percent for 12 commercial sector starting in 2029 and a hundred percent 13 for residential sector starting in 2026. The Bay Area has 14 water heaters as being a hundred percent replaced starting 15 in 2027 and space heaters is being replaced in 2029. Next 16 slide.

17 Now the green area shows the variation of 18 adoption rates across the scenarios and the blue shows what 19 is assumed for residential propane. The replace on burnout 20 is 100 percent starting in 2030 to adhere to the Air 21 Resources Board standard. While there is a 10 percent 2.2 reductions ramp up rate for AAFS 3 or the planning 23 scenario. And as can be seen residential propane falls 24 similar adoption rates as for gas. And to restate again 25 these assumptions were developed in collaboration with the

Air Resources Board. We are reviewing these assumptions
 with stakeholders including CPUC, CAISO and the California
 Air Resource Board. The direction from our leadership is to
 move forward with what we are presenting today. Next slide,
 please.

6 Now before I turn it over to Ethan Cooper to 7 discuss the results of these scenarios, I want to summarize 8 a few changes since the 2022 IEPR update. The first is the 9 most major one and Ingrid touched on it, both the planning 10 forecast and local reliability scenarios include the zero emission standards. So both not just one. Instead of just 11 12 one scenario. We have four and they vary by technology 13 weighting. Note that last year we assumed highly weighted 14 efficiency in that scenario. So this year our scenarios are 15 more conservative and includes more electric resistant 16 technology penetration. We updated some of our adoption 17 assumptions based on new information from the local air 18 districts and now we include residential propane and other 19 end uses in our scenarios. Lastly, we have updated FSSAT 20 with the latest data available from the 2023 IEPR forecast 21 as well as we have updated FSSAT's assumptions on regional 2.2 air conditioner penetration rates in PG&E territory. And 23 that data was generated from analysis by Recurve using AMI 24 data. Next slide.

25

So thank you so much for your attention. Let me

pass it on to our next speaker, Ethan Cooper who is the 1 2 technical staff in our units and he will discuss the 3 results 4 And you have to probably advance a few slides. I 5 have some appendix slides that give some details about the 6 zero emission appliance standards. 7 MR. COOPER: All right there. Thank you, Nick. 8 I'm Ethan Cooper and right now I'm going to be 9 going moving into looking at our results for the 10 incorporation of the zero risk compliance standards into our AAFS scenarios 3 through 6, they're being adopted for 11 12 the 2023 IEPR forecast. Next slide, please. 13 So for the results here, we're going to kind of 14 split it up into two main sections. The first section is 15 going to be looking at our overall energy impacts for all 16 of the AAFS scenarios that are going to be modeling the 17 zero emission appliance standard into that includes 18 scenarios 3 through 6 that could split it up and looking at 19 both the gas electricity impacts for each of these AAFS 20 scenarios. We'll taking a look at a bit of an impact 21 comparison for these scenarios to kind of see for each AAFS 2.2 scenario, what are the energy impacts are making some 23 change to our characterization of ZE standard while keeping 24 all else equal. Just basically seeing what are really the 25 major impacts of our technology characterization choices

1 that we have in terms of how it affects our gas electric 2 impacts for the ZE standard. And then beyond that we're 3 going to go into a second section which is going to be 4 looking at really just taking a more deeper dive into the 5 AAEE and AAFS load modifiers that Nick mentioned are going 6 to be being used for the demand forecast scenarios.

7 So both for the planning forecast and local 8 liability scenario. This will include looking at both the 9 gas and electricity impacts for AAEE and AAFS load 10 modifiers for our demand forecast scenarios. And then 11 looking at a comparison of these zero emission appliance 12 standards, just the impact of the zero appliance standard 13 for the local liability scenario and the results we have 14 for the 2022 IEPR update. And then the results we are 15 seeing for this 2023 IEPR cycle this year. And then lastly, 16 looking at a bit of view about the added electric 17 appliances that are coming into, they're going to be 18 installed into buildings because of our different AAFS 19 scenarios 3 and 4 for the two demand forecast scenarios. 20 With that, can you move to the next slide, please? 21 Alright, so I want to just pinpoint again our

major technology characterization assumptions that we have for the 0 percent appliance standard in each of our AAFS scenarios because it's going to be important to understand why the gas impacts for each scenario are going to be

1 changing between scenarios 3 and 6. And it's also important 2 because when we're doing our impact comparisons, the 3 changes we're going to be making are to any of the FSSAT 4 characterization levers we have in the light green boxes. 5 So like the water heating and space heating choice or the 6 AQMD choice. So just wanted to go get that out there before 7 we start going all in on the results. So with that we move 8 on to the next slide.

9 Alright, so now we're going to be going over our
10 overall impacts for gas savings, electricity additions for
11 the AAFS scenarios 3 through 6. Next slide, please.

So starting with AAFS scenarios three and four, we see that scenario 3 and 4 have a fairly large difference between the two of them and that difference is being predominantly driven by the programmatic impacts that we see for both AAFS scenario 3 and 4. See there's about 640 MM therms more gas savings in scenario 4 starting in 2030.

18 But by 2040 that does go down to about 84 MM 19 therms. And the reason why it goes down starting I think in 20 2036 is because of the fact that our zero emission 21 appliance standard gas savings for AAFS scenario 3 started 2.2 to become greater than what we see for AAFS scenario 4 in 23 that year, elbow to 2040. And we're going to go into more 24 as to why that is happening. We're going to take the deeper 25 dive into AAFS scenarios 3 and 4 that are being used to the

1 demand forecast scenarios. Can you move to the next slide, 2 please?

Then taking a look at our AAFS scenarios 5 and 6, we can see that the difference between these two scenarios is much lower than we saw for scenarios four, sorry, three and four. And the main reason for that is really the only main difference between scenarios 5 and 6 is the programmatic contributions and they aren't too different in these two scenarios.

10 So really the zero return appliance standards, gas savings or electricity addition impacts aren't too 11 12 different between scenarios 5 and 6 or 3 and 4. However, 13 that impact does come into play when we go between 14 scenarios four and five as we could show on the next slide. 15 But overall, the difference between scenarios 5 and 6 are 16 that scenario 6 saves about 135 MM therms is more gas in 2030 and about 19 MM therms is more in 2040. Move on to the 17 18 next slide. Thank you.

Yeah, so this is where we're showing the largest impact between the AAFS scenarios when we bring in the zero emission supply standard modeling comes between scenarios 4 and 5, and that is just due to the fact that scenarios 5 and 6, as we showed in our characterization table earlier on in this presentation, are including fuel substitution for not just water and space heaters for the gas for - gas

appliances, but also for fuel substitution of propane,
 residential propane, gas and water heaters along with fuel
 substitution for the cooking and close rank end uses.

So really AAFS scenarios 5 and 6 provide us with a lot more areas for the zero supply standard to have any gas savings for fuel substitution to occur leading to this large difference between the orange line, which is AAFS 5 and the green line, which is AAFS 4. But that can move on to the next slide to now look at electricity impacts.

10 Here's where we kind of start seeing an interesting situation where AAFS scenario 3 is kind of 11 12 going against what we'd expect it to be doing where instead 13 of being greater than AAFS scenario 4 throughout the entire 14 forecast is actually, sorry lower than AAFS scenario 4 15 throughout the entire forecast. It is actually higher than 16 scenario 4 starting in 2037. And we can see that the 17 difference between AAFS scenario 4 and 3 is about 2,300 18 gigawatt hours in 2030 with scenario 4 being greater than, 19 but in 2040 it's about 3,100 gigawatt greater, sorry 20 difference in 2040 with now AAFS scenario three being 21 greater.

We're going to go into why that is different in the next few slides. But before that I wanted to go onto the next slide to show the impacts we have for scenario 5 and 6 before we compare all of them together. So you can

1 see that for AAFS scenario 5, we are again seeing the situation where scenario 5 is much greater, not much 2 3 greater, but it is greater than scenario 6 throughout 2030 4 and beyond. And that is because of the zero emission 5 appliance standard and how we're modeling it differently between scenarios 5 and 6. So AAFS scenario 5 saves about 6 7 450 gigawatt hours or more electricity in 2030 and about 8 3,570 gigawatt hours more in 2040. So if we move on to the 9 next slide, I'll kind of explain the difference between the 10 two, between why scenarios 3 and 4 look different and same 11 for scenario 5 and 6.

12 So for the reason why AAFS scenario 5 is greater 13 than scenario 6 for electricity impact is because of the 14 fact that for AAFS scenario 6, we're modeling the zero-15 emission appliance standard using a technology efficiency 16 weighting choice of high rather than even, which basically 17 allows us to be installing more of the higher efficient 18 appliances into buildings rather than the lower efficient 19 appliances when we're using the, even waiting for AAFS 20 scenario 5 leading to an overall reduction in the electric 21 impact for that scenario. And then for scenarios 3 and 4, 2.2 the reason why scenario 3 is greater than scenario 4 23 starting in 2038 again is because, not because of how we're 24 modeling the standard, but it's just because of the fact 25 that the ZE standard has more gas savings for AAFS scenario

3 starting in 2036, which leads to starting at 2037, the ZE
 standard at a electricity AAFS scenario 3 also started to
 become greater than scenario 4 and that goes all the way up
 to 2040.

5 Now we're going to go more into depth about 6 really why it is so much greater where the gas savings were 7 still AAFS scenario 3 and 4 started getting closer and 8 closer together, but they did not show AAFS 4 being lower 9 gas savings is scenario three. We'll go into that later on 10 when we show the impact comparison of scenarios 3 and 4 alongside the impacts of AAEE as well. So with that, I'll 11 12 move on to the next slide.

13 So before we go on to looking into the further 14 deep analysis on scenarios 3 and 4, I kind of want to go 15 over our scenario comparison that I discussed earlier. So 16 for this we're just really looking at what are the major 17 energy implications of some of our major ZE appliance 18 technology characterization levers that we had in the table 19 shown in the beginning of the presentation before we got 20 into the results section.

And for that really we're just showing each of our AAFS scenarios in their original form, which is basically all of our solid colored lines on this slide and the following slides and then comparing them to another version of that scenario where we've changed one or one or

1 multiple of our assumptions we have and our technology characterization levers, those light green, those light 2 3 green rows that I talked about earlier. And basically just 4 seeing what is the energy impact of making that change 5 while making sure we keep everything else for that scenario 6 equal. So just changing as different assumptions to our ZE 7 standard technology characterization levers. So for AAFS scenario 3 and 4, the two choices we made is that first 8 9 scenario 3 we wanted to see what is our energy impact of 10 actually putting in that 10 percent put a line wrap up 11 adoption rate. Basically we did that by comparing our 12 original AAFS scenario three with a version of AAFS 13 scenario 3 called AAFS 3, no low ramp, which is our dashed 14 or red line that looks at our AAFS scenario 3.

15 But using the normal linear rep adoption rate 16 that is used for AAFS scenarios 4 through 6, basically the 17 one that does not have any reduction to the interim years. 18 And for that one we can see that as we expected the gas 19 savings that you get for AAFS scenario 3 using that 10 20 percent reduction to our linear ramp up adoption rate 21 lowers the amount of gas savings that we would see by about 2.2 95 MM therms and 2033 to have used the normal linear ramp 23 of adoption rate that is being used in all of our other 24 AAFS scenarios. And then for scenario 4, we're basically 25 looking at what are the impacts of including the Bay Area

AQMD's emission rules into our modeling of these supply standards. And that is shown by AAFS scenario 4, no Bay Area AQMD or dash green line that is showing the impacts of running the same scenario but having the Bay Area mission rules excluded from our modeling run.

6 And we can see here that the impacts including 7 AAFS scenario 4, the impacts for AAFS scenario 4 including 8 the Bay Area AQMD's emission rules provide us with about 35 9 MM therms more gas savings at 2030 than if we were to run 10 that same scenario but without the impacts of the zero 11 emission about, sorry, without the impacts of the Bay Are's 12 emission rules. So kind of a key takeaway of this slide, 13 what we can see on the next slide is that there is a pretty 14 noticeable difference in the different choices we made for 15 these scenario comparisons, but they aren't quite that 16 large as we were additionally expecting them to be for the 17 next slide.

18 This slide is just the electricity impact showing 19 the same scenario but just reverse energy looking at 20 different energy, looking at gigawatt hours added rather 21 than MM therm saved. And so we can kind of see that AAFS 2.2 scenario three including that linear, that reduction toward 23 linear rep of adoption rate reduces the amount of 24 electricity that gets added for that scenario by about 1040 25 gigawatt hours in 2030. If we to have run that scenario

with the normal linear ramp up adoption rate being used for
 the other AAFS scenarios.

And then for AAFS scenario 4, we can see that including the zero emission appliance standard, sorry the emission rules for the Bay Area AQMD increases the amount of electricity being added for that scenario by about 426 equal hours. In 2030 that if we were to have run that scenario without the impact to the Bay Area emission rules.

9 Moving on to the next slide we now wanted to go 10 see for AAFS scenario 5, how big of an impact is our choice 11 for including the zero emission appliance standard to be 12 modeled for other FSSAT end uses? Basically cooking clothes 13 drying as well as for residential propane fuel substitution 14 of water and space heating appliances. And that difference 15 was shown by creating the AAFS scenario 5 only water and 16 space heating scenario. The dashed orange line that 17 basically just shows us that including the zero emission 18 appliance standard modeling for residential propane fuel 19 substitution as well as for the other FSSAT end uses adds a 20 considerable amount more natural gas savings.

About 670 MM therms in 2040 that approved to have just run AAFS scenario 5 with only allowing for fuel substitution from the ZE standard into the water and space heating appliances. And then for AAFS scenario 6, we wanted to see what was the impact really for our gas savings on

including the South Coast AQMD's emission measures. But we 1 2 can see here by 2030 having the zero emission appliance, 3 the emission measures for the South Coast AQMD adds about 4 55 MM therms if there's more gas savings for our scenario 5 in 2030 than if we were to have run the scenario without 6 including the impact of the zero emission, the impacts of 7 the South Coast AQMD's emission measures, which is in our dashed blue line. So with that, if we move to the next 8 9 slide.

10 I want to then show the electricity impacts for AAFS scenario 5 and 6 for our scenario comparisons. So for 11 12 AAFS scenario 5, we can see that the inclusion of modeling 13 the zero supply standard for other Fuel Substitution 14 Scenario Analysis Tool (FFSAT) end uses and residential 15 propane fuel and the residential propane fuels really 16 increases the amount of electricity that gets added for 17 scenario 5 by about 10,700 gigawatt hours in 2040. And if 18 we were to have run that scenario without the inclusion of 19 fuel substitution for those other asset end uses or for 20 residential propane fuels and then for AAFS scenario 6, we 21 see that running the scenario with the impacts of the South 2.2 Coast AQMD's mission rules adds about 535 gigawatt hours in 23 2030. Then if we were to have run that scenario without 24 having the impacts of the South Coast AQMD mission rules be 25 included. So really it's a noticeable difference for AAFS

scenario 6 between running it with and without the South
 Coast AQMD, but it's not that large.

3 It's not as large at least as what we see for 4 running AAFS scenario 5 with or without fuel substitution 5 for the other FSSAT end uses or for residential propane 6 fuel substitution. And then the last one that we wanted to 7 add here was trying to go see what is the impact of running 8 our AAFS scenario 6, both with using the technology 9 efficiency weighting that we have for that scenario right 10 now, which is the high choice. It's basically allowing for 11 more high efficient appliances to be installed rather than 12 the lower efficient alternatives compared to running the 13 AAFS scenario, the dotted line using the evenly weighted 14 efficiency choice that is being used for all the other AAFS 15 scenarios. And we can see here that running AAFS scenario six with our high efficiency waiting gives us about 3,500 16 17 gigawatt hours of more less electricity being added to the 18 grid in 2040 than compared to if we were to have run AAFS 19 scenario 6 using the even instead of the high efficiency 20 waiting choice.

21 With that, if we move to the next slide, that's 22 the end of our overall impacts for all the AAFS scenarios. 23 We're now going to move into a more detailed impact of the 24 AAFS scenarios 3 and 4 that are being used with the 25 planning forecast and low core liability scenario. Next

1 slide, please.

2 So here we're going to be showing the gas impacts 3 that our AAEE and AAFS load modifiers have to the plan 4 forecast and again for, I think I forgot to mention this 5 earlier, but we're only going to be looking at for this and 6 the following slides, the residential and the commercial 7 sectors since those are the only two sectors that the zero 8 emission appliance standard is having any gas fuel 9 substitution being modeled for. And before we get into 10 this, I again want to go explain the process that FSSAT 11 works when it tries to do any fuel substitution 12 calculations for any FSSAT based fuel substitution. 13 As Ingrid mentioned earlier, at the end of her 14 slides is that we have our baseline gas forecast 15 residential and commercial sector, which is any gas 16 available for any fuel substitution or energy efficiency 17 measures. That forecast then gets reduced by any of the 18 impacts we have from programmatic AAFS to give us a 19 modified baseline forecast that is any gas left over for 20 any FSSAT based or in this case ZE standard based fuel 21 substitution. Once that fuel substitution is done, we then 2.2 reduce the baseline forecast one more time - that modified 23 forecast gets reduced to now incorporate the impacts of 24 programmatic and FSSAT based fuel substitution to leave us 25 with a revised forecast that gives us any gas left over for

any energy efficiency from AAEE to occur for the gas - for 1 2 any gas energy efficiency to occur for AAEE scenarios. And 3 that's where we can see in some cases we may have a chance 4 where once we only have gas leftover for AAEE after fuel 5 substitution has been accounted for, we might not have 6 enough gas actually available for all the AAEE savings to 7 be achieved and that's what we would show in this slide, 8 any AAEE savings only showing the savings that are able to 9 be achieved after we incorporate the impacts of 10 programmatic AAFS and ZE standard AAFS into the baseline 11 forecast.

So with that I'm going to move on to the next slide to go show on our baseline forecast, which is our solid black lineup there, what is the impact for programmatic AAFS scenario 3 in the planning forecast. We see that it reduces our baseline forecast by about 3.8 percent in 2040, which we then could compare that to the next slide.

Our ZE standards impact, which is shown here considerably greater in terms of the baseline gas reduction. It reduces the baseline gas forecast further by about 64.1 percent in 2040 and overall has a gas savings amount of about 3951 MM therms in 2040. So clearly we see that the ZE standard portion of AAFS is doing a lot of the gas savings work of the entire AAFS scenario 3. Move on to

the next slide -1

2	to then add in the impacts of AAE scenario 2. We
3	can see that it reduces the forecast one step further by
4	reducing our gas baseline forecast by about 4.4 percent in
5	2040 to lead to all the different wedges, the programmatic,
6	ZE standard and AAEE portions of our load modifiers
7	reducing the baseline forecast by about 72.3 percent in
8	2040. And this leads to an overall reduction in the gas
9	savings for all three wedges in 2040 of about 4,450 MM
10	therms. And move on to the next slide.
11	I want to quickly before going into local
12	liability scenario kind of show the progression in the
13	baseline gas reduction we have for our different load
14	modifiers from 2030 to 2040. And I kind just want to point
15	out the fact that for the ZE standard we have, even in
16	2030, a considerable amount of gas savings happening from
17	the ZE standard, it's about 14 percent in 2030. That's how
18	much it reduces the baseline gas forecast and they want to
19	show the substantial jump we have from 2030 to 2040 the ZE
20	standard, which just shows how much gas savings happen from
21	2030 onwards because of us now having the zero appliance
22	standard becoming to full effect and add its a 100 percent
23	compliance rate. Move on to the next slide and then one
24	more.
25	Now I'm going to show the impact of the local

1 liability scenario, the local scenarios AAEE and AAFS load 2 modifiers on our commercial and residential baseline gas 3 forecast. We can see that for AAFS scenario 4, we have a 4 considerable amount more baseline gas reduction for AAFS 5 scenario 4, the programmatic contribution, it's now about 6 9.4 percent reduction to the baseline forecast in 2040. If 7 we move on to the next slide.

8 We can see that the zero risk appliance standard 9 is still out of extra zero - extra natural gas savings for 10 the fuel substitution from the ZE standard. See that it 11 reduces the baseline forecast further by about 59.5 percent 12 in 2040 leading to an overall savings of about 3666 therms 13 in 2040. But the one thing we do want to note here is that 14 the baseline gas reduction and the gas savings value 15 actually has gone down for the ZE standard from what we saw 16 in the planning forecast. And that is actually important to 17 know because it is shown here to be kind of made up 18 actually by the extra gas savings we have for the 19 programmatic portion of AAFS. This time for the low city 20 scenario than we had in the planning forecast. And move on 21 to the next slide. 2.2 I want to show the final impact we have of our

22 I want to show the final impact we have of our 23 programmatic AAEE scenario 2. We reduces the baseline 24 forecast one step further to about reducing it by 3.8 25 percent in 2040 leading to the total combination of all

1 those wedges, reducing our baseline forecast by about 72.7 2 percent in 2040 leading to an overall gas savings amount of about 4,476 MM therms in 2040. I kind of wanted to also 3 4 show these baseline gas reduction percentages to just show 5 how big of an impact are AAEE and AAFS load modifiers 6 combined have on reducing our baseline gas consumption for 7 both the residential and commercial sector rather than just showing the overall gas impacts that each scenario has 8 9 alone rather than showing its comparison to the baseline 10 forecast. If we move one more scenario sorry, one more 11 slide.

12 I want to go show that again. There's a 13 substantial jump in the ZE standard gas savings and or I 14 quess a significant jump in the baseline gas reduction 15 percentage we have for the AAFS ZE standard in 2030 16 compared to what we have in 2040. 2030 baseline gas 17 reduction for the AAFS ZE standard is a bit higher than we 18 saw in the planning forecast, but again for 2040 we see 19 that the baseline gas reduction percentage as well as the 20 gas savings are lower in 2040 than what we saw for the zero 21 emission appliance standard. So with that move on to the 2.2 next slide.

23 So now I want to kind of go show in the table 24 what are the actual differences between the local liability 25 scenario and the planning forecasts gas impacts to the

demand forecast scenarios between 2030 and 2040. The 1 2 important thing to note in this table is that we can see 3 that the load modifier total in 2030 has a very large 4 difference between the two gas savings amounts, where the 5 local liability scenario is saving about 600 MM therms more 6 gas in 2030 than the planning forecast is. However, I want 7 to note that that does change in the 2040 values where now 8 the local liability scenario is still saving more gas but 9 the difference between the two are considerably lower but 10 only about 20 MM therms difference. And I want to go 11 pinpoint that the predominant reason is why that is 12 happening is because of our AAFS ZE standard. Now having, 13 as we've mentioned in the slides way earlier, that the 14 planning forecast ZE standard gas savings in 2040 are going 15 to be higher than we see for the local liability scenario 16 in 2040 by about I think 300 MM therm more gas savings for 17 the planning forecast ZE standard savings than what we see 18 for the local liability scenario. Move on to the next 19 slide.

I'm going to highlight that the main reason for that is because of our programmatic AAFS contributions introducing our baseline gas forecast and the local liability scenario versus the planning forecast. And the fact is that the ZE standard really has no difference in our technology characterization of that standard from 2030

1 onwards. It's only different in the pre-2030 timeline 2 because we have that production in the interim years of 3 adoption for the planning forecast then what we do in the local ability scenario. But beyond that, they have the same 4 5 compliance rates for electric appliances that are going to 6 be replaced each year with - sorry, gas appliances being 7 replaced each with an electric alternative. That leads to 8 the fact that if we have a higher AAFS programmatic 9 scenario, we're going to thereby have a lower amount of 10 baseline gas available for the ZE standard to replace, 11 which is what we're seeing here.

12 We have a higher local liability scenario AAFS 13 forecast, which means we have lower gas available for the 14 ZE standard to do any fuel substitution on, which is why 15 when compare to the baseline gas available for any fuel 16 substitution from the ZE standard for the planning 17 forecast, which leads to the gas savings for the planning 18 forecast for the ZE standard to be greater than the local 19 liability scenario.

If we move on to the next slide then I'm going to go into the electricity impacts now for these two scenarios. So for AAFS scenario 3, the ZE standard appears to have quite a large impact in terms of electricity being added to the grid. Even starting in 2030 when the first year of full compliance happens for the CE standard and

that's also because the programmatic - the AAFS 3 1 2 programmatic electricity additions are quite small. We 3 compare to the ZE standard and to the AAEE electricity 4 that's being saved by scenario 3. And by 2040 we see that 5 the overall impact of the ZE standard electricity additions 6 are about 41,800 gigawatt hours, which we compare to AAFS 7 programmatic is about 25 times greater amounts of 8 electricity additions than what we see for the programmatic 9 portions.

10 And the reason for that is because of the fact 11 that for the programmatic AAFS that's looking at efficient 12 electrification, really trying to go incentivize, putting 13 in the most efficient appliances out there to replace gas 14 equipment. Whereas for the ZE standard and for the FSSAT 15 modeling, we're basically allowing for not a majority but a 16 larger amount of different appliances to replace gas 17 equipment for every end. Use each of those appliances 18 having different levels of efficiency that dictate how much 19 electric gets added for gas or moved for each technology. 20 And just having that variety of electric technologies out 21 there means that we have more likelihood of putting in less 2.2 efficient appliances that would be increasing our amount of 23 electricity being added than what we are seeing for the 24 programmatic portions. And overall our net impact for all 25 of our AAFS and AAEE load modifiers in 2040 results in

about a 31,677 gigawatt hour increase in electricity for
 the forecast in the planning forecast by 2040.

3 And that's important to note because of the - go
4 to the next slide.

5 We're going to compare that to the total we have 6 connect back total we have to all the AAFS and AEE load 7 modifiers in 2040 being only about 31,816 gigawatt of 8 electricity, which is still higher than the planning 9 forecast but not by much. And the main reasons for that as 10 we're going to show in the next slide. But before that I'm going to stay here and just show that zero and appliance 11 12 standards savings in 2040 do go down to about only 37,716 13 gigawatt hours, which now compared to the programmatic AAFS 14 scenario is only about 13 times higher. And the 15 programmatic AAFS does go up by a little bit, as we can see 16 by the blue bars having I guess just being easier to see in 17 this graph than what we saw in the planning forecast.

And we also have lower AAEE gas savings which makes sense because using a lower AAEE - sorry scenario. So if you go to the next slide.

I'm going to go kind of show impacts of the electric impact for our demand forecast scenarios side by side for the planning forecast and local liability in both 2030 and 2040 to show really explaining why we saw AAFS scenario 3 electricity impacts being greater than AAFS

scenario 4 starting in I believe it was 2038. That's 1 2 because as we can see here for the load modifier total, the 3 last row in our light green boxes, we see that at 2030 the 4 local liability scenario is adding about 7,365 gigawatt of 5 electricity where the planning forecast is only adding 6 about 2363. So there's quite a big difference between local 7 liability and planning forecast with local liability being 8 higher. But once we move on to 2040, as I kind of 9 pinpointed in the graphs and slide before this, we only 10 have a small difference between the local ability scenario and planning forecasts at electricity kind of falling what 11 12 we have on our light blue row below that showing that there 13 was only a 20 MM therms difference between the gas savings 14 and the local reliability and planning forecast.

15 Now we only have about a little bit less than 200 16 gigawatt hour difference between the local ability scenario 17 and the planning forecast in 2040 for AAEE and AAFS load 18 modifiers. And the main contributing factor to those 19 numbers not being too different is, again, because the ZE 20 standard has a lot more electricity addition to the 21 planning forecast than it does in the local ability 22 scenario, which is just a bit of a byproduct of the fact 23 that we have more ZE standard gas savings in the planning 24 forecast than the local liability scenario. And that makes 25 it so that way the difference between the programmatic

1 gigawatt hour electricity additions in the planning 2 forecast versus local liability scenario not being great 3 enough to make up for the difference we see for the ZE 4 standard being greater in the planning forecast than in the 5 local reliability scenario. Leading to the situation we saw 6 in the charts - I think the second chart that I showed or 7 the first chart I showed for the comparing AAFS 3 and 4 is 8 electricity impact having scenario three be greater, the 9 scenario four starting in 2038 and staying the same all the 10 to 2040.

11 With that I'm going to move on to the next slide. 12 To kind of end off on our energy impact 13 assumptions or analysis by showing what our local 14 reliability ZE standard gas impacts were in the 2022 IEPR 15 update versus what we are seeing for them in our 2023 IEPR 16 cycle. This year we noticed that the gas standard savings 17 for the locality scenario are going to be lower for this 18 IEPR cycle than they were last year. And the primary reason for that is the fact that we are using a residential 19 20 baseline gas forecast for the 2023 IEPR that is lower than 21 what we are using for the 2021 IEPR that was used when we 2.2 ran the ZE standard for the 2021 -sorry, in the 2022 IEPR 23 update. This leads to just the fact that the ZE standard is 24 going to have less gas available for any fuel substitution 25 than what we saw last year. If move on to the next slide.

1 I want to show the electricity impact, which is 2 actually the reverse what we're seeing for the gas savings 3 impact. We're now using the - we're now the ZE standard is 4 actually showing high electricity additions starting in 5 2030 for the 2023 IEPR when compared to the 2022 IEPR 6 update. And that is being driven largely by the fact that 7 our efficiency weighting choice has been changed. What we 8 were using last year to this year, where last year we were 9 using a high efficiency weighting choice that basically 10 gave more priority for the higher efficient appliances to go be installed to replace gas equipment where now we're 11 12 using an evenly weighted efficiency choice that gives more 13 - or not more priority but basically gives equal priority 14 to all appliances to replace gas's equipment basically 15 allowing or - basically having us put in more or less 16 efficient appliances than what we saw last year. With that, 17 I'll move on to the next slide, which is kind of the final 18 slides that I have for this presentation.

And this is just basically looking at our electric appliance equipment that's being installed from our programmatic and ZE standard portions of AAFS throughout the planning forecast on this slide and for the local reliability scenario on the following slide. So here we can go see this chart showing our residential air and water heat pumps and electric resistance technology that

1 are being installed for each AAFS scenario with blue 2 showing our heat pumps and then orange showing our electric 3 resistance. But electric resistance only being for our 4 water heating end use as the HVAC end use is only looking 5 at heat pump technologies. And one last thing note here is 6 that this chart is again only looking at the residential 7 sector and not looking at any commercial heat pumps since we're not currently able to in our FSSAT tool model the 8 9 impact or model the amount of heat pumps being installed 10 for the commercial sector. And it also does not incorporate 11 any of the heat pumps that have been previously installed 12 in years prior to 2024.

13 So we also have a line at the very top which is 14 called 6 million residential heat pumps, which is kind 15 showing our target similar to the one that we have. Similar 16 to the one that was established in the 2021 IEPR that Nick 17 mentioned about having 6 million heat pumps be installed by 18 2030, but we're only limiting it to residential heat pumps 19 for our chart because that's the only sector we're showing 20 the AAFS stock for. We can see here that in 2030 for the 21 planning forecast we are adding about, I would say I think 2.2 there's about 3.3 million heat pumps being installed by 2.3 2030 from our AAFS scenario 3. And then there's an extra 24 1.1 million electric resistance appliances being installed 25 in that same year, for total about 4.4 electric appliances

total in 2030 being installed. We can see here that if we're looking at just our projected installations of key pump appliances from the AAFS scenario 4 from 2024 to 2030, in 2030, we do not appear right now to be in the path towards reaching that 6 million residential heat pump target.

7 And if we were to also add in, as you see on the 8 text box to the left, the roughly 1.15 million residential 9 and commercial heat pumps that we estimate to have 10 currently been installed in California, which is based off of CEC analysis, we still only about shy of 5 million heat 11 12 pumps. So still does not appear that we are on the path to 13 the planning forecast to be reaching - do not appear to be 14 on the path to - but are slowly approaching that 6 million 15 heat pump goal. However, we also have to note that because 16 we're not able to include commercial appliances, that is 17 also affecting the amount of forecasted AAFS stock values 18 we're going to be including. So that path could very well 19 change to be reaching that 6 million heat pump target were 20 we able to include the commercial sector installed heat 21 pumps from our AAFS scenarios. Move on to the next slide. 2.2 I want to show the impacts of the local liability

23 scenario. We're now in 2030 for AAFS scenario four, we're 24 actually already just from the impacts of AAFS scenario 4 25 installing almost 5 million heat pumps by 2030 now about an

1 extra 1.112 million electric resistance appliances by 2030 2 as well leading to an overall total amount of about a 3 little more than 6 million total electric appliances being 4 installed by that year for AAFS scenario 4. But we're 5 looking at just the heat pumps of 2030 and including our 6 impacts that we have for the roughly 1.5 million 7 residential and commercial heat pumps already installed in 8 the state, we can see that we are actually getting to above 9 6 million heat pumps being installed by 2030, which kind of 10 shows that local reliability scenario does appear to be on the path towards reaching that 6 million heat pump target. 11

And I guess the final conclusion for these last 12 13 two slides are just showing that for the local reliability 14 scenario we're quite confident or we are confident that 15 that scenario does appear to be on the correct path towards 16 reaching the installation of 6 million heat pumps by 2030, 17 but we're not as confident for the planning forecast that 18 it'll be able to is on the path yet right now to be 19 reaching that 2030 6 million heat pump goal.

But we also need to remember that without having the impacts of commercial heat pumps for our AAFS results, that path is not exactly the true one. That could change once we are able to incorporate the impact of added heat pumps for the commercial sector with our FSSAT tool. So with that move on to the next slide, which I think is just

1 the final slide. So I'll say thank you all to everyone and 2 I think we're moving on to questions. So I'm going to pass 3 on to Cynthia.

MS. RAITT: Thank you, Ethan. This is Heather. Ethan and Nick, and first we'll just ask Vice Chair Gunda if he had any questions for you.

7 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Thank you, Heather. First I 8 want to just say thank you Ingrid, Nick and Ethan. That's 9 so much content there. I was just going through slide by 10 slide over again. I know we had a lot of internal discussions and briefings, but just a large amount of 11 12 content to digest. I have a couple of questions but I would 13 like to - I don't see any Q and A in the public, so I'll 14 try to set up a couple of questions and let's circle back.

15 So I think at the 30,000 foot level, I just want 16 to go back to maybe start with Ingrid, if Ingrid's still 17 here.

18 MS. NEUMANN: I'm here.

VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Okay, so Ingrid just can you just for the record, confirm that the pyramid of scenarios that you showed. AAEE and AAFS the 1 and 2, so that applies, but for AAEE and AAFS, and just making sure that you also explain that the 1 and 2 are primarily coming from the potential end goal study or anything else you want to add. I just want to make sure for the record we have that,

how are we constructing the first two scenarios?

1

2 MS. NEUMANN: Yeah, so the scenarios, just like 3 in previous years, the 1 was the most conservative, right? So 1 and 2 are, well, okay, 1 we're not using for the 4 5 forecast. Two we are using for the AAEE 2 for the local 6 reliability but not for any fuel sub. Then 3 is our 7 reference that we're using both for AAEE and AAFS for the 8 statewide planning scenario. Four we're using AAFS 4 in 9 conjunction with a AAEE 2 for the local planning. Then the 10 most aggressive or optimistic AAEE and AAFS 5 and 6, the 11 boulder blue and the violet are not being used for any 12 forecast scenarios.

13 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Yeah, so just making sure 14 though on just the inputs that go into those 1 and 2. Could 15 you just expand on that for the record? Yeah.

16 MS. NEUMANN: Oh. Yeah, so that's true. So 17 predominantly what does go in there is a conservative 18 scenario from the potential goal study for IOU programs. 19 Our own conservative estimate of the POU programs, they 20 only submit one scenario for us, and then we used - based 21 on the differences in the CPUC'S potential goal study 2.2 between their more conservative scenarios and their more 23 aggressive scenarios by sector. We used those if they were 24 9 percent lower or 5 percent higher or whatever it was, we 25 used that to inform the sector based conservative view and

1 aggressive view of a POU program scenario. And we did that 2 in 2021. We did that again in 2023.

So those are two big data streams there. And then pretty much the Title 24, 2022 building standards, those are there in a conservative view as far as how much implementation compliance and that sort of thing. But those are the core pieces that do go in to those more conservative scenarios.

9 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Yes. Okay, thank you. So I 10 just wanted to get that on the record because we don't 11 discuss that today as much, but we know we discussed that 12 in the assumptions workshops.

So in terms of the magnitude of efficiency and AAFS, do we have - so we mostly talk about that in energy and terms. So we're talking about gigawatt hours and terms, could you just give an indication of what the magnitude in terms of megawatts generally - go ahead.

MS. NEUMANN: Well, I mean, so those would be the hourly values, right? I mean or some peak ones. And so we haven't put those together yet,

VICE CHAIR GUNDA: But from previous years, what is typically the magnitude of the building? The - like the fuel substitution like for example last year on the outlet side.

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MS. NEUMANN: Well, I mean it was a lot more than

it would be now. Yeah, I know. I don't have it right now.
 Sorry.

VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Sorry, sorry. I should not have put you on the spot like that. I think where I'm going with the question is just what do you expect in terms of the megawatts change in the fuel substitution is where I'm going. Like when we talk about reasonableness to how do we want to plan for it, what levels of megawatt impacts are we generally thinking about in directionally?

MS. NEUMANN: So I mean for the programmatic pieces that's smaller, right? For the totals, I don't think the totals changed as much with the SIP implementation accounted for. Those would look very similar to what we saw in 2022 for the local reliability scenario.

MR. COOPER: I think I can speak to that one. I think that's -

MS. NEUMANN: I was hoping that you might havethat number.

MR. COOPER: I think Nick mentioned - I think during his presentation that it was about 3000 ish megawatt increase from the zero emission plan standard in the local liability scenario in 2035. And that I think was the megawatt difference between planning forecast and local liability scenario. But most of that difference was from the inclusion of the zero emission appliance standard in

the local reliability scenario. So it was quite a big jump up, particularly because we were including the zero emission appliance standard in the local scenario while we weren't in the planning forecast. So it might be similar for both the planning forecast and local reliability scenario this year in terms of the zero appliance standards impact.

8

VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Got it.

9 So Ethan, I think this is more a comment. Just 10 first of all, just in the same spirit of this morning, the amount of work that's going into this is just tremendous. I 11 12 mean I kind see the evolution of our building work. I 13 remember when Nick joined the team and Ingrid joined the 14 team and where we were to where are today in terms of 15 continuing to change the rigor and how we think about all 16 these policy issues is just really fabulous to watch. So 17 I'm just now I'm thinking through next year we're going to 18 puts hundred report and a significant part of our SB 100 19 work is going to be the demand scenarios and there is this 20 blurring of demand forecast, demand scenarios. And what are 21 those handoff points? I'm just trying to figure out when we 2.2 talk about the penetration, the total addressable market in 23 a highly electrified future is probably more or less the 24 same.

25

It's like a part of the question is every time we

1 change the assumptions, the s-curve or the penetration 2 changes. And so where do you build those megawatts that are 3 required to keep the system reliable, continue to change? 4 And I'm trying to just figure out how do we support the 5 discussion of overall in 2045 timeframe, whether it's the 6 2021 SB 100 report in the future report. We're thinking 7 about a high electrification future.

8 So directionally we're going to get to the same 9 spot, but at this point, given the regulations and the 10 speed at which these regulations will come into compliance, that penetration shape will change and that shape will have 11 12 a direct impact on sourcing the resources necessary for 13 keeping the system reliable. So I think the more of a 14 comment is I would really appreciate if the team can in the 15 final adoption at a workshop or whenever we do that final 16 results indicate those ideas would be really helpful just 17 for the conversation around reliability and planning. Any 18 questions on that? Are we generally tracking that point? 19

MR. COOPER: That makes sense, yeah.

20 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Yeah, great. And I think I 21 wanted to also just support Nick, the decision that you shaped on the planning scenario using the CARB's zero 2.2 23 emission appliance regulation, I think really supportive of 24 the argument you provided that is a more or less reasonable 25 to occur. That's how you're thinking about this.

So I think a couple of comments on that. Given on 1 2 one hand we are planning for reliability and making sure we 3 quickly build as much as we can on the system side, but 4 given the rate impact that it could have and how do we 5 optimize that, really recommend bringing back to either an 6 informational item at a Business Meeting or however when 7 the CARB's regulations are already actually done and if 8 there's a significant departure from this, having some way 9 of updating those numbers in a mid basis. And finally, I 10 think on the gas side, you also laid out for the gas system 11 planning, looking at a more conservative approach. I feel 12 like that's very prudent given the overarching transition 13 on petroleum natural gas and electricity. There's so many 14 uncertainties and keeping the system reliable at large to 15 provide the confidence that we can get through this in a reliable fashion. Really important, really support that and 16 17 look forward to hearing stakeholder inputs into it. We 18 finalize the forecast. So I'm just generally really 19 thrilled with all of your work. I could ask a million 20 questions and Ingrid probably like you already asked that 21 question before. 2.2 It's such a dense material to digest this, but 23 really thrilled with all the work and look forward to

24 having some offline conversations. And with that I'll pass 25 it to Heather.

1 MS. RAITT: Great, thank you so much. 2 So it doesn't look like we have any questions, 3 but I'll just go ahead -4 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: And I think we might have a 5 comment. We might have one Q&A. 6 MS. RAITT: Yeah, it's really just, yeah, it's a 7 comment. Well, I'll go ahead and read it for us. 8 So in the newest 2023 IEPR cycle, we are 9 providing four substation allocations to the CAISO for 10 their transmission planning. These include the usual summer 11 peak, but also three other snapshots across the year to 12 provide better inputs to the CAISO for off peak 13 assessments. 14 So anyway, thank you for that Mike. So not seeing 15 any questions beyond that, I think Cynthia's off the hook. 16 And just thank you again, Ethan, Nick, and 17 Ingrid. Those were really comprehensive presentations. 18 Really appreciate all the work that went into them. 19 And so we'll move on to the next part and to hear 20 about behind the meter distributed generation and storage. 21 And we'll start off with Alex Longsdale. Go ahead Alex. MR. LONDSALE: Thanks, Heather. Good afternoon, 2.2 23 Vice Chair, Commissioner, Advisors, Stakeholders, members 24 of the public. I'm excited to be here today alongside my 25 colleague Mark Palmere, to present our 2023 distributed

1 generation forecast. Next slide.

2 The presentation is broken up into three key 3 segments. First, I'll present our forecast framework for 4 the 2023 forecast cycle. I'll then hand things over to my 5 colleague, Mark Palmere to present our annual forecast 6 results. Last but not least, I'll present updates to our 7 non-residential and residential behind the meter hourly 8 storage forecasts. Next slide. 9 And without further ado, I'll now present the 10 forecast framework. Next slide For 2023, our distributed generation forecast 11 12 team has implemented new methods for determining historical 13 behind the meter distributed generation capacity, resulting 14 in slightly lower estimates of PV capacity and higher 15 estimates for energy storage capacity. We've also 16 implemented a new market adoption model, commonly known as 17 dGen as well as a standalone storage model. 18 Last but not least, we've also updated our behind 19 the meter energy storage charge and discharge profiles, 20 which I will present later today. Along with our 21 methodological changes, we've also updated key incentives 2.2 and policies in our forecasting framework. Starting with 23 the net billing tariff. The net billing tariff for NBT was

25 This went into effect for interconnections beginning in

24

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adopted by CPUC in late 2022 as a replacement for NEM 2.0.

1 April of 2023.

In addition, we've also incorporated updates to the federal investment tax credit. The most recent extension is part of the Inflation Reduction Act for IRA and has now extended the tax credit through 2034. The tax credit provides a credit of up to 30 percent of installation costs for behind the meter distributed generation resources. Next slide

9 For our forecast, our team leverages four models 10 to predict growth and distributed generation capacity 11 resulting from retrofits and new construction. Previous CD 12 forecast tools did not distinguish between standalone and 13 paired adoption for retrofits. The following table 14 highlights our current suite of forecast modeling tools. 15 The first column identifies the distributed generation 16 installation type, which includes retrofit and new 17 construction. The second column includes the name of each 18 forecast model. Columns three through five identify the types of distributed generation configurations that the 19 20 model is capable of forecasting. DGen, the first modeling 21 tool listed in this table, is a market adoption model 2.2 capable of forecasting distributed generation retrofits for 23 standalone solar PV and paired solar PV and energy storage 24 systems. Standalone storage is not considered in dGen as 25 this tool is intended to compare the economics of

1 installing solar PV and solar PV plus storage. CEC staff
2 presented more details on this tool at the August 8th DAWG
3 meeting alongside NRA and encouraged folks to review slides
4 from this workshop.

5 The second tool listed here is simply referred to 6 as our standalone storage model, predicts growth and 7 adoption of standalone energy storage systems. It is a 8 linear regression model which predicts adoption of 9 standalone systems based on forecasted energy system costs.

10 Next we have forecast tools which were developed to account for the installation of distributed generation 11 12 resources for new construction. Both models adhere to the 13 2022 California California Energy efficiency standards. As 14 shown in the table 2022 energy code only requires energy 15 storage installations for the commercial sector. Thus for 16 single family residential construction, we're not 17 forecasting additional energy storage capacity. Next slide.

The following table lists the inclusion and 18 19 exclusion of several renewable distributed generation 20 programs in our current forecasting framework. Before 21 discussing the table, I'd like to define terms from this 2.2 table. When I'm referring to the economics forecasts, I 23 mean that the program requirements and the economics 24 related to adoption are factored into the forecast. And for 25 compliance-based forecast, this adheres to Title 24

1 requirements and does not directly account for the 2 program's requirements or economics associated with 3 adoption. As shown in the table, the current forecast 4 includes economics and compliance -based projections for 5 the net billing tariff. The dGen model includes an 6 economics based forecast for retrofit DG systems 7 interconnected under NBT since it factors in the tariffs 8 requirements, namely TOU rate participation and ACC export 9 as well as ACC adder values into the forecast calculations 10 for net present value and payback periods, both payback 11 periods and net present value are important measures which 12 affect behind the meter distributed generation capacity in 13 our forecast.

14 Furthermore, it's assumed that single family 15 homes adhere to Title 24 requirements and will interconnect 16 under NBT. Thus the forecast includes the compliance based 17 forecast the systems interconnected under this tariff. The 18 next program listed in this table is virtual net energy 19 metering or VNEM. VNEM does not include an economic space 20 forecast of this tariff. And I'll explain more about that 21 in the following slide. However, the Title 24 commercial 2.2 forecast implicitly accounts for new construction 23 considered multi-tenant spaces. Thus growth and distributed 24 generation capacity interconnected under VNEM is indirectly 25 captured in our forecast. Furthermore, dGen does not model

DG adoption under the NEMA or Net Energy Metering 1 2 Aggregation tariff. More details regarding this exclusion 3 are provided on the following slide. With that being said, 4 new construction captured by our four space projections 5 indirectly accounts for DG adoption under this program. 6 Current and past new construction projections do not 7 include specific breakouts for multimeter, multi-tenant and 8 single meter single-tenant spaces. Staff understand that 9 refinements and identification of these construction types 10 are likely required based on the ongoing VNEM and NEMA proceedings. Next slide. 11

12 Excluded programs. So starting with VNEM, solar 13 plus storage retrofits to existing buildings aren't 14 forecasted due to owner tenant barriers for adoption. That 15 is in the dGen model. We don't consider an owner purchasing 16 a distributed generation resource where the benefits go to 17 the tenants. We're unable to capture this type of 18 relationship in our current adoption models. Moving to 19 NEMA, adoption is not considered by our model framework due 20 to the complexities associated with modeling a distributed 21 generation resource intended to reduce electricity cuts 2.2 costs dynamically from multiple meters. It's important to 23 note that CPUC has released a proposed decision on August 24 2, 2023 to revise VNEM and NEMA programs.

25

Moving to community solar. Forecasted adoption of

1 community solar is a challenge to include in the current 2 forecast models. Current renewable energy subscription 3 programs are under review by CPUC and may be replaced in 4 the ongoing consolidated community solar proceeding. CEC 5 staff will consider ways to include renewable energy 6 subscription programs in our future forecast based on the 7 outcomes of the consolidated community solar proceeding.

8 Last, but not least, we have the renewable energy 9 self generation bill credit transfer or RES-BCT. CEC 10 forecast tools aren't configured to forecast adoption of 11 distributed generation where the bill credits are shared 12 across multiple billing accounts. This program also has a 13 statewide capacity limit of 250 megawatts and closes thereafter. Thus, there's limited growth in this program, 14 15 but we'll continue to monitor it and include the 16 interconnected systems in our historical capacity data. 17 This concludes my overview of our forecast framework. 18 Mark Palmere, our lead forecaster, will now 19 present annual forecast results. Thank you. 20 MR. PALMERE: Thanks, Alex. Good afternoon, 21 everyone. My name is Mark Palmere, and I'm the lead 2.2 forecaster. As part of the overall forecast.

I'll be talking about the updates made to the annual forecast inputs as well as going over some high level results. Slide, please.

1 One key input we updated is installation cost. To 2 estimate the cost of solar, staff used CPUC's adoption of 3 \$3.30 per watt as the current cost of installing a 4 residential solar system in California in the year 2023. 5 Staff then used NRELs annual technology baseline data to 6 model the rate of change in costs throughout the forecast. 7 The ATB was also used to calculate the discount rate of commercial installation costs. For 2023, our value there is 8 9 \$2.15 per lot. And as you can see, this is forecast 10 throughout the entire period of our forecast. And by 2040 11 the last year of the forecast it decreases to \$1.65 per 12 watt for residential and \$1.22 for commercial. Slide, 13 please.

14 We have also updated the electricity rates used 15 in our forecast. The base year rates are reflective of that 16 year's electricity rates. In this case, our base year's 17 2022. TOU rates escalate in accordance with the 2023 18 electricity rate forecast. The graph to the right shows a 19 sample rate escalation used in our model, in this case 20 SCE's rates throughout the forecast period. And also note 21 that the model's payback and net present value calculations 2.2 do also take into account the updated NBT decision. Slide 23 please.

And these give us monthly savings calculated by our model that line up with the electricity rates. As an

1 example, here is a sample hourly electricity rate forecast. 2 In this case SCE's TOU-D-4-9 residential rate from the 3 months of October to May. Showed in three years our base 4 year of 2022, 2030, and 2040, which is the last year of the 5 forecast. And you can see how the rates increased over the 6 forecast period. And meanwhile, the graph on the right 7 shows the average first year monthly bill savings, which is 8 calculated by our model as an intermediate output that 9 helps determine adoption. And basically as a result of 10 these increase rates, the average monthly savings also increases dramatically from 2022. Well it starts in 2024, 11 12 but from 2022 through 2040. Slide please.

13 Another update we made was to the average size of 14 residential Title 24 installations. Staff acquired permit 15 data from the Energy Commission standards compliance -16 standards compliance branch to estimate average residential 17 PV compliance installation size for new homes by forecast 18 zone. These sizes were higher than previously estimated 19 leading to increased compliance-based solar PV capacity in 20 the residential forecast. Slide please.

Now I would like to go over the annual results.Slide please.

First PV, our forecast shows steady adoption rate until the mid 2030s. Capacity additions level off after 25 2034, as you can see. And that's due to the elimination of

1 the Investment Tax Credit incentive or ITC. Slide please.

2 These results are greatly influenced by the input updates I previously mentioned. Updating the forecast cost 3 4 installation as well as electricity rates affected the 5 payback period calculation, which is another immediate 6 output of our forecast. Due to lower costs and higher 7 rates, the payback is forecast to decrease until the ITC is 8 phased out in the mid 2030s, at which point it jumps up for 9 a little bit before beginning to decrease again. Slide 10 please.

Looking more specifically at solar installations, 11 12 we see that the majority of installed solar is forecast to 13 be retrofits of existing buildings until the ITC incentive 14 expires. This is because Title 24 new home installations 15 are based on compliance, therefore, they do not level off 16 with the expiration of the credit as the retrofits do. 17 However, looking overall throughout the entire forecast to 18 70 percent of added capacity added PV capacity comes from 19 retrofits. Slide please.

Now let's look at the breakout by planning area. The majority of PV capacity is in IOU territory, mainly reflecting a similar majority of customers in that territory. Ninety-two percent of cumulative capacity through 2022 is in IOU territory. And it is forecast to decrease slightly by the end of the forecast, but still be

about 88 percent by utility throughout the forecast PG&E's total capacity is forecast to jump from 6.8 gigawatts to 14.7, SCE's from 4.5 gigawatts to 12.8, SDG&E 1.8 to 3.5, LADWP 0.5 to 2.1, SMUD 0.3 to 1.0 and all others - the aggregation of all the other utilities from 0.3 gigawatts to 1.2 in 2040. Slide please.

7 Another informative breakdown is solar by 8 pairing. The payback periods in our model tend to be lower 9 for solar systems that are paired with a battery and it is 10 seen as an important tool in reducing electricity sales. 11 Reductions in installation costs of energy storage coupled 12 with rising electricity rates results in an increased share 13 of paired DG adoption through 2032. However, the share of 14 standalone solar PV increases in later years due to the ITC 15 expiration, which in our model affects storage more than it 16 affects solar. Slide please.

And that brings us to overall storage results, 17 18 which similar to PV increase at a steady rate until the 19 elimination of ITC in 2034. The adoption is actually 20 greater than PV as changes to excess solar compensation in 21 addition to the cost and rate factors mentioned in the 22 previous slide, all incentivized storage adoption. In fact, 23 the average annual growth rate throughout the forecast is 24 about 30 percent for storage compared to about 14 percent 25 for solar. Slide please.

1 While standalone systems make up the majority of PV capacity, standalone storage is relatively rare. Over 2 3 two-thirds of currently installed storage capacity is 4 paired with PV systems and that number is forecast to be 83 5 percent in 2040. However, there still is growth in the 6 standalone sector as it is now also eligible for the ITC 7 resulting in increased adoption rates also until 2034. 8 Slide please.

9 And finally, I'd like to share storage results by 10 planning area. As with PV, the majority of capacity is in IOU territory. So for storage it's actually an even wider 11 12 gap as our base year numbers indicate 95 percent of 13 installed storage capacity being in IOU territory. That is 14 forecasted drop to about 90 percent by 2040, but it is 15 still a strong majority. And this concludes our summary of 16 the annual forecast. I'll now toss it back to Alex Lonsdale 17 for a breakdown of hourly storage results. Alex.

18 MR. LONDSALE: Thanks for your presentation,19 Mark.

As indicated, the following slides will cover updates to our hourly non-residential behind the meter storage profiles for the 2023 forecast. Next slide. For the 2023 forecast cycle, our overarching

24 methodology remains unchanged from previous demand 25 forecasts. For 2023, our behind the meter non-residential

storage profiles are from CPUC's upcoming self-generation
 incentive program, or SGIP, energy storage impact
 evaluation.

4 Our methodology is as follows. First, we develop 5 our annual behind the meter distributed generation capacity 6 forecast. We then map this capacity forecast to SGIP 7 evaluation building types. We then apply normalized SGIP 8 profiles to our capacity forecast, and then aggregate the 9 spatial temporal resolution to match the forms that we post 10 as part of the IEPR. Our decision to use these profiles in 11 our forecast is primarily based on data availability as 12 well as the SGIP data sample size relative to total 13 interconnected systems in California. In the following 14 table, you'll net two storage configurations paired with 15 solar PV and standalone.

16 And the second column is an estimate of number of 17 non-residential behind the meter storage systems by end of 18 calendar year 2022. In the third column we have the average 19 SGIP evaluation data project sample size. You'll note that 20 the SGIP data sample size is about a third of all the 21 interconnected systems estimated from interconnection data. 2.2 Please note that the count of systems is not representative 23 of the distribution of capacity by configuration. 24 Standalone storage makes up about 70 percent of total 25 behind the meter non-residential system capacity in 2022.

1 Next slide.

2 Methodology refinement. So while our overarching 3 methodology hasn't changed, CEC's new distributed 4 generation capacity forecast tools distinguish between 5 standalone impaired behind the meter storage adoption and 6 capture this distinction in hourly profiles more precisely. 7 Please note for hourly charts in this presentation, 8 positive megawatts indicates energy storage discharge 9 negative megawatt values indicate charge. The hour index is 10 always hour ending Pacific Standard Time.

11 The chart on the left shows a typical July 12 weekday storage profile in calendar years 2023 and 2026. 13 There are three lines in this chart. The dark blue line is 14 a total load profile. Standard blue dashed line is the 15 paired storage profile and the light blue line is the 16 standalone storage profile. The key takeaway here is that 17 the aggregate CAISO profile changes through time as a share 18 of standalone impaired storage capacity changes. As shown on the chart on the right, you'll note by 2026, the share 19 20 of paired storage capacity has increased relative to 2023. 21 This result is an aggregate profile with on peak discharge 2.2 behavior, which more closely aligns with paired system 23 profile, resulting in a less percentage of energy charging 24 overnight. Next slide.

25

The following chart compares the 2022 and 2023

non-residential behind the meter storage profiles for 1 2 typical weekdays in July and December in calendar year 3 2035. The first chart for typical July weekdays shows how 4 increased paired storage adoption results in more midday 5 energy charging, whereas the 2022 forecast did not 6 explicitly capture growth and adoption of paired or 7 standalone systems. Thus, the profile shape is the same as calendar year 2022, and assumes most energy is still 8 9 charged overnight. The chart on the right compares December 10 2035 average hourly profiles. For the 2023 forecast, you'll note that the total energy discharge during the on peak 11 12 hours is lower compared to July and is of a more fixed rate 13 through the traditional on peak hours. Growth impaired 14 storage system adoption by 2035 results in an increased 15 share of energy storage charging when solar generation is 16 available. The reduction in total energy charged overnight 17 from hour ending 21 to six from CED 2022, CED 2023 as 18 follows. For July weekdays, the reduction in energy assumed 19 to be charged overnight is 57 percent, and for December 20 weekdays is 51 percent. This speaks to the refreshment of 21 updated self-generation incentive program data, capturing 22 most recent charging and discharging behavior amongst a 23 larger pool of energy resources interconnected to the grid. 24 Next slide.

VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Hey Alex?

25

1 MR. LONDSALE: Yeah. 2 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Hey, just a quick question on 3 this one. Sorry, didn't mean to interrupt. Basically y-axis 4 here going from negative 400 to 300, what is that magnitude 5 from the previous slide? I'm just think what is it 6 indicative of or is it just a directional number? 7 MR. LONDSALE: Sorry, I'm not sure I'm following 8 your question. These values are based on discharge rates 9 for measured systems. So the typical discharge per rate of 10 capacity -11 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: It's just - Okay, it's the 12 pool of the data that you had. Is that what it is? 13 MR. LONDSALE: Correct. 14 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Okay, Okay, thank you. So it's 15 not kind of scaled to the forecast results, it's just 16 basically -17 MR. LONDSALE: This is -18 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Looking at -19 MR. LONDSALE: No, this chart here is scaled to 20 the forecast capacity. So we have our normalized profiles 21 on a base tier where you have your normalized rate of 2.2 charge or discharge as a percentage. So some megawatt 23 measured system from the SGIP incentive program has a 24 megawatts discharge or charge value in a specific hour and 25 its rated capacity. And all that data is brought together

1 and develop average normalized profiles from all the pools 2 of resources from the SGIP data. We then use those 3 normalized discharge rates of charging and energy 4 discharging and scale them to our forecast capacity. Does 5 that make sense?

6 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Yes, but I'm not completely 7 tracking in the sense that if we go back to slide 21. 8 Right. So that's kind of the totality. So if I'm 9 understanding this right, we are in the 6,500 megawatts of 10 cumulative capacity and this is in the 400 range. Can you 11 explain that?

12 MR. LONDSALE: Absolutely. Yep. Absolutely. So 13 average discharge rates are relatively low right now in 14 terms of the data that we've seen for non-residential 15 systems. So keep in mind the chart you're looking at right 16 now, that is total statewide capacity, not by residential 17 and non-residential. A bulk of the capacity in our forecast 18 is actually in the residential sector. So you'll see in the 19 following slides that I'm going to present when I 20 transition to residential storage. You'll see that the 21 energy charge and discharge values are higher in the 2.2 forecast period because there is more storage adoption, 23 like the percentage of all capacity is weighted towards the 24 residential sector instead of the non-residential space in 25 our forecast.

1 So you have to break this down to say maybe 30 2 percent of this capacity is applicable to the non-3 residential space. Then you have to break that out to, this 4 is statewide results. We're looking at only IOU planning 5 areas for an hourly forecast. So then decrement that 6 another couple percentage points, and then you're looking 7 at discharge rates on average that fall between and on peak hours, maybe 15 to 20 percent at most. So there's several 8 9 factors we have to scale these numbers down to really come 10 to what is the hourly value of energy charge or discharge. VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Excellent. Thank you so much. 11 12 Thanks for the clarification. 13 MR. LONDSALE: Yeah, I totally understand why 14 you're asking that question from the charts and could have 15 made that a little more clear. So appreciate your question. 16 Picking up where we left off with the CAISO 17 September peak impacts. So revised capacity protections 18 accompanied with refresh profiles results in greater 19 systemwide peak productions, increased storage discharge 20 during hour 19 in 2035 is approximately 58 megawatts and is 21 indicated by the markers here in this chart. Next slide. 2.2 That concludes my overview of the non-residential 23 behind the meter storage profiles. I'll now present updates 24 to our residential behind the meter storage profiles. 25 For the 2023 forecast, again, our overarching

1 methodology is the same. So staff used NREL's System 2 Advisor Model to develop behind the meter residential 3 storage profiles. SAM simulations are configured for a 4 prototypical single-family home with behind the meter solar 5 PV and storage. Several SAM parameters are modified to 6 produce hourly profiles for the CED forecast. Solar PV and 7 storage system size were selected based on CEC analysis of 8 utility interconnection data. Single family home and annual 9 electricity consumptions estimated from our revamped 10 residential sector end use models. TOU rates were selected in accordance with the Net Billing Tariff. Hourly dispatch 11 12 strategies are configured based on the assumption that 13 systems dispatch during evening hours. Next slide.

14 Before I present our updated profiles, there are 15 also other key assumptions that we need to mention. So past 16 CED forecasts consider time of use arbitrage explicitly 17 during the on peak hours. It's important to note that when 18 scaling these assumptions to planning area projections, 19 this resulted in large hour to hour changes in load, shown 20 on the following slide. While it's assumed most energy 21 storage discharge occurs during the on peak period SGIP 2.2 impact evaluations suggests some discharge may be occurring 23 outside of these hours. Furthermore, with the 24 electrification of appliances and vehicles, it is probable 25 that storage discharge will extend beyond traditional on

peak hours. In result, staff developed and presented
 several profile scenarios to stakeholders at our October
 DAWG meeting. The following slides compare the preferred
 scenario profile to CED 2022 profiles.

5 Next slide. Oh, there we go. So this chart 6 compares normalized profiles. It's marked 2021 forecast, 7 but these are also applicable to the 2022 forecast, and 8 these normalized profiles are indicated by the gold lines 9 in this chart. Please note the Y-axis values here are 10 kilowatt hours per kilowatt hour rated capacity and applied 11 to all of the energy capacity within a given track. The 12 first segment of this charge, PG&E, followed by SCE and 13 SDG&E. The 2022 profiles suggests residential storage 14 behavior is different after hour 21 amongst the IOU 15 planning areas. Most notably the SCE profile had assumed 16 energy discharge drops off completely by hour 21, whereas 17 the PG&E profile had assumed continued dispatch until 18 midnight based on time of use prices. Moving away from TOU 19 on peak dispatch to a more general evening dispatch 20 strategy results in more consistent assumptions across the 21 IOU tax and may be more reflective of system-wide behavior 2.2 through time. Staff see the need to continue to inform 23 refinements to behind the meter storage profiles as more 24 data in the space becomes available. Next slide. 25 The following chart highlights forecasted

1 cumulative CAISO system-wide peak hour discharge for the 2 2023 forecast compared to 2022. There's actually slight 3 decrease in discharging hour 19 2035 when compared to last 4 year's forecast. This is a result updating our discharge 5 rate allowance in the SAM model as well as similar total 6 cumulative capacities by 2035.

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Next slide.

8 The following chart compares CED 2023 behind the 9 meter storage profiles to a historical CAISO Limited Energy 10 Storage or LESR profile in 2022. This is utility scale 11 storage. CED profiles include residential and non-12 residential sectors. The forecasted behind the meter energy 13 storage net discharging calendar year 2040 surpasses the 14 historical averages from the 2022 limited energy resource 15 profile data. It's important to note that motivations for 16 behind the meter storage in the forecast are optimized 17 around end user goals to minimize bill savings through a 18 blend of TOU arbitrage and peak demand shaving. Whereas 19 utility scale systems dispatch based upon grid needs. While 20 there are differences in motivations for discharging 21 storage, there appears to be some convergence in charge and 2.2 discharge behavior across BTM and FTM systems. Simply put 23 both FTM and BTM systems are charging during hours of solar 24 resource availability, and discharging the most during on 25 peak TOU hours. Staff look forward to learning more from

CPUC's upcoming SGIP evaluation prepared by Verdant. These 1 2 reports typically highlight storage behavior during grid 3 constrained hours and serve as a basis for learning how BTM 4 storage could be better utilized in the future, both from a 5 GHG and load perspective. BTM systems have a great 6 potential as a flexible load modifier and our forecast team 7 understands the need to continue to track the space closely 8 and think through how behind the meter storage profiles may 9 change time. Next slide.

10 Next, I just want to give a special thanks to CPUC for helping us in acquiring the SGIP data, Verdant 11 12 Consultants for providing the SCE data ahead of the report 13 release. And, of course, the Distributed Generation 14 Forecast Team, Mark Palmere, our lead forecaster, Bobby 15 Wilson, who's joined our team this year as an energy 16 analyst and forecaster. And last, but not least, Sudhakar 17 Konala, who used to be our lead forecaster has rejoined our team as a forecast advisor and we're happy to have him 18 19 back. Next slide. And of course, thanks to all stakeholders 20 for their continued collaboration at DAWG, thank you 21 Commissioners, public attendees for your time and attention 2.2 today. And that is my presentation. 2.3 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Can I just jump in, Heather? 24 MS. RAITT: Oh, yeah. Please do.

VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Thank you, Alex and Mark. I

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probably will sound like a broken record, but again just thank you, thank you, thank you. And how amazing of work you guys are doing in terms of just continuing to modify and improve the work. And thanks for acknowledging Sudhakar. It's really great to have him back on the team again. And also to Bobby thank you for your work.

7 I have a of very high level questions, comments, 8 and kind of discussion. If we take a couple minutes here, 9 Alex and Mark. I'm trying to look at this from a couple of 10 different perspectives. So one is, I think Alex, you commented that towards the end, one element of it is just 11 12 improving our forecasting to be able to provide the best 13 available forecast to PUC and other lRAs for a grid 14 planning perspective, right? So that's kind of an important 15 element. So for the IRPs. The other element I'm looking 16 through is what incremental opportunity do we have with 17 behind the meter and DRD (phonetic) sources to support grid 18 reliability, right?

So earlier this year when we adopted the load flexibility goal of 7,000 megawatts. We broadly framed that as three buckets. And I think I just want to frame that and then ask you a couple of questions to react. But we said about 3,000 megawatts of that 7,000 is going to come from load modifying. So it's primarily storage, it could be demand like DR whatever, it's like virtual power plants,

1 not virtual power plants, but in some programs. And then 2 you go towards, okay, once you reduce the demand based on 3 primarily redesign, you now go into planning for your 4 resource procurement. And there are some virtual power 5 plants and incremental programs that come after that. And 6 then we said between the load modifying and RA, resource 7 adequacy, we can think of roughly 3,000 megawatts and then 8 4,000 of the megawatts were going to come for incremental 9 even beyond that. So first question of clarity, how does 10 the forecast treatment in terms of really articulating what's load modifying, what's RA, like virtual power plants 11 12 and such in terms of those programs at PUC and other IRAs 13 that are using behind the meter storage for a virtual power 14 plant, for example, how do we avoid double counting? What 15 is the current way of doing it? And how do we think about 16 that?

17 MR. LONDSALE: So you're referring to, let me 18 just make sure I understand the question correctly before I 19 respond. So you're asking for how do we account for energy 20 storage systems that are behind the meter, that are a part 21 of virtual power plant and they have their own charge and 2.2 discharge behavior. How do we distinguish that capacity 23 from other behind the meter resources that may be 24 strategizing around TOU arbitrage and peak demand shaving? 25 Is that your question?

1 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Yep. Yep, exactly. How are we? 2 MR. LONDSALE: Okay, so we don't currently have 3 to be transparent. We don't currently have a way to, in our 4 interconnection data, we overhauled estimating the behind 5 the meter capacity, but we haven't had a way just yet to 6 target exactly which interconnected systems would be 7 virtual power plants, which ones would be enrolled in those 8 sorts of systems. So that is not part of our behind the 9 meter historical process. That's not something that's 10 incorporated right now in terms of behind the meter, nonresidential system. So if they're connected via a NEM 11 12 interconnection agreement, if they're connected in any of 13 those NEM buckets, then their capacity is factored into our 14 hourly estimates of charge and discharge. 15 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Got it. Thank you so much. 16 Mark, do you want to add anything? I saw you came 17 off mute. 18 Oh, nothing addition to what Alex MR. PALMERE: 19 said. 20 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Thank you. 21 So, Alex, then I think just as a comment, as we 22 continue to incorporate quantitatively some of the 23 refinements, it would really appreciate clarify at some 24 point in the near future here to really shed light on the

25 intersection of the forecasting work. How does that support

this paradigm of 7,000 megawatts of load flexibility goal we have, right? So how can we think about this is what's load modifying element? This is what's virtual power plant maybe? I think it's very small right now. The virtual power plants, I think it's tens of megawatts right now. I think it's 30 or 40 in PUC, but I just want to make sure that we put a pin on estimating that.

8 And then second, I think just looking at the 9 forecast, as Mark mentioned, the forecast magnitude hasn't 10 significantly changed since the NEM 2.0 to NEM 3.0 and 11 whatever. Also noted that there's a lot of mathematical 12 changes that we had. Setting aside that the numbers, the 13 total addressable market, right? If we think about a 14 hundred percent roof space in California for all existing 15 buildings. What is the - where are we plateauing based on 16 our modeling right now? I think what I see is 30-40 percent 17 maybe. I don't know if you can comment on that. And what do 18 you think is stopping that? I mean I'm sure the answer, 19 it's the payback period, but anything else that you could 20 shed light on would be helpful.

21 MR. PALMERE: Yeah, for sure. Yeah, so we've been 22 doing a little looking into that a little more and it looks 23 like, yeah, our model, the maximum market share as they 24 define it does as you say, have a lot to do with payback 25 period. And so the numbers we're getting as when the

1 payback period is lowest in the forecast, the max market 2 share is about 60 percent. So that's the as things are now, 3 the limit that we're looking at. And yeah, as I said, a lot 4 of it has to do with as the model is developed, that is the 5 limiting factor where as the payback period gets lower, the 6 maps, the potential goes up. But obviously in reality there 7 are other limitations. I think a lot being that, and this 8 is something we're working on modeling better, is the 9 different types of home owner or home residences like 10 rentals and multifamily buildings. Obviously there are more barriers or financial disincentives for adoption there 11 12 compared to a single family owner occupied home. Yeah. So 13 that's something we're trying to definitely working on 14 better capturing. But other than that, so yeah, I think 15 there's that as a inhibition and as you mentioned the 16 payback period, those are the two that we're noticing. I 17 don't know if Alex has anything to add. 18 MR. LONDSALE: I think Mark, I think you

19 highlighted the larger buckets. I think that the owner-20 tenant relationship, a lot of people may rent their spaces 21 or there's existing multifamily buildings right now and 22 with the resource mostly benefiting all their tenants. 23 There might be some barriers under a virtual NEM situation 24 for retrofits where you're really not maybe going to tap 25 into that market just because there's not a large enough

1 incentive for the owner to recuperate their investment 2 because the benefits are going to the tenants occupying the 3 space on their electricity bills. They are receiving the 4 bill credits for the energy generated on top of that roof. 5 So I think that's part of it. And I think, so renting 6 spaces, right. We need to, I think a refinement we can look 7 through is how many single family homes are also being rented out. They're purely for rental space because the 8 9 motivations to install, in our model, the motivations to 10 install a distributed generation resource, people want to 11 see a payback on that resource.

12 They want to be their recuperating their 13 investments. And I think with the owner-tenant 14 relationship, that is a classical barrier to getting more 15 PV on all the rooftops in California. I think there's another sliver of that bucket, and that is just not all 16 17 homes are optimally built for solar PV. And I think this is 18 a smaller bucket, but just addressing it, there are homes 19 dispersed throughout California in different climate zones 20 and there are different shading and different roof 21 orientations that might not be optimal for solar PV. So I'm 2.2 thinking about more like the mountain communities and 23 things, and that is something that's factored into dGen. 24 There is a whole report that talks about the technical 25 potential based upon Lidar data and irradiance data of how

1 much irradiance can you get in this area? Is it economical 2 to install solar on these roofs? I think in California a 3 large part of roofs are well suited for solar PV, but I 4 just wanted to mention that as a slim bucket where you're 5 going to start to decrement the total available roof space 6 a little bit from those sort of considerations.

7 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Thank you, Mark and Alex. 8 Alex, just a follow up on that one then. So 9 between the technical potential, just reiterating this 10 between the technical potential in California behind the 11 meter solar and also storage systems to what we 12 economically cap at or hit the ceiling. And if I heard 13 Mark, it's about 60 percent, then what part of that 14 technical potential do we cap at, roughly.

15 MR. LONDSALE: Based on the current ceiling that we have in our model, that's correct. We're assuming based 16 17 on, so there's studies and that was part of the DAWG 18 meeting we talked about with NRELs. There were surveys 19 conducted based upon market payback periods for solar PV. 20 And based on the survey data that we have and integrated 21 into our modeling framework and our assumptions, given a 22 payback period of approximately six years, you're going to 23 saturate a market of 60 percent.

24 So I think another layer to this that we're 25 talking about and about a six year payback period and

1 saturating the market is this complexity about who can 2 afford to make the financial investment on the front end 3 for these systems. So we're thinking not everyone is upper 4 middle class or middle class - targeting those buckets of 5 making sure that the right incentives are available for 6 disadvantaged communities, lower income. So when we talk 7 about the broad scale of just everyone installing solar, I think it's really important to consider income buckets as 8 9 well. And we do have a version of the model that we're 10 working on to consider and more target, let's think about 11 adoption, but we need to make sure we're more stratifying 12 these adoption buckets and technical potential based on 13 financial ability to make the upfront investments on 14 distributed generation resources to make sure that that is 15 accurately reflected in our forecasts moving forward. 16 VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Great. Okay. 17 So one other theme here, just thinking through, 18 so in 2020 when we had the reliability crisis in 19 California, there's a couple of things we looked at. One is 20 obviously we had supply constraints and the extreme heat, 21 but we also had some monotonal conditions that decreased 2.2 the overall production of generation from solar bulk solar 23 very rapidly in the middle of the day. 24 So one of the questions that was raised was, what 25 happens to behind the meter storage, right? And behind the

1 meter solar during that time as you - if you have a couple 2 of cloudy days, monsoonal days that are coinciding with 3 high heat, trapped heat. How do we think about that 4 potential loss of generation? Again, I know that's not the 5 forecasting and the planning piece, but it might be washed 6 off in a one in two planning mode. But I really would like 7 to put a pin in thinking about the potential volatility, 8 volatility on the system that we might see because of 9 behind the meter PV. And to some extent the storage might 10 compensate for that - behind the meter storage, but I would 11 really like us to continue to explore that team as a part 12 of reliability work.

13 Definitely, and I don't want to MR. LONDSALE: 14 say too much about that right now. I think that there's 15 still scoping work, but I understand that there's a lot of 16 stochastic modeling that we're working on and I think that 17 some of the stochastic modeling approach about variability 18 and generation throughout the week or throughout the month 19 and thinking through variability and generation profiles 20 for PV. Also we need to consider a lot of these systems in 21 our forecast right now appear to be charging off of solar 2.2 generation resources. So factoring that in as well. I think 23 that there's a lot of analysis to be done in the space that 24 you're describing.

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VICE CHAIR GUNDA: Yeah, thank you.

1 So in closing, Alex, thanks to you and Mark and 2 the team Bobby and Sudhakar. I do also want to recognize 3 your slide 32 in a way you kind of talked about how the 4 limited energy storage, but also that the behind of meter 5 storage profiles kind are similarly charged and discharge 6 while the magnitudes are different. And I think it's an 7 interesting thing that whether you're coming from a grid 8 side bidding perspective or the TOUs, the arbitraging of 9 this resource is coming maybe hopefully to an and would 10 love to follow that chain of thought as well. So overall incredible work, thank you and look 11 12 forward to the stakeholder feedback on how to make this 13 better. Thank you. 14 MR. LONDSALE: Thanks, Vice Chair. 15 MR. PALMERE: Thank you. 16 MS. RAITT: I'm not seeing any questions from 17 Zoom or participants via Zoom. So thank you Mark and Alex so much for those 18 19 presentations. And so Commissioner, if you're okay, we'll I 20 think we're ready to move on to public comment. Okay, 21 comment. 2.2 So I see that there are two hands raised, so if 23 anyone on Zoom would like to make comments, just use that 24 raise hand feature to let us know that you want to comment. 25 And if you're on the phone you can press star nine and that

1 will let us know that you want to comment. And so we'll 2 reserve three minutes per person, just one person per 3 organization place. And let's see. 4 So the first one is Yu Zhang from PG&E and so you 5 may need to unmute on your end. Go ahead. 6 So I don't know if Yu Zhang unmuted, but we can 7 come back to you and we'll move on to Brandon Serna. You 8 want to go ahead and unmute? 9 MR. SERNA: Oh, apologies. I think I raised my 10 hand by accident. 11 MS. RAITT: Okay, no worries. Let's see, if you 12 had a question, I mean a comment. Excuse me, maybe that was 13 an accident as well. Anyway, and if anyone else has comments to just raise your hand and if you're on the phone 14 15 again, press star nine and they'll let us know. Otherwise 16 we'll just give it another moment and we will close public 17 comment. 18 Alright, not seeing any hands up. Vice Chair, I 19 think it's back to you. 20 Oh, actually, let me, if I may, I'm sorry to 21 interrupt. Just mention again that written comments are 2.2 welcome and due on December 1st. And then we have, as the 23 next slide shows, we have another workshop coming up on 24 December 6th for the rest of the forecast results. And so 25 hope you all can make it for that. And that will also be a

remote workshop. And with that, if you had any closing remarks, Vice Chair. VICE CHAIR GUNDA: No, that was a great day. I just love the kind of wonderful work that's happening. Heather, thank you to you and your entire team for facilitating and that IT team and support team. So yeah, I don't have any further comments. Thanks to all, and thanks to the public for participating and look forward to future conversations on this. With that, happy to adjourn. (ADJOURNED AT 3:37 p.m.) 

## CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I do hereby certify that the testimony in the foregoing hearing was taken at the time and place therein stated; that the testimony of said witnesses were reported by me, a certified electronic court reporter and a disinterested person, and was under my supervision thereafter transcribed into typewriting.

And I further certify that I am not of counsel or attorney for either or any of the parties to said hearing nor in any way interested in the outcome of the cause named in said caption.

IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand this 9th day of January, 2024.

ELISE HICKS, IAPRT CERT\*\*2176

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I certify that the foregoing is a correct transcript, to the best of my ability, from the electronic sound recording of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter.

Martha L. Nelson

January 10, 2024

MARTHA L. NELSON, CERT\*\*367