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CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION

COMMISSIONER WORKSHOP

In the Matter of:) Docket No. 19-IEPR-03
)
2019 Revised Electricity and) RE: 2019 Revised Natural
Gas Demand Forecast) Electricity and
) Natural Gas Demand
) Forecast

CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION (CEC)

WARREN-ALQUIST STATE ENERGY BUILDING

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1516 NINTH STREET

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA

MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2019

10:00 A.M.

Reported by:

Peter Petty

APPEARANCES

COMMISSIONERS PRESENT:

Janea S. Scott, Vice Chair

Andrew McAllister, Commissioner

Karen Douglas, Commissioner

Patty Monahan, Commissioner

Ken Rider, Advisor to Chair Hochschild

CEC STAFF PRESENT:

Matt Coldwell

Ingrid Neumann

Cary Garcia

Mark Palmere

Bob McBride

Elena Giyenko

Aniss Bahrenian

Sudhakar Konala

Nick Fugate

Mike Jaske

Rosemary Avalos, Public Advisor's Office

PUBLIC COMMENT

V. John White

Ken Schiermeyer, SDG&E

Delphine Hou, CAISO

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P R O C E E D I N G S

10:06 A.M.

SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA, MONDAY, DECEMBER 2, 2019

MR. COLDWELL: All right. Good morning,
everybody. Welcome back from Thanksgiving holiday,
hopefully everybody had a good one.

So my name is Matt Coldwell, I'm the manager of
the Demand Analysis Office here at the Energy Commission.
I'm filling in for Heather this morning who usually leads
these IEPR meetings. So I'll try my best to do a good
job in her stead.

So just quickly I'm going to go over just a few
housekeeping items to start with. So the restrooms are
just right outside the doors here to the left in the
atrium. If there's an emergency and we need to evacuate
the building, just please follow staff out to Roosevelt
Park which is located diagonally across the street from
the building here.

Just want to mention today's workshop is being
broadcast through our WebEx conferencing system. And
parties should be aware that you are being recorded, if
you get up and make comments. So we'll post the audio
recording and the written transcript on the Energy
Commission's website in about a month.

At the end of the workshop there will be an

1 opportunity for public comments and so we're going to ask
2 parties to limit those comments to about three minutes.
3 For those of you in the room that like to make comments,
4 you can fill out a blue card and give it to me or give it
5 to the Public Advisor Rosemary there in the back, and
6 then when it's your turn to speak, just come up to the
7 center podium here, the microphone, and give -- it's also
8 helpful to introduce yourself so the court reporter has
9 your name.

10 For WebEx participants, you can use the raise
11 your hand feature that WebEx provides if you want to make
12 a comment, and we will call on you during the public
13 comment period. You can also use that same feature to
14 lower your hands in case you want to withdraw your
15 comment.

16 Materials for this meeting are available on the
17 website. Hard copies are on the table at the entrance to
18 this hearing room. Written comments on today's topics
19 are due on Monday, December 16th by 5 p.m. The workshop
20 notice explains the process for submitting those written
21 comments. And of course you can ask staff, too, if you
22 have any specific questions.

23 So finally, I'd like to thank our participants
24 for being here today, and then just request that you
25 identify yourselves before speaking. This is help --

1 this is helpful for those of us in the room, for folks
2 participating remotely, and of course for our court
3 reporter.

4 So we're here today to talk about the 2019
5 Electricity and Natural Gas Demand Forecast. We'll also
6 have a presentation on our Transportation Energy Demand
7 Forecast this morning too. But I'll -- with that, I'll
8 turn it over to the commissioners for opening remarks.

9 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Great. Good morning, and
10 welcome everybody. Thank you so much for joining us
11 today at our IEPR Commissioner Workshop on the 2019
12 Revised Electricity and Natural Gas Demand Forecast. I
13 am Janea Scott, the vice chair of the Energy Commission
14 and overseeing the IEPR process this year. We want to
15 welcome everybody.

16 I do want to reiterate what Matt said this
17 morning. If you'd like to make a public comment, please
18 grab a blue card and you can hand it to him or to our
19 public advisor who's waiving one there for you to see.
20 And we will be delighted to hear from you.

21 I'm looking forward to hearing the information on
22 our revised forecast here. As you all know, the forecast
23 work that -- and analysis that the Commission staff does
24 is foundational to all kinds of clean energy planning
25 that the state is overseeing. And it's something that

1 both our sister agency, the Public Utilities Commission
2 and also the California Independent System Operator use
3 in their planning processes as well. So it's fantastic
4 to really hear what's going on here, where some of the
5 kinks may have been, what we've worked out, and really
6 get those numbers well done for all of us.

7 I'm also very much looking forward to the
8 transportation forecast, it's something that we have been
9 working very hard to update and make sure that we've got
10 the latest and greatest information with electric
11 vehicles, fuel cell vehicles, and making sure that as we
12 make this transition to zero emission vehicles, we're
13 capturing that appropriately both within the
14 transportation forecast but also as it begins to reflect
15 in the electricity forecast.

16 So looking forward to today. Let me see if any
17 of my fellow commissioners have remarks that they would
18 like to make this morning.

19 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Great. Thanks, Vice
20 Chair Scott.

21 I'm Andrew McAllister, lead on efficiency and
22 overseeing the forecast works. So really excited to see
23 the series of presentations. Want to thank Nick, Cary,
24 and the whole crew for -- Siva, the whole team which I
25 know it's -- it's small but mighty. And also looking

1 forward to the transportation forecast update.

2 Also, the storage and the self-generation update.

3 I think, you know, the sort of long-term scenario
4 building for particular storage. But both of those
5 continues to be really important as we try to figure out
6 sort of what the distribution level forecast, what
7 changes and distribution level resources actually implies
8 for the overall forecast.

9 And then also the hourly, the evolution of our
10 forecast to produce hourly results is also really
11 critically important for long-term planning. And
12 certainly with our sister agencies, that's a key resource
13 for transition planning and for the RA work, and just
14 really, really critical in terms of, you know, as we move
15 towards understanding load shapes and just the impact on
16 our overall resource mix on a time sensitive basis. The
17 work that we're doing and the analytics we're doing are
18 really evolving us in a direction that's going to --
19 that's super necessary but also really interesting. So
20 building those capacities is something that's critical
21 for the Commission going forward.

22 So I really appreciate all the team's work both
23 up to now, today, and to come. So looking forward to
24 hearing what everyone has to say today and getting some
25 feedback.

1 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: All right. Back to you.

2 MR. COLDWELL: All right. Thank you,

3 Commissioners.

4 So first up today is Cary Garcia who's going to
5 be providing just kind of a general overview of the
6 forecast. So I'll invite Cary to come on up.

7 Let me see if I can do this. This is the part
8 where Heather is a lot better than me. So.

9 MR. GARCIA: All right. Good morning. So after
10 Thanksgiving. I'm primarily running on caffeine now so
11 less tricky. So hopefully I make sense up here.

12 So I'm Cary Garcia. As Matt mentioned, I'm the
13 lead forecaster in our Demand Analysis Office. And so
14 today I'm going to, as the title suggests, just an
15 overview of our statewide process for doing the forecast.
16 And then I'll a little bit later in this presentation
17 I'll get into some specific details about the planning
18 area forecasts.

19 Although I will for the IOU planning areas, I
20 will not be getting into the peak demand because as
21 Andrew mentioned, that's getting handled through our
22 hourly demand model which Nicholas Fugate will be talking
23 about later today.

24 But nonetheless, the consumption and sales
25 forecast will be driving some of that information so

1 hopefully this provides some background to those
2 forecasts later.

3 So first I just wanted to go over some of the
4 basic products that we produce. As I mentioned,
5 electricity consumption and sales forecasts, this
6 particular forecast is forecasting from 2019 through 2030
7 using 2018 as our actual historical starting point. And
8 we do these forecasts by eight planning areas in the
9 state. PG&E, Edison, San Diego, the three primary IOU
10 territories, and then we also do Los Angeles Department
11 of Water Power territory, Burbank and Glendale, Imperial
12 Irrigation District, and what we call NCNC, our Northern
13 California Non-CAISO. And so that's going to include
14 SMUD service territory along with Turlock, Modesto,
15 Merced, and some other portions of the balancing
16 authority of Northern California.

17 And so in addition to the consumption in cells
18 forecast, we also produce peak forecasts. As I
19 mentioned, we rely on our hourly electric load model for
20 the IOU planning areas, and we use our traditional
21 essentially a translation for peak end-use based on
22 consumption data to peak using load factors from our
23 older but still functional HELM model, hourly electric
24 load model which was the predecessor to the hourly
25 electric load model that we use now for those IOU

1 planning areas.

2 And so these peak forecasted in by TAC as well as
3 those balancing authority areas and we lay these out in
4 our demand forecast forms, sets a baseline form for the
5 high, mid, and demand scenarios as well as what we call
6 our load serving entity and balancing area forms which
7 breaks out LSE, sales, sales by individual LSEs, and also
8 peak demand by particularly important areas for the ISO's
9 planning purposes. And so that will be located in the
10 form 1.5. So we're still wrapping those up, but those
11 will be posted shortly following this workshop today.

12 And we also produce end-use natural gas
13 forecasts. Same -- pretty similar, slightly different
14 planning areas looking at PG&E, SoCalGas, and San Diego
15 Gas and Electric being the primary three gas providers in
16 the state. And those will also be getting wrapped up as
17 well shortly this week. But I don't have slides prepared
18 yet for those but they are a part of our typical full
19 IEPR forecast.

20 We also include -- so these forms that I
21 mentioned previously are we start off with our baseline
22 forms and we also produce manage set of forecasts for
23 both sales and peak demand. And this is going to include
24 additional achievable energy efficiency that we've
25 developed this past year using the 2019 potential and

1 goal study for IOUs as well as POU potential savings from
2 municipal utility reports.

3 And typically we'll -- planning in the state
4 revolves around the Mid-Mid which is sort of our, you
5 know, our baseline best estimate of what the demand is
6 going to be along with energy savings. And our more
7 conservative case, which is our Mid-Low, essentially the
8 same mid demand case but with slightly low expected
9 savings in the future.

10 And please stop me if you have any questions
11 along the way. I saw -- I know there's a few new --
12 fresh faces that I don't typically see at our Demand
13 Forecast Workshops.

14 So a little bit about the method as I've laid out
15 some of the products. The models start off with our end-
16 use models by sector so residential sector, commercial,
17 industrial, mining, resource extraction, transportation,
18 communication, utilities, Ag, as well as street lighting.
19 So we -- those models depending on historical electricity
20 demand in the state along with rate forecast for
21 electricity and natural gas. We also have a self-
22 generation model that we spoke about earlier that now
23 includes storage forecasts which Sudhakar will talk about
24 later today. As well as transportation electrification
25 with the help from our transportation electrification

1 forecasting unit.

2 And then as I mentioned, this information gets
3 fed into our hourly forecasting model for those IOU
4 territories which essentially drives the trend for peak
5 demand which you'll see later.

6 We also apply some adjustments accounting for
7 additional committance efficiency savings. So that's
8 savings that is going to be from new programs that will
9 be implemented in the 2018, 2019 period that we didn't
10 capture in previous forecasts. And that will essentially
11 drive down -- add savings to our forecast driving down
12 some of the starting points and lowering some of those
13 forecast trends. As well as the additional achievable
14 energy efficiency which I'll talk about a little bit
15 more. And then we also include some adjustments for
16 climate change as well.

17 So just to lay out our demand scenarios or demand
18 cases. The key element here is really demand that's
19 the -- oh. So we're starting off with our high demand
20 scenario and that essentially pretty simply just has high
21 economic and demographic projections along with higher
22 climate change impacts and higher penetration of electric
23 vehicles. But to create that, a true higher demand case,
24 we've laid it out to where you would expect with high
25 electricity demand, you would have lower rates and

1 therefore less incentive for self-generation. So you'll
2 notice when I talk about rates or Sudhakar will talk
3 about PV, there's a flip-flop in demand scenarios which
4 sometimes can be confusing for folks.

5 The low demand case is the opposite of that. So
6 essentially a low economic demographic information in
7 electric vehicles, penetration higher electricity rates
8 and more self-generation but no climate change impacts.
9 The baseline assumptions lie between both the high and
10 the low with moderate amount of climate change which I'll
11 talk about more.

12 The key inputs that we rely upon are primarily
13 Moody's Analytics and Department of Finance. Department
14 of Finance is used for population and household estimates
15 for a high, mid, and low cases. And Moody's really just
16 the economic information. Gross state product,
17 employment. I mention employment twice because there are
18 different types of employment by sector that are useful
19 in some of our models. Actually, I mentioned that twice
20 because that's a typo but I was trying to save myself
21 there.

22 And just below what I have here are some of the
23 assumptions that drive the mid case. And throughout this
24 presentation I'll primarily focus on the mid case so if
25 you see something that doesn't say like high or mid, I'm

1 generally focusing on the mid case because that's what
2 we'll use for our planning purposes as I mentioned
3 before.

4 But we're seeing in those -- some of the drivers
5 of the economic information that we receive.
6 Unemployment rate in some cases does start increasing so
7 we've typically seen, you know, more and more employment.
8 But in the latest projections that we have in comparison
9 to 2018, there was a sort of a dip in 2021, 2022, and in
10 some planning areas, that dip has been more dramatic
11 right around that time period.

12 We see slower wage growth as well. And these are
13 just -- the following three bullets are really just what
14 some of the drivers here are. So some uncertainty around
15 trade that's occurring in those projections. There will
16 be some rebound so you'll see this trend where things
17 start dipping down a little bit and then slightly slower
18 growth in the long term.

19 And then with the latest Department of Finance
20 information, we do see some increases in households and
21 some planning areas. Statewide it's a very small
22 increase, but population growth remains pretty slow and
23 if not a little slower than we previously -- the previous
24 estimates we received from the Department of Finance.

25 Some other inputs that we have in our forecast.

1 As I mentioned, PV energy that Sudhakar provides through
2 his modeling efforts. I won't steal his thunder but
3 these are some quick bullets here and he'll get into more
4 detail in that later today. Light-duty electric vehicle
5 consumption that we've included in the forecast. So it's
6 roughly 15,000 gigawatt hours of consumption by 2030,
7 most of it being attributed to residential electric
8 vehicle charging.

9 We also have medium and heavy-duty vehicles in
10 our forecast that the TEFU unit provides. You can see
11 pretty significant growth in that sector, so that's going
12 to be buses, transit buses, and various, you know, gross
13 vehicular weight classifications for the different types
14 of medium and heavy-duty vehicles.

15 And they also include off-road electrification
16 which is going to be things like forklifts and other sort
17 of -- what else? I think forklifts is the one that comes
18 easiest to my mind. I'm actually not quite -- I'd have
19 to ask our transportation (indiscernible) the different
20 things that can be electrified that don't go on the road.
21 But those have been updated for this forecast as well.
22 And so that will affect sectors like commercial, our TCU
23 forecast which includes like port electrification and
24 military bases and things like that.

25 As I mentioned, climate change is included in

1 this forecast. There are high and mid demand cases. And
2 these scenarios were developed by the Scripps Institute
3 of Oceanography. But we -- essentially using the same
4 scenarios that we've had before, I think there's an
5 update on the horizon in the 2021, 2022 range, so we
6 revamped this. But essentially what we're doing is
7 keeping those same projections and just -- what would you
8 call it -- incrementing it to the new starting point to
9 keep -- to keep it in line with what our projections are
10 now for current demand.

11 The last bit here, Ag and water pumping has been
12 adjusted. So we may have -- we may have mentioned in our
13 preliminary forecast that we've now developed a cannabis
14 cultivation forecast. And I'll -- we're going to talk
15 about that in a little more detail. Unfortunately the
16 staff that developed that wasn't able to make it but I'll
17 do my best to answer any questions in that forecast and
18 provide detail around that.

19 But ultimately, it's roughly around almost 4
20 percent of total consumption by 2030 so getting to around
21 12,000 gigawatt hours. So essentially, it grows that
22 population. And I'll talk about that a little bit more.
23 But this is primarily focused on indoor cultivation which
24 is expected to be the bulk of the crop production in the
25 state.

1 So getting into climate change a little bit.
2 These are the updated projections or I guess re-
3 incremented projections focusing on the 2019 starting
4 point when they would have effect because we would expect
5 that in the 2018 consumption history that we have, we
6 would already be seeing the impacts of climate change in
7 that data. So we're simply just re-estimating it to take
8 into account the impacts that would occur in 2019 and out
9 to 2030.

10 So the high demand case, what's happening there
11 is that this is using a business as usual climate
12 mitigation scenario from Scripps. So essentially there's
13 no climate mitigation occurring and so you see an
14 increase in temperatures due to the GHG emissions. So
15 that's something around the range of 1½ to 2 degrees
16 increases in temperatures over time. The mid case is
17 more moderate assuming some level of mitigation but as we
18 know, we may not be doing the best work that we can be
19 doing on that so there's still a fair amount of increases
20 in temperatures that occur.

21 And so this sort of shakes out into a net effects
22 being that although you have increase in cooling degree
23 days that would increase electricity demand, you also
24 have an increase in heating degree days over the year
25 which essentially would reduce space heating and things

1 like that in the electricity sector. So ultimately it's
2 sort of a net effect and we -- we go about developing
3 these using, as I said, those temperature projections
4 from Scripps. We estimate a set of econometric models
5 focusing on the commercial and residential sectors which
6 are going to be the most weather sensitive. And so from
7 that, we develop essentially a coefficient for
8 sensitivity to temperature changes and then we use
9 that -- use those trends from the different high and
10 demand, high and low -- sorry, high and mid temperature
11 changes due to climate change to estimate what those
12 impacts are. So basically a degree equals, you know, two
13 degrees in temperature over this much time period will
14 equal X, you know, X number of gigawatt hours based on
15 that coefficient.

16 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So Cary, just to -- so
17 you've -- you've put that in energy terms, right, and I
18 think the -- one of the most important issues here is how
19 it effects peak and peak shift and seasonal --

20 MR. GARCIA: Yeah.

21 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- load shapes. And so
22 just wanted to make sure that you're going to be talking
23 about that as well.

24 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. So I typically would have
25 included -- or in previous history, we would have

1 included the peak numbers here as well. But now, which
2 Nick will talk about later today, we've started modeling
3 climate change on an hourly basis and that's something
4 that Scripps has helped us develop.

5 So they've essentially taken the previous
6 daily -- essentially it was daily temperature data that
7 we've had, and they were able to create an hourly profile
8 of those impacts for us out to 2030. And so those are
9 going to be incorporated into the hourly forecast.

10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

11 MR. GARCIA: And will have effects on peak.

12 COMMISISONER MCALLISTER: Thanks.

13 MR. GARCIA: And looking at Nick, he will get
14 into that. He has a thumbs up so confirmed there.

15 Yeah, I should also mention, you mentioned peak,
16 but we also do the same thing for natural gas as well.

17 Okay. So efficiency. So here we're including in
18 the revised forecast, we have the new 2018 to 2019
19 utility program savings from both the IOUs and the POUs
20 in the state. And so this will also include standard
21 savings. So the latest 2019 Title 24, Title 20 appliance
22 standards as well as some federal standards that are
23 baked into the forecast. So those will be the new
24 committed pieces. And as I mentioned, the new potential
25 and goal study provided us with new information for

1 additional achievable energy efficiency that we apply to
2 our manage forecast.

3 So looking at a committed savings, this might
4 seem like a goofy slide but I'll kind of walk you through
5 it. So starting with that orange line there, that's the
6 new building and appliance standards. So as you have new
7 construction and new appliance standards being applied to
8 those buildings, you would see the savings start
9 increasing over time as those compliance with the
10 standards starts maximizing. So you can see there's a
11 growth there over time.

12 That blue line, that's an efficiency program
13 savings so that's a little different. So what
14 essentially happens there is the programs come on line in
15 2018, 2019. And they begin to decay off as the useful
16 life of those programs start declining over time. And so
17 the way it shakes out, that green line at the top was
18 essentially the combination of both those savings streams
19 occurring. So you have this declining and new efficiency
20 programs because there's no new committed savings
21 occurring while the new building and appliance standards
22 are taking effect.

23 So ultimately you have the high amount of savings
24 occurring in 2019 and 2020 all the way through 2021 as
25 well. And then this slowly starts declining as that

1 efficiency programs decline. You can see from the graph
2 efficiency programs, the latest ones, provide the bulk of
3 that savings in the beginning. And then slowly around
4 2025, you can see they sort of level off there and end up
5 matching the building standards, and the building
6 standards end up keeping the total committed impact on
7 the forecast from declining further.

8 But you can see that total impact in the
9 beginning there is pretty large in the first part of the
10 forecast, 24,000 gigawatt hours. And it inclines a
11 little bit as you can see by 2030.

12 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So Cary, you had
13 conversations with the PUC about the program, so the
14 future of those program savings. I mean, we're working
15 with them on sort of what the -- well, I guess backing up
16 a little bit. Historically, right, the -- each
17 portfolio, you know, every few years the -- the ratepayer
18 funded efficiency programs kind of get a refresh and it
19 opens up sort of new wedges that wouldn't necessarily be
20 in the out years of this forecast. Right? And so you'd
21 kind of expect this forecast to have a tailing off over,
22 you know, the five last, five final years of this
23 forecast period.

24 So historically like this isn't a surprise, I
25 think, because there's some sort of new unknown savings,

1 you know, be a program approach or widgets or whatever
2 that sort of will fill in above that green to sort of
3 make it flat, right? That's historically kind of what's
4 happened. You know, that's what innovation's all about.

5 I guess so the question I would have is are you
6 taking into account the kind of the fact that the
7 ratepayer funded programs are kind of projecting that
8 they're going to have actual declining savings over time,
9 like that they are having a harder time finding cost
10 effective savings in the efficiency portfolio. That
11 seems to be the conversation that's playing out at the
12 PUC, for example.

13 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. I can't answer that right now
14 primarily I haven't gotten to that level of detail on
15 this. I know we have some staff here that worked on
16 committed savings.

17 Ingrid, would you be able to respond to that?

18 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: I mean --

19 MR. GARCIA: I should mention my other name is
20 the chief aggregator so a lot of this data comes to me
21 and I do my best to understand all the bits and pieces.

22 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: I mean, this is a
23 conversation we've been having in the context of the
24 Efficiency Action Plan which, you know, staff has been
25 working busily on for many months now.

1 MS. NEUMANN: Okay. Hi, this is Ingrid Neumann.
2 I did the AAEE portion for this. So I believe Cary's
3 discussing the committed savings that go into the
4 baseline forecast.
5 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Uh-huh.
6 MS. NEUMANN: So what you're discussing is in the
7 PG study that is used for the AAEE.
8 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Right.
9 MS. NEUMANN: So that decline is seen there.
10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.
11 MS. NEUMANN: So that's what he'll be discussing
12 in the minutes forecast, probably. This is the portion
13 of codes and standards and IOU and POU programs that are
14 in the committed.
15 MR. GARCIA: Yeah.
16 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: In the committed.
17 Right.
18 MR. GARCIA: But I think Andrew's getting to has
19 there been in the previous iterations of committed
20 savings, has there been more of a decline relative to --
21 based on these issues with ratepayer funding?
22 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: I mean, the goals right
23 now are defined now for the portfolio going forward and
24 they're actually smaller than they have been
25 historically. And the spend is likely going down on

1 those programs so that would expect that to be reflected
2 here.

3 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. The program savings is going
4 to be coming from the CPUC's -- I'm blanking on the name
5 of that database.

6 MS. NEUMANN: So I don't know. I can't speak to
7 the what's in the baseline forecast other than specific
8 committed codes and standards were included in the
9 baseline forecast and then those were not included in the
10 AAEE because that is supposed to be incremental --

11 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Right.

12 MS. NEUMANN: -- to the baseline forecast.

13 So you can see how he has the newer building and
14 appliance standards. So for example for Title 24, the
15 2019 building standards that don't go into effect until
16 2020 are included here with the committed savings.
17 Right? But future code cycles are not included here but
18 rather they're included in AAEE.

19 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: AAEE. Okay.

20 MS. NEUMANN: So the potential of goals that the
21 CPUC is putting out and their projected decline in
22 savings, I don't think that's what you're seeing here.
23 That's what you'll see in AAEE.

24 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

25 MS. NEUMANN: I would suspect that this is what

1 you would normally see, right? Because these are not --
2 these -- the program IOU and POU programs savings here
3 are existing ones not projected ones, not in the goals --
4 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah, exactly.
5 MS. NEUMANN: -- that you're referring to.
6 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So eventually you'd
7 have some AAEE that pumps that green line up --
8 MS. NEUMANN: Right. And it's not as much this
9 time as we've seen in the past.
10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. That's my -- I
11 guess my question is --
12 MS. NEUMANN: That is true.
13 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- what -- what is the
14 recent work for the new portfolio over at the PUC
15 incorporated into this baseline. It sounds like the
16 answer to that is no, which is okay.
17 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. I -- it's -- as I mentioned,
18 it's 2018 to 2019 --
19 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah, okay.
20 MR. GARCIA: -- what's happening there. And
21 there is some -- there are some programs that occurred
22 before then that are still embedded in the forecast, and
23 we just added the 2018, 2019 as they were --
24 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.
25 MR. GARCIA: -- given to us by --

1 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

2 MR. GARCIA: -- CPUC.

3 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: I see.

4 MR. GARCIA: But Ingrid brings up a good point as
5 well, though, which is that I think you're correct in
6 that if you're seeing these changes to that portfolio
7 happening now but when we get to 2021, for example, we
8 should start seeing some changes based on that. And
9 that's something we can follow up on to get a conclusive
10 answer to that.

11 But Ingrid also brought up a good point in that
12 you are seeing it in the potential goal study in that the
13 additional achievable energy and efficiency has been cut
14 almost 50 percent in comparison to the previous versions
15 of AAEE that we've had in the past. Or actually
16 comparison to 2017 which was the most recent one prior to
17 this 2019.

18 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Right, got it.

19 MR. GARCIA: So that effect definitely is getting
20 captured there.

21 And this brings us to AAEE. So you can see
22 here -- there are various flavors of AAEE. So we have --
23 start at the very bottom there. So you'll see the
24 high -- the first -- the first part of each scenario is
25 essentially the demand scenario. So a high demand

1 scenario at the top there on the blue -- sorry, at the
2 top of the legend, not the top of the graph.

3 But that's matched up with an AAEE scenario which
4 in this case that blue line would be the high demand with
5 the low energy efficiency impact. And then you see the
6 various flavors of that as you go through. As I
7 mentioned, we primarily focus on the Mid-Mid, that green
8 line there, and the Mid-Low which has the more
9 conservative amount of energy efficiency.

10 So that Mid-Mid, as you can see, is around 16,500
11 or so gigawatt hours by 2030. And as I just mentioned,
12 that's about half what we've previously had in our Mid-
13 Mid scenario for energy efficiency savings for these
14 additional achievable energy efficiency savings.

15 And you can see the more moderate Mid-Low
16 scenario around 12,000 gigawatt hours by 2030. And way
17 at the top there, the Mid-High plus, assuming a far
18 greater amount of efficiency savings over time with
19 additional programs occurring there along with standards
20 and all the other bits and pieces that are at play in
21 there.

22 But I'll show these a little bit more and Nick
23 will have these as well looking into the effects on the
24 demand forecast when you apply these scenarios to the
25 individual planning area forecast.

1 So these will basically, I'm showing energy here
2 but they'll also drive down peak demand as well. And
3 Nick will have modeled that on an hourly basis which
4 we've done this year for AAEE savings.

5 So getting to our cultivation forecast. So as I
6 mentioned, we've been developing a new forecast product
7 focusing on cannabis cultivation. And just to start off,
8 I mean, there's really some challenges here. These are
9 pretty big ones that create a lot of uncertainty in what
10 you would -- in developing a forecast, particularly some
11 of the high and low scenarios around it.

12 So first of all, historical data on production
13 and consumption is going to be difficult to find,
14 particularly when you have an industry that has been
15 illegal for quite a while. There's not a lot of
16 information getting shared. You know, people keep that
17 in, you know, just general users of cannabis may not be
18 willing to share information about that. And you also
19 have underground production that was occurring in the
20 state.

21 There's also a fair amount of uncertainty around
22 energy intensity of the cultivation. So what types of --
23 what types of, you know, methods will you use to
24 cultivate it? Will you use indoor version of this which
25 is more energy intensive, probably the most energy

1 intensive. Outdoor which is the least energy intensive.
2 Or somewhere in the middle, use a greenhouse which kind
3 of takes the best of both worlds using sunlight along
4 with some, you know, modifications for lighting.

5 And within that, you have the energy intensity,
6 obviously, but there's also different rates of production
7 for those three different methods there. There's some
8 benefits to using indoor and greenhouses in that you get
9 to cultivate more often during the year versus outdoor,
10 you're kind of limited to the world's natural seasons.

11 And then you also have the noncommercial home
12 operations that can be occurring as well that are
13 difficult to capture. So those would be things like, you
14 know, just the fact that there's -- I think you can have
15 up to six or so plants just depending on, you know,
16 cities and county regulations. But that can be occurring
17 as well that would be driving up residential electricity
18 demand.

19 But once again, that's difficult information to
20 capture, there's not a lot of data yet about that. But
21 that could influence the uncertainty around our forecast
22 here.

23 So the basic method for the cannabis cultivation
24 forecast starts with estimating California usage of the
25 products. So let's -- that basically breaks down to how

1 many users are there and how much are they using? So we
2 relied upon the Substance Abuse and Mental Health
3 Services Administration, SAMSHA, to calculate this
4 information. And we also accounted to underreporting
5 that could occur as I mentioned, as that would be
6 something that we would expect given the transition
7 from -- or looking at historical data when it was illegal
8 versus now where it has been legalized.
9 And so using some literature, we account for that roughly
10 a 22 percent adjustment for underreporting that may be
11 occurring.

12 And so once we estimate that baseline of users
13 and amounts, we need to forecast the number of users that
14 are going to be -- that we expect to continue to use and
15 then also because of legalization, we would expect
16 additional users to come on. And so the main driver here
17 is essentially population growth. So heavy users are
18 expected to keep using generally the way they have been.
19 But similar to other states when we look at Washington,
20 Colorado, you see this uptick in usage from new users
21 that otherwise seem to know that it's legal, they kind of
22 jump into that realm and want to use a little bit more
23 than they have done previously.

24 There's also another bit where we have to rely on
25 literature as well to account for exports that occur.

1 And this could change quite a bit given that, you know,
2 legalization is starting to -- it seems to be in the West
3 Coast, perhaps, and other states are now legalizing. So
4 Nevada, for example our neighbor next door, was most
5 recent in 2017. And so that could add a lot of changes.
6 So if you have other states around you that are
7 cultivating themselves, you would -- you could
8 essentially have less exports occurring because there's
9 no longer needed in those states.

10 But right now, based on literature, roughly a 3
11 percent multiplier has been applied to account for those
12 exports that will occur. But as I said, you know, things
13 can change and legislation can change state by state.
14 Federal legalization is something that could come up and
15 that could cause some changes and require some
16 adjustments to this current forecast.

17 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So just to be clear,
18 that's a 3 X, right? That's a three times.

19 MR. GARCIA: It's three times.

20 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So -- so three-quarters
21 of the cannabis cultivation in the state would be still
22 illegal. So, yeah, that seems like a pretty important
23 number to get a good handle on if we can.

24 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. Yeah and -- I mean, it's not
25 baked into this forecast but I know that in the recent

1 news, I believe there were some increases in some of the
2 taxes on that. That's something that we have -- hasn't
3 been addressed here, but that could also be causing some
4 changes.

5 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Taxes on the legal.

6 MR. GARCIA: On the legal, right. So if you're
7 talking about, you know, black market cultivation, I
8 believe the news is sort of saying, well, it's pretty
9 clear you raise the prices on legal products, then
10 suddenly there's an increase demand for black market if
11 it's cheaper.

12 Obviously there's some caveats with that. You
13 know, theoretically the state would be a safer product
14 because it's regulated, it's tested. So there -- there's
15 some tradeoffs there, but generally you expect, you know,
16 an increase in those taxes and the cost of it would --
17 would make black market products more -- more likely to
18 get purchased.

19 MR. RIDER: May I ask a question?

20 MR. GARCIA: Yeah.

21 MR. RIDER: Just on the intensity there, you
22 know, California electric rates are significantly higher
23 than surrounding states. And so just as a question, you
24 mentioned, you know, three times multiplier on the
25 exports.

1 Is that mostly a certain type of grow -- because
2 thinking about, you know, if Oregon or, you know, I don't
3 know where you're thinking this is getting shipped but,
4 you know, if it's legal there, you know, the electricity
5 rates are much lower so it makes sense that actually --
6 you would think offhand that the more energy intense
7 versions of the production would migrate to lower
8 electricity prices.

9 So I'm curious as to what factors -- and maybe I
10 can dive into this if it's in this report, but what
11 factors make California the primary -- like with our high
12 electricity prices, why we're such a primary grower and
13 supplier to the surrounding regions.

14 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. As I mentioned earlier, I did
15 not prepare this particular part of the forecast.

16 MR. RIDER: Yeah, I understand.

17 MR. GARCIA: I wish I had that information but I
18 could follow up with you and dig into -- we have a draft
19 report that we have so we could share that with you and
20 get into the specific details of that, how that
21 multiplier was developed. But I can't answer that right
22 now. I'm sorry.

23 But I think what you're saying does makes sense.
24 There are some -- I was trying to get to that. I mean,
25 there's a lot of uncertainty around how these other

1 states operate. And your good example is like
2 electricity rates, right? Even within the state, as
3 electricity rates change from planning area to planning
4 area, you'd expect people would move their operations to
5 different areas. That may not be as easy with a large-
6 scale operation but it could have an impact for sure.

7 Getting into that -- some of that production. So
8 we relied upon California Department of Food and
9 Agriculture looking at the percentage of permits given to
10 different -- different types of growing operations. So
11 outdoor here shakes out roughly to about 20 percent of
12 the gross. And the other portions are primarily
13 greenhouse, as you mentioned.

14 You know, some of those electricity rates, you're
15 going to have sort of a middle group on balancing the
16 amount of yield you can have along with the cost in
17 comparison to indoor. So that greenhouse ends up being
18 the predominant -- predominant permit that is getting
19 applied for or is actually permitted in the state.

20 As I mentioned earlier, that forecast was roughly
21 around 12,400 gigawatt hours in our mid case for -- for
22 that cultivation. But there's a lot of uncertainty
23 around this so we've spoke to our expert panel getting
24 some input. Thus far, the preliminary comments were that
25 the mid case does seem reasonable given some of the

1 uncertainties. But we still want to dig into what would
2 be appropriate like high in demand cases that would
3 capture that uncertainty.

4 As I mentioned, we could -- it would be helpful
5 if we had more data on the number of users of each type,
6 heavy and light. Hopefully we'll get more data on that
7 as legalization is no longer a new trend in this state or
8 across the -- across the country. We want to understand
9 like how much are people using, what is the actual
10 production? That's hopefully something we can start
11 getting from the state in terms of like CalCannabis. I
12 think they're, you know, a fresh agency, but as I think
13 more data comes in, we start getting more information
14 what the production is, what the tax information is, and
15 what's getting sold out there.

16 And also we'll start getting more information. I
17 mean, we have the current permit data but we'll be
18 getting, you know, as we get more and more data, we'll
19 see how things shake out between indoor and greenhouses.
20 Those are two dramatically different levels of energy
21 usage there, as I mentioned, so that energy intensity is
22 going to change.

23 In the forecast as we applied it, right now it's
24 pretty basic using population to share out a statewide
25 forecast to the different planning areas. It might seem

1 pretty crude at first and it is for right now, but when
2 you look at that permit data, ultimately you see as I
3 kind of broke out this information, this outdoor, indoor,
4 and greenhouse is what you end up seeing is the heavily
5 populated areas are also getting the indoor operations
6 was their most energy intensive, whereas the lower
7 population dense areas are going to the outdoor
8 operations so they would have lower energy usage overall.

9 So for right now that works, I think it's our
10 best estimate. But hopefully we can leverage some more
11 of this permitting data. And as I said, getting more
12 information on actual production that's occurring at
13 these facilities would be very helpful to improve upon
14 this forecast.

15 And then ultimately right now, we're adding it to
16 our agriculture and water pumping forecast. That seems
17 to be the best fit. We can always tease it out and move
18 it to different sectors as appropriate. You would expect
19 there would be a small increase in like side operations,
20 for example, not just cultivation but the processing to
21 make different products from it. But right now, that
22 seems to be very small according to the literature than
23 otherwise could be captured in something like commercial
24 sector model, for example. But just like any other
25 business that would be out there.

1 All right. So I am -- spent a lot of time on
2 cannabis cultivation, more so than I was expecting. So I
3 will try to dig into the state results and leave time for
4 the rest of our presenters.

5 So getting into the statewide results here --
6 sorry, there's something in the way there. This is
7 looking at the baseline economic and demographic
8 information for our latest high, mid, and low scenarios
9 that you see there. And then I put a note there for the
10 mid demand scenario from the previous forecast that we
11 developed.

12 So as I mentioned before, we do see that
13 population growth from 2019 through 2030, our forecast
14 period, does decline, is reduced in comparison to 2018.
15 Households overall does see an uptick in comparison to
16 2018, whereas personal income, manufacturing output are -
17 - are reduced a little bit, manufacturing output in
18 particular.

19 Manufacturing output would not be something we
20 wouldn't expect. We've seen industrial load in the state
21 and resource abstraction, for example, on the decline,
22 which has kind of been going on for the better part of a
23 decade.

24 And then total employment. So here total
25 employment seems, you know, about level with the previous

1 mid demand case but planning year by planning year this
2 starts changing. And employment's an important driver
3 for our commercial forecast in that the driver for that
4 commercial forecast is commercial floorspace which uses
5 employment by different sectors -- or employment by
6 different sectors to map to a specific building type. So
7 small office, hospitals, schools, different types of
8 building types where floorspace is important to do those
9 projections for the commercial forecast.

10 So if you see a -- start seeing declines in
11 employment and as I mentioned before there was sort of
12 this -- there's sort of a negative growth in employment
13 occurring in 2021 and twenty -- and slower growth through
14 2022. It begins to take off you will see like a dip in
15 that consumption in sales in the near term and then it
16 slowly starts to rise out of there as there's -- and this
17 is typical in economic projections. Nobody really
18 predicts a recession, nobody wants to be that guy. What
19 they generally say is, okay, things are going to slow
20 down a little bit and we're going to slowly climb out of
21 it which is kind of -- it seems to be the economists'
22 best guess of what will happen without saying yes, a
23 recession is going to happen.

24 And vice versa, we sort of see things -- you see
25 a similar phenomenon when you're looking at okay, how are

1 we going to get out of a recession? You'll see things
2 like oh, we're going to get out of it now. Nope, we're
3 going to revise it. And so it's a little slower and
4 slower.

5 So I think we're kind of in that phase right now
6 where there's a lot of uncertainty, we do feel -- a lot
7 of economists I think feel like there's going to be sort
8 of this dip in employment. At some point we're riding
9 pretty high on the employment growth for the better part
10 of the last five years or so. So I think there's an
11 expectation that's going to slow down a little bit but
12 not quite a full recession yet.

13 Okay. Another input that I mentioned is
14 electricity rates. So this is on a statewide basis,
15 looking at the overall increases in rates. You can see
16 fairly significant increases over the forecast period,
17 particularly this is going to occur in more of the nearer
18 term. But those are pretty dramatic here. And so we've
19 included updates for the PG&E and Edison's distribution
20 revenue requirements and that's going to be based upon a
21 lot of this wildfire mitigation that's going to be added
22 to the ratepayers here.

23 And then some less -- less dramatic increases for
24 San Diego Gas and Electric. Although the latest
25 information from the general rate cases has been included

1 in the forecast. But by comparison, you can see in the
2 2018 much lower rates, pretty flat there. Whereas now we
3 see these increasing rates in the forecast. And they do
4 have an effect on particularly -- I highlight residential
5 and commercial because those are going to be the most
6 sensitive to these rate increases that are forecast.

7 So looking at consumption. So consumption is
8 going to be the end-use electricity demand that includes
9 self-generation as well. So behind the meter PV and
10 other forms of self-generation.

11 Some mid case, as I said, is going to be brought
12 down a little bit and slowed in comparison to 2018
13 because of those drivers that I was mentioning before,
14 those effects that occurring in the residential and
15 commercial sectors. And this continued decline and
16 industrial and resource extraction through the state.

17 So ultimately by 2030, you can see there are
18 roughly 320,000 gigawatt hours in comparison to our --
19 our previous forecast, that dotted line. I should lay
20 out the demand scenarios in case it's a little hard to
21 see. So that dotted line you see at the top there was
22 our previous forecast, our mid case forecast from the
23 2018 update. The red line is our high demand scenario.
24 And that green line at the bottom is our low. And then
25 that dark blue line in the middle is going to be our

1 best -- our baseline scenario, our mid case.

2 And these are baseline forecasts so they only
3 include those committed savings impacts, they don't
4 include the additional achievable energy efficiency
5 savings.

6 So here's the sales results. So the difference
7 between that previous forecast and this is simply
8 subtracting out the self-generation impacts from PV and
9 other components. And so that's what's going to cause
10 that slope, sort of a dip down there, this curve, as PVs
11 growing faster in the near term and sort of tails off --
12 tails off towards the -- the longer term -- longer term
13 portion of the forecast.

14 So overall, average annual growth is about half a
15 percent comparison to almost 1 percent in the previous
16 mid case. One important change here is that in the 2018
17 update, we sort of had another AA scenario which had AAPV
18 for the Title 20 for impacts for solar on new home
19 construction. So this now has been baked in to our
20 baseline forecast. So that's going to add an additional
21 PV that otherwise wasn't in the update forecast. And
22 that will be coming -- Sudhakar will talk about that a
23 little bit more coming on line in 2020, relatively soon.

24 So that's also going to drive down that forecast
25 there so you see sort of like a hockey stick on the

1 bottom as that comes online in 2020. But then you have
2 the other components like the electric vehicles and other
3 things adding to the forecast that continue to drive the
4 forecast up.

5 But, yeah, and as I note there, so you see that
6 faster growth in PV in the near term whereas the long-
7 term source starts tapering off. So that's what's
8 causing those differences in that trend line between the
9 previous mid case and the new one.

10 Looking at baseline sales results by sector, this
11 is basically the 2019 through 2030 component average
12 growth rates for various increments from -- of years.
13 Sort of a mid-scenario or a mid- -- a near-term 2019 to
14 2025, you see that slower growth there. Whereas growth
15 starts picking up in the medium to long term and then
16 over the forecast, that shakes out to about 1 percent as
17 you can see in that residential sector.

18 Commercial, we do see that decline in electricity
19 sales and so you're going to have that PV growth there
20 but you'll also have just a lower consumption forecast as
21 I mentioned from the decreasing employment which is going
22 to drive that commercial floorspace projection which is
23 going to then drive the commercial sector demand. So if
24 you have lower commercial floorspace, you therefore have
25 lower commercial sector demand.

1 Additionally, you'll have those committed savings
2 estimates that I showed affecting the baseline
3 consumption data which also drives things down a little
4 bit. But those start decaying off over the -- over the
5 forecast period. So the forecast starts creeping up once
6 again.

7 And you see some other pieces here, as I
8 mentioned. Slower floorspace, some person per household
9 starts decreasing which could increase your
10 residential -- or decrease your residential electricity
11 usage. And then the increasing rates that I showed
12 before also contribute to slower growth in those
13 commercial and residential sectors.

14 Industrial, as you can see, continuing to decline
15 a little bit faster than previously. Mining as well
16 raise some extraction. When you see the Ag bump a little
17 bit -- bump up a little bit, that's not typical, usually
18 it's pretty flat. But since we added that cannabis
19 cultivation to the Ag forecast, you see this increase in
20 that over time.

21 And then you also see some trends in street
22 lighting, essentially efficiency occurring there that's
23 driving down the street lighting forecast, so LEDs and
24 things like that.

25 Any questions on the statewide? Going to try to

1 jump in to hear Marty a few minutes over -- a minute over
2 time.

3 So the next presentations I'm going to give are
4 getting into the planning area. So these first slide,
5 I'll give a little bit of an input summary showing what
6 the major drivers are and some of the pieces and I'll get
7 into the baseline scenarios, sales, and some of the
8 managed scenarios. And for the IOUs, I won't get into
9 peak, I'll leave that to Nick later today.

10 So as I mentioned, we have those increasing rates
11 for PG&E here. And as I -- along with -- in comparison
12 to the rest of the state, we have less household growth
13 that's getting added in the near term, so that's going to
14 be driving down your residential forecast. And those
15 increasing rates will also influence the commercial
16 sector as well. And along with that, you'll see --
17 there's a larger decline in employment in 2021, so
18 essentially dipping down. And then that longer term
19 growth is a little slower compared to 2018.

20 Below that is just some pieces for the PV energy
21 you can see still growing pretty well, almost 9 percent
22 in the forecast. Light-duty vehicles add some additional
23 consumption as well as the medium and heavy-duty vehicles
24 there, showing those 2030 figures.

25 Similar graph to the state but looking now at

1 PG&E for baseline sales. As I mentioned, the commercial
2 and residential sales are going to be lower due to those
3 drivers that I mentioned before. You could even see a
4 decline in commercial sector sales in that midterm and
5 relatively little growth over the long-term forecast.

6 And similar issue with the -- with the
7 residential sector. And you can see the Ag sector there
8 bumped up a little bit. That's because there's about 600
9 gigawatt hours of that cultivation being added to the
10 forecast, along with some increases in crowd production
11 and municipal water supply usage.

12 And then similar, you'll see this across the
13 state and I think all planning areas will have that
14 decreasing and street lighting usages as I mentioned to
15 the efficiencies that occurring there.

16 So this is a graph of the sales results here that
17 I just showed but just aggregated up for all the sectors
18 combined. This mid case, the growth is pretty flat.
19 That carve out you see in the bottom looking at the mid
20 case is essentially that PV coming online and growing
21 faster in the near term, and it starts to taper off and
22 so you end up seeing increase in demand over the forecast
23 period but a decline in that near term. So right in
24 that -- through 2021, the PVs actually -- energy is
25 actually growing at 18 percent per year which is pretty

1 significant causing that sort of hockey stick-like shape
2 there on the bottom.

3 But overall, because of those declines in overall
4 consumption or slowdowns in consumption due to those
5 drivers, you do see a slower rate of growth here. Nearly
6 flat for sales in comparison to under one percent in the
7 2018 forecast. And we're also coming in at a much lower
8 starting point, the 2018 sales were a lot lower. And
9 that gets driven down further by those committed savings
10 coming on line in 2019 and stay pretty -- pretty relevant
11 through 2021, 2022.

12 And those begin to taper off along with the PV
13 and the other pieces that while light-duty vehicles and
14 all these other additions start bringing the forecast
15 back up out of that dip there. So essentially, those
16 other demand modifiers are outpacing the PV growth there
17 along with the committed savings.

18 This is kind of a blown up graph, it looks more
19 dramatic here because it's definitely zooming in, right,
20 to 2019 to 2020. But this is comparing our Mid-Mid and
21 our Mid-Low AAEE scenarios for the sales results. And
22 you can see pretty clearly the Mid-Low is more
23 conservative here, roughly at 3300 gigawatt hours in
24 2030, whereas the more optimistic Mid-Mid base case is
25 around 6,000 by 2030. But overall, the Mid-Mid will

1 reduce those baseline sales results that I showed here by
2 about 5 percent in 2030 when those savings are added to
3 the forecast.

4 Edison, similar story, you have increasing rates
5 that are going to affect your res and commercial. But
6 less of a decline in employment here in comparison to
7 what we had previously. So you don't see as much of a
8 slowdown in comparison to some of the other planning
9 areas.

10 PV energy results, still quite a bit, roughly
11 growing at 9 percent per year. And then the light-duty
12 vehicle consumption as well as a fairly significant,
13 although medium heavy duty is still somewhat small in
14 comparisons to the other components of the forecast, it
15 is growing quite a bit in our mid case as you can see
16 here from about 5 gigawatt hours to almost 450.

17 Yeah, so commercial sector, as I said, not hit as
18 hard so it remains relatively flat. You don't see those
19 declines in commercial sector sales that you saw in the
20 PG&E's planning area. And then the residential sector
21 also is not hit as hard, although it is -- this is a
22 slowdown in comparison to our previous forecast. So you
23 can see the commercial and residential sectors are down 6
24 and 7 percent, respectively, in comparison to that 2018
25 update forecast.

1 Looking at this graph, you do see we're kind of
2 similarly in -- rough -- close to the same starting
3 points that we were before, but now there is still a
4 slowdown in comparison as well as that PV growth there
5 carving out a little bit of a dip. But as I mentioned,
6 Edison is not as nearly as impacted as some of the other
7 planning areas by the changes in the economy. And so
8 ultimately sales slows a bit but roughly about half a
9 percent versus 1 percent in 2018 reaching 104,000
10 gigawatt hours by 2030 there. But ultimately, this ends
11 up being about 4 percent lower than the 2018 update.

12 Looking at the managed forecast as I showed
13 before. Similar story, the Mid-Mid ends up dropping
14 about 5 percent off the baseline sales case. And you see
15 the difference between those -- the conservative Mid-Low
16 versus the baseline managed case, the Mid-Mid there.

17 Some of those -- some of those kinks in there,
18 some changes in rates that are happening year to year.
19 So that's what's going to be causing -- and we're also
20 zooming in quite a bit so some of these changes seem a
21 little more dramatic than they otherwise would.

22 San Diego's input. So San Diego here did see a
23 decrease in employment. Like PG&E, they had a -- a
24 greater decrease in unemployment in comparison to the
25 previous economic data that we received. Household

1 additions also dips in 2020, so they're still adding
2 households but it's that growth is actually much slower
3 in 2020 and then it starts picking up again. And this is
4 going to be a little different than 2018.

5 But the rates see modest growth, but nonetheless
6 in the 2018 forecast that are almost flatter declining,
7 whereas now we do see some growth, although they're --
8 they don't grow as rapidly as PG&E and Edison's
9 territory.

10 And then the bits and pieces there. So still
11 significant growth in PV energy. Light-duty vehicles are
12 adding to that consumption in that big change in medium
13 and heavy duty comparison to our 2018 forecast. In
14 comparison to 2018, the medium and heavy duty is
15 relatively flat, but now we see these new technologies
16 come into play. And our transportation forecasting staff
17 will talk about that more later.

18 So mentioned there's some -- some sort of growth
19 in the residential and commercial sectors. As you can
20 see, as I was showing before, although Edison didn't have
21 that decline in employment, you can see the impact of
22 what's occurring here in our commercial sector. That
23 near term decline in employment which -- and slower
24 recovery from that leading to an overall commercial sales
25 forecast in comparison to the update.

1 Residential sector, as I showed -- or as I
2 mentioned, that near term, there was a slower increase in
3 those households. This starts picking up and grows a
4 little bit faster over the long term. And then sales
5 ultimately grows roughly 1 percent. Industrial sectors
6 still on the decline which is not anything new. And then
7 the Ag sector appears to be growing tremendously but it's
8 relatively small for San Diego and that's going to be the
9 addition of that cultivation there. And then once again,
10 street lighting, seeing some savings occurring in the
11 forecast.

12 So looking at the sales results. Slower growth
13 in comparison to the mid case but growing at just under
14 half a percent annually in our mid case, which is roughly
15 6 percent less than 2018 -- the 2018 forecast in 2030.
16 Roughly 19,000 gigawatt hours. And you can see the
17 differing trends between that mid case and the 2018
18 update versus what we have now. And that's going to be a
19 much faster PV adoption in the midterm in comparison to
20 what we had in that update.

21 So you can see the -- that belly that starts to
22 form there as the -- we would essentially start out with
23 consumption, carve out the belly with the projections of
24 self-generation. And you can see it has a much different
25 trend in comparison to the 2018 update there.

1 MR. RIDER: Cary.

2 MR. GARCIA: Yeah.

3 MR. RIDER: Can you explain the residential
4 difference here in San Diego Gas and Electrical? It's
5 quite a bit -- well, at first it starts much lower and
6 then it goes -- it's the most dramatic difference, I
7 guess, compared to any other service territories. It's
8 quite a big change between the initial five years and
9 then the following.

10 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. So what was occurring in the
11 -- so looking -- the big driver for the residential
12 forecast is going to be your households growth, so what
13 the households. And so I noticed the same thing. And so
14 digging into the household projections, what you have is
15 in the 2018 forecast, you didn't have a decline. It was
16 sort of just steady growth over the long-term forecast.
17 So just a nice even line.

18 What's happening now is you see the growth come
19 on, slower growth, and then a faster recovery. So that's
20 why you get this kind of -- along with some increases in
21 rates, but this is adding to that decline in the 2019 to
22 2025, and then it starts picking up more rapidly in 2025
23 to 2030 over the forecast.

24 MR. RIDER: Driven by population growth, economic
25 growth or?

1 MR. GARCIA: This is household projections from
2 Department of Finance. Yeah.

3 MR. RIDER: All right. Thank you.

4 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So just to be clear,
5 that's just -- the Department of the Finance believes
6 that there's going to be a dip and then a surge in the
7 latter half of the decade?

8 MR. GARCIA: Yeah, that's happening -- this is
9 not -- this is special to San Diego. I'd have to dig in
10 with Department of Finance to find out specifically why.
11 Because San Diego is pretty straightforward because it's
12 county to county mapping, unlike some of our other
13 forecasting zones.

14 But I'd have to double check with finance to find
15 out what exactly is causing that. It's not -- it's not
16 the same as some of the other planning areas. Some of
17 them do see generally, like I was saying, they'll have a
18 slower growth and maybe a little bit of a dip, but San
19 Diego actually declines quite a bit just right off the
20 bat and then just bounces up really quickly.

21 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: It would be good to
22 have that -- good to have that insight.

23 MR. GARCIA: Okay. Yeah, and then here's our
24 AAEE impacts. So across all the most of the planning is
25 roughly a 5 percent reduction, as you can see, 4½ to 5

1 percent reduction. But ultimately our Mid-Mid reaches
2 roughly 18,000 gigawatt hours by 2030 here. So 900
3 giga compared to the other planning areas, San Diego's
4 relatively small compared to them, so you see less AEE
5 impacts overall here. So on a scale of 900 to 600
6 between the Mid-Mid and the Mid-Low cases. Triple digits
7 in comparing to the four-digit impacts that you see in
8 the larger places.

9 Moving on to LA. Also seeing increase rates here
10 relative to 2018. And also a larger decrease in the 2021
11 employment in slower growth. Over the long-term, PV
12 energy growing fairly well, 8 percent over the forecast
13 period. And then you see the impacts there of light-duty
14 vehicles that are baked into the forecast. Along with
15 the growth of medium duty and heavy duty vehicles.

16 So residential and commercial sector once again
17 have been reduced, growing at 1.9 percent and 1.1
18 percent, respectively, in the previous forecast. So a
19 little bit slower in the commercial sector, as I
20 mentioned that dip in that employment driving those
21 floorspace projections. And then slight decrease in the
22 residential sector growth, but not as dramatic as some of
23 the other planning areas or San Diego that I showed
24 before.

25 And then Ag sector, a little bit's getting added

1 here as well. So you can see how that tremendous
2 increase. And so that's going to be -- it's expected
3 that that would be indoor operations that would be
4 occurring in the LA's territory. And then once again,
5 street lighting is -- is pretty declining and industrial
6 and mining sectors, heavy manufacturing sectors are on
7 the decline as they have been previously. But that's a
8 steeper decline than -- and across all the planning
9 areas, we see a steeper decline in those industrial
10 mining sectors.

11 So here we see some fairly significant change
12 between what we've had before and what we have now which
13 actually puts us more in line with what we've -- with the
14 projections provided by LA, DWP, through the IEPR process
15 when we do those comparisons. So sales growth is just
16 under 1 percent now versus 1.2 percent. So that trend
17 didn't change so much, reaching almost 2400 -- 24,000
18 gigawatt hours by 2030.

19 We found that the 2018 actual sales were far
20 lower than what we were predicting so in the 2018 update,
21 we were starting with 2017 actual of data, expecting that
22 to continue to grow. But we ultimately had a decline in
23 2018 which will bring the forecast starting point down a
24 little lower. And then you're adding to that committed
25 savings estimate that would drive that 2019 value even

1 further down.

2 So looking at net peak results. And I'll
3 mention, I wasn't able to -- yeah, okay, I have it here.
4 I wasn't able to do the -- we typically will do an AAEE
5 peak, but we haven't been able to finalize that yet, so
6 we'll have to work on that this week. So I'll just be
7 showing the baseline net peak results here versus some of
8 the POU's territories. SMUD will be the last one.

9 So we're growing quite a bit slower in comparison
10 to what we previously had. Half a percent versus one
11 percent in the 2018 update reaching, as you can see here,
12 6300 megawatts in 2030. But these update projections are
13 more in line with LADWP's IEPR forecast growth. Looking
14 at how we've done this previously. So we don't have --
15 we don't have an hourly forecasting model yet for LA and
16 SMUD, for example. It's something that we've been trying
17 to work on in the future. We rely on load factors by
18 particular end-uses that are developed from our previous
19 HELM model, hourly electric load model.

20 So what I did there is I just recalibrated some
21 of those load factors to better estimate what the
22 contribution of consumption, the peak load would be, that
23 translation from end-use consumption to peak load. By
24 adjusting that factor, we end up with something a little
25 more in line with what twenty -- with what LADWP is

1 projecting. This came up in our preliminary forecast, we
2 had dramatically different forecasts. So hopefully that
3 adjustment will hold well. But once we re-fab our HELM
4 model and that continues to get developed, we'll be able
5 to retool this a little bit more and dial it in. But
6 yeah, I'll leave it there.

7 Jumping back to sales, this is just a quick slide
8 of the sales forecast here with the AAEE applied to it.
9 So reducing quite a bit of AAEE savings in the Mid-Mid
10 scenario here. I mean, reducing sales by about 16
11 percent so you end up seeing a declining sales estimate
12 over the forecast period whereas that more conservative
13 estimate of AAEE savings ends up with a flat sales
14 forecast in that Mid-Low and that green line there.

15 So going -- saving the best for last in the
16 home -- the home utility. Once again, near-term
17 household growth is slower but -- and ultimately total
18 additions reduced by 2030. Long-term employment here
19 slowed with a much larger dip in 2021 in comparison to
20 the previous forecast. And we also see a slower growth
21 in population.

22 PV energy growing a little bit more over the
23 forecast period, 11 percent versus 7 percent. And there
24 are light-duty vehicle and medium, heavy-duty
25 contributions to the forecast.

1 So as I said earlier, so that you see that
2 reduction and near-term household growth reducing that
3 residential forecasts. The slow downs and commercial
4 sector also reducing, reducing the sales forecast.

5 Declining industrial, it does dip up a little
6 bit. But mining, obviously, I don't see any much
7 resource extraction happening in the Sacramento County
8 area, but that is expected. And a little bit of Ag
9 getting increased and that's due to about 70 gigawatts of
10 cultivation impacts getting added to the 2030 by --
11 getting added by 2030.

12 But ultimately the two big drivers here, as I
13 said, commercial and residential -- commercial and
14 residential sectors, I should mention this before is
15 roughly 80 percent of demand in the state. And so that's
16 why I kind of key up on those two big -- big drivers
17 there. They're the ones that see the most action
18 particular. But these have been reduced a fair amount in
19 comparison to our previous estimates.

20 And so when we get to our baseline sales
21 forecasts, you see a reduction as well overall when you
22 combine all the sectors together. So just under 1
23 percent growth versus almost 1½ percent in the 2018
24 update there. So 11,300 gigawatt hours here. So that's
25 compared to the 12,500 or so that we had before.

1 So this actually also puts us pretty in line with
2 what SMUD has provided. I think they're in the process
3 of updating their forecast again for September. So we'll
4 have to see what those look like as well to do our
5 comparisons there.

6 Looking at peak results. 3200 megawatts by 2030
7 because you have a consumption in sales forecast to
8 reduce, you're also going to have a reduced net peak
9 result. And so the annual growth here slows a little bit
10 from those drivers that I mentioned before. But, you
11 know, not too -- not too different of an actual growth
12 pattern but more of an adjustment downwards from the new
13 starting point.

14 And then looking at the manage sales. Little bit
15 less AAEE than some of the other planning areas, but that
16 still reduces the forecast a little bit so the Mid-Mid is
17 actually declining here as you can see in that blue line.
18 Actually -- or growing, I mean it's declined but it's
19 growing at 0.3 percent versus a half here. So roughly
20 0.8 that I had in the previous slide there. And then
21 1300 gigawatts of AAEE that's being impacted in 2030.

22 So I think that's it. I've already wasted 23
23 additional minutes from my previous speakers. But are
24 there any questions throughout this? I can jump back to
25 anything. Do my best to answer them.

1 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Yeah. No, not wasted time at
2 all. Thank you for the thorough presentation.

3 Other questions for Cary?

4 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. I guess I'm a
5 little surprised at the -- so, you know, we talk a lot
6 about how transportation is going to be this big new
7 load. And, you know, we're looking out to 2030. And
8 maybe with the exception of Edison and kind of, you know,
9 SDG&E is a unique case. But it looks like the long-term
10 managed forecasts are pretty low and there's sort of not
11 out to 2030 at least, this big wedge of, you know, the
12 numbers for gigawatt hours consumed by electrification
13 transportation don't seem to be overwhelming the rest of
14 it.

15 So I guess that's a little bit of a surprise to
16 me. I wonder if it is to anybody else. You know.

17 MR. GARCIA: Yeah, you're -- I mean, you're
18 coming in with -- so first we'll estimate the consumption
19 by the particular sectors. So we have -- so we're just
20 keying up on residential and commercial sector, for
21 example.

22 Looking at the -- we start off with that
23 consumption forecast, and that's already getting driven
24 lower in comparison to what we've had before. And so
25 that's our starting point.

1 And the way we apply the transportation forecast
2 that's getting layered upon that lower forecast already.
3 And then you start adding on the sales -- or the
4 reduction in sales from PV generation that's still
5 declining. So you end up with this end -- add to that
6 the committed savings that's coming online. So that's
7 all getting baked into there just kind of pushing that
8 forecast down further and further.

9 So even though the transportation is adding quite
10 a bit, you do kind of see -- like you can see here, it
11 sort of kind of dips back up. So that savings is coming
12 away. Let me jump back to -- to PG -- to San Diego, for
13 example.

14 So it does have that dip, but that -- additional
15 consumption from light-duty vehicles and electrification
16 is adding to the forecast. It's bringing us out of that
17 because otherwise, you would have something that would
18 have -- I'd have to do the counterfactual and say what if
19 transportation didn't happen and see what these forecasts
20 look like.

21 My guess would be that you wouldn't see this
22 increasing in the longer term. Because the
23 transportation is still relatively -- there's quite a bit
24 of electrification occurring, but that -- those big
25 changes are happening further out in the forecast period,

1 we're adding, you know, 3 million vehicles or more.

2 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Well, San Diego
3 you said that -- I mean, we saw the numbers for a
4 population growth basically being in those out years as
5 sell. So there's some driving there.

6 I guess I was looking at PG&E and DWP, and SMUD,
7 I guess, where basically the net was pretty flat even in
8 the out years. Which is actually okay. I mean, the idea
9 with efficiency and, you know, the other demand. You
10 know, the distributed stuff is it creates headroom for
11 all the new load that's going to come in for
12 electrification vehicles and heating loads.

13 So that's great. I guess just want to make sure
14 we're -- we're seeing what's adding and what's
15 subtracting and making sure that each component is
16 reasonable.

17 Thanks.

18 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I'm assuming that in the
19 next presentation, we're going to go over the numbers of
20 actual electric vehicles that we're looking at. And I
21 think they're not very high either. So I think there's
22 multiple things happening.

23 Yeah. I mean, Cary's right that it's -- it
24 really is an out year thing. Because even if sales
25 really escalate, it's the replace -- it takes a long time

1 to cycle out the entire fleet. So with the 15-year-ish
2 life span of light-duty vehicles and even longer with
3 heavy-duty vehicles, it takes a long time to cycle them
4 out.

5 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Other questions for Cary from
6 the dais?

7 All right. Thank you, Cary.

8 MR. GARCIA: All right. Thank you.

9 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: So we are at about 11:30,
10 we'll go till 12:30 for the transportation forecast. So
11 we'll give that the hour that we're looking for.

12 And it looks like Mark is going to start us off.

13 MR. PALMERE: Good morning, Commissioners and
14 Ken. As well as the stakeholders and members of the
15 public. Thank you all for being here.

16 My name is Mark Palmere and I work on the Light-
17 duty Transportation Vehicle Forecast. And today we will
18 be presenting on three different parts of our forecast.
19 I'll be presenting light-duty vehicles. And then our
20 freight specialist Bob McBride will be presenting medium
21 and heavy-duty vehicles. And finally, our forecast lead
22 Aniss Bahrenian will be presenting about overall field
23 consumption.

24 So to start with, here is a broad look at our
25 model and how it works. And if you've been to any of our

1 presentations before, you've probably seen this. But I
2 know some of you are relatively new so I just wanted to
3 very quickly go over it.

4 And we have a wide range of inputs from our
5 vehicle survey which assesses consumer preferences to
6 economic and demographic data, fuel price forecasts,
7 vehicle populations, vehicle attributes. And vehicle
8 attributes are -- can be influenced by policy regulations
9 such as CAFE. And finally, there's also the incentives
10 which are another input into our model.

11 And those influence each model in different ways
12 but in general, they give an idea of what we're expecting
13 over the next ten or so years. At our model, we have a
14 personal vehicle choice model, commercial vehicle choice
15 model, and that's light-duty commercial vehicles,
16 government and rental model, truck choice, aviation, and
17 other bus. And all those lead to our outputs of vehicle
18 stock on the road and transportation energy demand.

19 And a few of the values that we use are base year
20 values while others are projected inputs. And the base
21 year values include the current vehicle stock, the
22 current household-type distribution, current fuel
23 consumption, and current vehicle miles traveled or VMT.
24 And then we have projected inputs which are future
25 economic and demographic data which come from Moody's and

1 the Department of Finance future energy prices from the
2 EIA, future vehicle attributes which are compiled by a
3 contractor as well as through staff input and future
4 transit and school bus population. And these inputs go
5 through 2030 which is the end of our forecast.

6 And another important thing to note about our
7 demand scenarios is that they are based on electricity
8 demand. So the high -- the high demand forecast is our
9 high electricity demand forecast which means that is the
10 set of inputs that is most favorable for higher
11 electricity consumption which would mean high population,
12 high income, and then high petroleum fuel prices, but low
13 electricity, natural gas, and hydrogen fuel prices. And
14 this would also mean lower electric vehicle prices and
15 relatively higher gasoline vehicle prices compared to the
16 other cases.

17 We have the mid demand case which is the middle
18 inputs for all of them. And then the low demand case
19 which is the opposite of the high whereas population and
20 income are low but electricity, fuel prices are high and
21 petroleum fuel prices are still low.

22 And now I'm going to present our light-duty
23 vehicle results.

24 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Can I -- I'm sorry, can I
25 ask just a quick question?

1 MR. PALMERE: Uh-huh.

2 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Can I go back one slide?

3 MR. PALMERE: Yeah.

4 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Just so I understand since

5 fuel prices are, you know, time specific at least for

6 transportation, trying to do it off peak. Are you saying

7 that the high price for the low demand, the high price

8 would mean for transportation fuels, the price of

9 electricity would be high?

10 MR. PALMERE: Yes, that's correct.

11 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Okay. So even if you're

12 charging off peak, you're still assuming high price?

13 MR. PALMERE: So by high we mean high relative to

14 the other cases.

15 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Uh-huh.

16 MR. PALMERE: So, it'll be like --

17 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Oh, so it's only like high

18 relative to other cases, not high relative to electricity

19 prices generally.

20 MR. PALMERE: Yeah, that's a good -- that's a

21 good -- yeah, thank you for clarifying.

22 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Thank you.

23 MR. PALMERE: Yeah. These high, mid, and low

24 means relative to the other scenarios.

25 And then here's another scenario chart, if you

1 haven't had enough of these. There are -- obviously,
2 these are all the inputs we use or a summary of the
3 inputs we use. And I'm not going to go over it in great
4 detail for the purposes of time but you can see if you
5 can read that closely, you can see some of the different
6 inputs we assume, for example, vehicle prices in our low
7 case are based on a battery price declining to \$120 per
8 kilowatt hour, whereas in the high case, it's down to \$80
9 per kilowatt hour.

10 And then we have an aggressive and bookend case
11 that we -- we created as an experiment to see how high
12 the EV population could grow. And in the bookend case,
13 we have battery prices declining to \$62 per kilowatt
14 hour.

15 And then other important attributes are makes and
16 models, model availability where we have more classes of
17 PEVs, plug-in electric vehicles, available in the higher
18 scenarios, higher ranges, higher fuel economy, and lower
19 refueling time.

20 In addition, the incentives are forecast to last
21 longer in the higher cases. Meaning that in -- through
22 2030 in the aggressive and bookend case, the state rebate
23 will still be available as well as HOV lane access for
24 PEVs and FCVs. Whereas in the low case, it expires as in
25 2025 for the rebate and 2021 for HOV lane access.

1 And then the last --

2 MR. RIDER: Mark, can I ask you a question about

3 this table here?

4 MR. PALMERE: Yeah.

5 MR. RIDER: I'm not deft enough to remember.

6 I've looked at this for the 2018 as well.

7 MR. PALMERE: Uh-huh.

8 MR. RIDER: Has any of these -- have any of these

9 cells here been updated or changed since 2018?

10 MR. PALMERE: Yeah. A lot of the attribute ones

11 have changed. The incentives and preferences are pretty

12 much the same. But the attributes we have in the higher

13 cases we have more availability in the -- or the

14 aggressive and bookend case more availability in the fuel

15 cell market.

16 MR. RIDER: Okay.

17 MR. PALMERE: I believe the ranges are a bit

18 different. And I believe the vehicle prices are lower as

19 well.

20 MR. RIDER: Great. Thank you.

21 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Ken, one of the things the

22 team is also working to do is to update the attributes as

23 well. So one of the ones we've talked about is time to

24 station. So if you're charging at home or at work, your

25 time to station is sort of zero. Right? But right here,

1 we're sort of captured it by the same way that it would
2 take you to drive to a gasoline station which works with
3 a fuel cell. Right? With the hydrogen, you've got to
4 drive to the station still. But we might to tweak some
5 of those additionally for charging infrastructure and
6 where people might be charging.

7 And we've also worked really closely and maybe
8 Mark I can let you or the team speak to this in more
9 detail. But with the demand analysis working group has a
10 specific group that's looking at the electrification of
11 vehicles. So like some of the SCE scenarios which are
12 much more aggressive than ours. You know, we've been
13 working with SCE to try to roll those in as well to get a
14 really good number within this space. But there are
15 still things that we need to tweak as we go along.

16 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And the 2030 ZEV
17 population, can you talk about how that was varied this
18 year compared to last?

19 MR. PALMERE: Yes. Actually, there's a few
20 slides with the population numbers so I'll be going over
21 that very soon. And thank you for that.

22 And Commissioner Scott, going back to what you
23 said. Yeah, we definitely use -- we definitely
24 appreciate the input from the demand analysis working
25 group because they are -- it is a number of utilities and

1 a few OEMs as well who are able to provide their
2 unique -- or different perspective which is very helpful.

3 And, you're right, with the -- with things like
4 time to station and fuel prices, I know you have brought
5 that up in the past the off peak charging. Things like
6 that. It's -- we're still figuring out ways to
7 incorporate them into the forecast because electric
8 vehicles definitely bring up a lot of new -- new ideas
9 that weren't present in the -- that weren't even
10 consideration in the forecast ten years ago before --
11 before the technology was prominent.

12 And now I'm going to go over the light-duty
13 vehicle results. And to start with, this is the overall
14 vehicle stock and it ranges from about 35 million to 35½
15 million in 2030. And you'll notice that's pretty
16 similar, there's not that much range. And that's because
17 the overall vehicle stock is a result of income and
18 population changes. And the income and population
19 numbers that we have are not too different. So as a
20 result, the overall vehicle stock population is not going
21 to be that different where we see a lot of the variation
22 is the stock by fuel type which I'll be going over next.

23 And here's the plug-in electric vehicle stock
24 which is not to be confused with the ZEV stock which is
25 zero emission vehicles and includes hydrogen as well.

1 PEV does not include the fuel cell vehicles.

2 And in -- for PEVs, the number of PEVs by 2030
3 ranges from a little over 2½ million to a little under
4 4.5 million in the high case. Which means there is quite
5 a bit of difference, depending on the attributes and
6 inputs which means that right now that we can envision a
7 wide range of possible scenarios where a PEV penetration
8 could be higher or lower depending on what sorts of
9 vehicle attributes are offered and what sort of policy
10 and incentives are made to nudge it in one direction or
11 the other.

12 And then this graph looks very similar. It's
13 just with the hydrogen vehicles added in because this is
14 ZEV stock as opposed to PEV stock. And I'm going to look
15 at the hydrogen numbers more specifically later. But in
16 general, it's still about between 2½ and 4½ million ZEVs
17 in 2030.

18 And this is just the low, mid, and high case.
19 For this presentation, we didn't include the aggressive
20 or bookend but as shown in that table, they are higher.

21 And compared to the preliminary forecast, this
22 is -- the BEV and the PHEV numbers are pretty similar.
23 We see a little bit of -- a little bit of an increase but
24 overall, they're very similar to what we had in the
25 preliminary workshop in July I believe it was, and this

1 was because we didn't have a lot of changes to our
2 attributes or to any of the baser -- baser numbers in
3 those few months.

4 And this is just more specifically battery
5 electric vehicles. And battery electric vehicles of all
6 the ZEVs, they're the ones that we're forecasting to have
7 the biggest jump in 2030. In the high case, they make up
8 about 10 percent of total vehicle stock. Just a little
9 bit under -- a little bit under 3 million. And in the
10 low case, about 1.7 million.

11 So again, we're seeing that wide variation
12 depending on the attributes and depending on the case.

13 PHEVs also rise but not quite at the level that
14 ZEVs arise, but still we see about a four or fivefold
15 increase from currently as high as 1.4 million in the --
16 in 2030 in the high case.

17 And something to notice in both of these charts
18 is you'll notice the -- at 2025, there's a little bit of
19 a kink in each of the lines. And that is due to in our
20 forecast, we anticipate the state rebate running out in
21 2025, that's just -- obviously we don't know that but
22 that's just our best guess based on what we do know. And
23 so you can see the results of that in the -- in the graph
24 where it does have an effect on stock and it decreases
25 the rate at which BEVs and PHEVs are put on the road.

1 And just one more draft about BEVs and PHEVs is
2 the breakdown between BEVs and PHEVs. This is something
3 that we've seen in the past a lot more optimism for
4 PHEVs. But now based on what we have with some of the
5 announcements of manufacturers discontinuing, some of the
6 popular PHEVs and more focused on BEV technology, that
7 we're anticipating right now it's about a little over 50
8 percent the share of BEVs verses PHEVs, we're
9 anticipating it to be almost two-thirds the ratio of BEVs
10 to PHEVs in 2030 in the mid case.

11 And that is as a result there's a lot of
12 different attributes, obviously the prices and all of
13 that is going to have an impact. But overall, we've seen
14 manufacturers tend to focus more on BEVs based on their
15 announcements and other plans. So that's why we have a
16 more optimistic future for BEVs. Although, as you saw in
17 the last graph, PHEVs are still increasing on a steady
18 rate.

19 And finally, this is going to be my last slide, I
20 believe. And this is the fuel cell vehicle stock. And
21 before I get to that, I want to mention that we do
22 forecast all fuel types so we do have graphs like this
23 for all of the fuel types currently on the road,
24 including gasoline, diesel, flex fuel hybrid. And for
25 the purposes of time, I'm not going to present them, but

1 they are in the appendix of this sheet if you have this,
2 so you can take look at your convenience or -- and we're
3 happy to answer any questions about that. But for the
4 purpose of time, we're focusing on ZEVs.

5 And the final one I'm talking about is fuel cell
6 electric vehicles, hydrogen vehicles. And this is where
7 we did see a significant difference between our
8 preliminary forecast and our revised forecast. Our
9 revised forecast has about 160,000 hydrogen vehicles in
10 2030 in the mid case. And that's about a 30,000 increase
11 from our preliminary forecast. And that's due to just
12 better -- or having more actual data from the DMV as --
13 since hydrogen is the newest technology that we're
14 focused on. It changes even more quickly than BEV and
15 PHEV and our 2018 actual numbers that we were able to
16 finalize indicated a more -- more optimistic future for
17 fuel cell vehicles. So that's why you see if you compare
18 this to the preliminary graph, that's why you see that
19 increase.

20 And I just want to talk about how in this one,
21 the low is noticeably lower. And that's because as I
22 say, it is a little bit of a newer technology so we
23 really have no idea if it's going to catch on or if so,
24 how much. And that's why in the low case, it's not very
25 optimistic at all for it just because there's a chance

1 that the prices could never go down and it just never
2 breaks out and becomes a common technology. But in the
3 mid case and the high case, it is a lot more optimistic
4 over close to 200,000 on the road in the high case.

5 And so that's the end of the light-duty vehicles.
6 If there are any questions, I'm happy to answer them
7 from --

8 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I have maybe more of a
9 comment than a question which is I think it would be
10 worth on the charts showing the aggressive scenario just
11 because if we, you know, that -- that puts us closer to
12 where we need to get to meet our state goals.

13 MR. PALMERE: Uh-huh.

14 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And it highlights to the
15 state that in order to reach that, we're going to have to
16 do some pretty aggressive measures.

17 And so I do feel like it's important to show how
18 we are all working together to meet the state goals and
19 how much work it's going to take. Not just us, right?
20 But the entire state to be able to meet those goals.

21 So that's just a comment.

22 And can you go back to the fuel cell slide? I
23 mean, this is the one I was the most surprised by
24 because, you know, we have 6,500 today on the road, we
25 only have a few manufacturers that are producing them.

1 They have plans to ramp up but other manufacturers are
2 not. It takes a long time to scale up fuel cells.

3 I'm just very skeptical that -- yeah, the mid and
4 high cases don't seem to align with where the market is
5 today. It might be where the market is in 2025, we might
6 start getting that trajectory but I don't see that
7 happening right now.

8 So, yeah, that's my concern is that the battery
9 electric ones to me seem, you know, more aligned with
10 where we're seeing the market. The fuel cell one does
11 not seem very aligned with right now where the market is.
12 It's where we hope the market will be in a few years.

13 MR. PALMERE: Uh-huh. Yeah. Yeah, that's
14 definitely a fair concern as I mentioned the fuel cell is
15 the one that we're the most uncertain about.

16 But just comparing -- looking at the numbers now
17 as you said 6,000 to even as recently as twenty -- 2016
18 or 2017, when it was still under 1,000, we are seeing the
19 growth. And yeah, as you mentioned without -- without a
20 lot of manufacturers, it's going to be hard --

21 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: The models.

22 MR. PALMERE: -- but we have seen -- yeah.

23 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Yeah. I mean, we have a
24 very limited number of models, we have a very limited
25 number of manufacturers.

1 And our hope is that we'll be able to build from
2 that and scale up rapidly. It's just --

3 MR. PALMERE: Uh-huh.

4 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: It's not going to happen
5 by next year.

6 MR. RIDER: Yeah. Right. That's like a four
7 times, if we're at 6,000 now just looking at this graph.
8 It's almost a four -- I mean, you'd have to get to like
9 over 20,000 next year and the next year.

10 MR. PALMERE: Yeah.

11 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: I think it's worthwhile. I
12 mean, one of the things the transportation team does with
13 the Air Resources Board is there's a report that comes
14 out in June about how many cars are on the road. And a
15 report that comes out in December about how many -- how
16 many fuel cell cars are on the road. And then a report
17 comes out in December about how many hydrogen stations
18 there are and what are the things that we need to do to
19 keep moving. And I do think these early year numbers in
20 the mid case align with those reports from Air Resources
21 Board where they've talked to the manufacturers about
22 what they see coming.

23 But it would be worth digging into to make sure
24 that -- that those reports that we're putting out match
25 up with what we have here in our demand forecast as well.

1 And it's been a little while since I've looked
2 into it so I can't remember what the exact numbers are
3 but I do think those early year numbers are -- are
4 matching up.

5 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: With the AB 8 report?

6 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Yeah. But we should double
7 check because it's awhile since I looked at it.

8 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Yeah. And the AB 8 report
9 was also talking about how by 2025 there seems to be a
10 lack of fuel cell models that are going to be able to
11 make the -- make the market really scale up.

12 And we've had these supply disruptions which
13 have, you know, for folks who want to lease these
14 vehicles, there's a lot of uncertainty about whether
15 they'll be able to get the hydrogen fuel even as we're
16 making a lot of progress on the hydrogen stations. So
17 just --

18 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Think about how we portray
19 that, huh?

20 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Yeah. Yeah.

21 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Absolutely.

22 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Yeah. It's important to
23 highlight that they are -- they have the potential to
24 scale up and they have the potential to do it, but we
25 have to also face the market realities which are where we

1 are today.

2 MR. PALMERE: Uh-huh. Yeah, definitely for sure.

3 Thank you for -- thank you for that input.

4 Commissioner Monahan, and going back to your
5 previous point, the aggressive is that's definitely
6 something we can include on our charts as well. We try
7 to keep it a little bit -- try to not, like, overwhelm
8 people with too many lines but that's definitely, for
9 going with your point, that's definitely something that
10 we can do for that purpose. So thank you.

11 Now I'm going to say I'm going to hand it over to
12 Bob McBride on medium and heavy-duty vehicles.

13 MR. MCBRIDE: Good morning, Commissioners,
14 stakeholders, all the participants.

15 Just a second here. Now we turn to medium and
16 heavy-vehicle forecast. We include field technologies in
17 each class once they're commercialized, meaning offered
18 for sale by dealer. Often a driven-incentive program so
19 no medium-duty hydrogen and no interstate long haul ZEVs.
20 Gasoline and diesel hybrids announced by manufacturers
21 using these technologies in other classes are included.
22 Some terminology that's specific to medium and heavy.

23 ZEVs are, when I use ZEV, it really means zero
24 emission despite there will be a credit system in advance
25 clean trucks, but we're not going to delve into that.

1 It's a proposed regulation.

2 So ZEVs, battery, electric, hydrogen fuel cell
3 catenary electric. Then there's NZEV, near ZEV, that's
4 plug-in hybrids, essentially, which may eventually emerge
5 into general trucking but there's none that are
6 commercialized now outside the very small world of
7 vocational trucks like bucket trucks, called -- which are
8 also called power takeoff, cranes, that sort of thing.
9 They're not in general trucking.

10 Once we walk through the vehicle weight classes,
11 I'll talk through our summary table, the forecast
12 scenarios, yet you need one more of those. We have a
13 brief look at ZEV buses in 2030 and then turn to the
14 truck forecast. I'll describe the incentives used in the
15 truck choice model and then focus on tractor trailers,
16 cost per mile, and market share for the tractor trailers,
17 for the in-state tractor trailers. Manufacturer
18 announcements and a fleet price for hydrogen. The medium
19 and heavy-duty ZEV forecast slide then Aniss Bahrenian
20 will share results on fuel consumption.

21 Here's our medium and heavy duty -- here, medium
22 and heavy duty means on road trucks and buses, the gross
23 weight of 10,000 pounds and over. Gross weight is the
24 maximum loaded weight that's legal rather than the
25 unladen or the curb weight of the vehicle which is quite

1 a bit less. The heaviest here is eight times the weight
2 of the lightest which is quite diverse by weight alone,
3 not to even talking vocation. They're also diverse in
4 their applications. Cargo and passengers, freight versus
5 services, specialty vocational vehicles like cement and
6 bucket trucks.

7 We included our matrix with the eight truck
8 classes we use and which fuels they appear -- or which
9 fuels appear in each class. It's in the appendix. We're
10 not going to go through that right now.

11 So here's a pocket guide to the truck scenarios
12 in the entire medium and heavy-duty forecast. Three
13 scenarios are considered for trucks and for transit
14 buses, low, mid, and high. We apply the in-place
15 regulations in the forecast such as innovative clean
16 tracks -- innovative clean transit and the existing truck
17 rules. Existing statewide truck rules, I should say.

18 Our modeled truck incentives take a range of
19 values over time largely for ZEV and low knocks
20 technologies. The air resources for HVIP program, hybrid
21 and electric vehicle incentive program or something very
22 close to that, for commercialized vehicles through
23 CALSTART which vary in how far they extend in the future,
24 how much of the cost is covered. So the incentives are
25 different in the three cases.

1 The three cases also have distinct forecasts as
2 to battery prices. More on incentives and batteries
3 later. Our scenarios for forecasts stock of different
4 ZEVs is on the last four lines, including lines for
5 battery electric hydrogen, fuel cell electric, and
6 catenary electric. At least you can get there. They're
7 specific. That changed quite a bit.

8 ZEV stock in 2030 varies by a rough factor ten
9 between low and high cases so that illustrates the
10 uncertainty in this really rapidly developing sector.

11 Here's a 2030 snapshot of ZEV stock in three
12 truck classes. Innovative clean transit regs require ZEV
13 drive trains in new vehicles in increasing percentages
14 from 2023 and 2026 to a hundred percent in 2029.

15 Airport shuttle regulations require 33 percent
16 ZEV in fleets by 2027 and a hundred percent somewhere in
17 the '30s. And note that the shuttles number -- okay,
18 that's the correct number, 789 of those airport shuttles.

19 We expect a good population of battery electric
20 school buses given support from public funding. Almost
21 4,000 transit buses, over 700 shuttles, 2300 school
22 buses.

23 Wait, this is déjà vu, why do we have this? Oh,
24 truck forecast is separate. Okay.

25 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Bob, can I ask a quick

1 question about that back on page 19?

2 So you said it was -- it's the 33 percent reg
3 that the Air Resources Board has recently done. Is that
4 33 percent of today's population or that's 33 percent of
5 the population that you think will be on the road in
6 2030?

7 MR. MCBRIDE: The 30 per -- no, 30 per -- which
8 sector are you talking, Commissioner?

9 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: So you were mentioning the
10 airport shuttles, right, and you said it --

11 MR. MCBRIDE: Yeah.

12 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: -- requires 33 percent of them
13 to be on the road by 2027 have to be ZEVs, right?

14 So my question is, are you basing your number off
15 of how many there are today or how many airport shuttles
16 you think there will be on the road in 2027?

17 MR. MCBRIDE: I'm pretty --

18 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: If that makes sense.

19 MR. MCBRIDE: I'm pretty -- let's, Elena Giyenko
20 actually prepared the --

21 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Okay.

22 MR. MCBRIDE: -- these slides.

23 MS. GIYENKO: Yeah, so, you're correct. This
24 directly from the regulation.

25 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Uh-huh.

1 MS. GIYENKO: So the numbers, I believe in 2030,
2 there are close to 60 percent. So this number currently,
3 I think -- I believe in February Air Resources Board
4 surveyed airport shuttle operators. They received I
5 believe roughly a thousand buses that are currently in
6 operation. However, they don't have any actual data.
7 The airport shuttle regulation will come into effect with
8 the reporting starting 2022.

9 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Uh-huh.

10 MS. GIYENKO: So we would know exactly how many
11 buses are on the road --

12 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Okay.

13 MS. GIYENKO: -- directly.

14 MR. MCBRIDE: Thanks, Elena.

15 We're on 21. So there are a number of changes
16 from the preliminary forecast. I was just happy to have
17 a preliminary forecast, but it needed a number of tweaks
18 because ZEV numbers were quite low. So we make changes
19 in data and some assumptions since the -- for these, I'll
20 look at here.

21 We lowered the embedded battery prices in our
22 battery electric trucks to 30 percent higher than what we
23 used in the light-duty forecast. That's based on an
24 estimate of how much you have to beef up medium and
25 heavy-duty battery. Still quite a bit lower than we had

1 in the preliminary. Thirty percent may cover cost of
2 cooling, control, and system control. Power rating since
3 medium and heavy-duty trucks have intense drive cycles.

4 When a hypothetical fleet considers how many
5 miles a truck will go a year, we now include only the
6 four recent vintages. So we're looking at 2014 to 2017
7 instead of ten years in the preliminary forecast which I
8 believe looked back to 2009.

9 Truck requirement -- I'm sorry, truck retirement
10 is as important in new truck choice in future purchases.
11 So drilled down a little bit. We now use three cases for
12 truck retirement based on data from two historical
13 periods on record and EMFAC data. And their midpoint is
14 mid case.

15 We now use a hydrogen price assuming fleet
16 ownership of a right sized hydrogen station and lower
17 tank pressure -- or lower as compared to light duty.
18 When taken together, these result in a far lower price
19 than our retail hydrogen price we use for light duty.

20 The premium to purchase -- to the purchase price
21 of alternative fuel vehicle beyond the cost of the same
22 vehicle conventionally fueled, that price we call
23 incremental cost. So it's an incrementing cost, yeah.
24 From recent hybrid and electric vehicle incentive program
25 records, we determined the fraction of incremental cost

1 covered by vouchers for each truck class and each
2 incentivized fuel technology. So they varied both by
3 class and by which fuel they were.

4 I applied this fraction to estimates of purchase
5 price through 2021, for all three scenarios. So the
6 three incentive scenarios and the three incremental costs
7 are the same through 2021. Funding is assumed to be
8 available for all comers which may be a shady assumption.
9 Starting in 2022, the low scenario gets no incentives.
10 The mid scenario gets 80 percent of the current fraction
11 of incremental cost. So high case, full incentive. Mid
12 case, 80 percent. And the low case gets zero. So after
13 2021, there's no incentives in the low case which you'll
14 see in the results a lot.

15 Now the high scenario actually gets 99 percent.
16 And that's -- it would be 100 except it's a quirk of the
17 model we're using. It blows up if you put in 100
18 percent. You can't have anything as cheap as the base
19 fuel. So we assume this last one percent has negligible
20 impact. The current truck choice model needs a net to be
21 different.

22 So three scenarios, three incentive levels,
23 funding available to all comers. So here's a look at one
24 truck class. Market share, high scenario for fuel tech
25 in Class 3 which is just bigger than light duty where the

1 larger -- largest pickups and vans show up. Diesel
2 dominates early and dips under 50 percent in 2025.
3 Battery electric tops 30 percent in 2026 and has a slight
4 decline later. And gasoline hybrid which is new in this
5 class rises after 2025 reaches 20 percent in 2030. So --

6 MR. RIDER: Can you back to that slide? Quick --

7 MR. MCBRIDE: Certainly.

8 MR. RIDER: -- question on that. So this is the
9 high demand case?

10 MR. MCBRIDE: Yeah, actually I looked last night.
11 The mid case is pretty similar.

12 MR. RIDER: Okay.

13 MR. MCBRIDE: A little lower.

14 MR. RIDER: So this is -- just to go back to the
15 voucher thing, is that -- those vouchers aren't for this
16 type of vehicle or is that for this type of vehicle?

17 MR. MCBRIDE: Yeah, Class 3 does get a voucher.
18 It's -- it's -- all the pickups are excluded first so
19 it's -- actually, applies to a smaller population. I
20 have not done this.

21 MR. RIDER: Okay, because I'm just --

22 MR. MCBRIDE: I'm just --

23 MR. RIDER: -- wondering if this is, I guess, is
24 this y-axis here the percent of new cells for the --

25 MR. MCBRIDE: I'm sorry, yes, that's -- that's

1 the market share, yeah.

2 MR. RIDER: Okay. So I mean, I'm just a little
3 confused because if the voucher if the high demand case
4 is essentially free in terms of purchase cost, one
5 percent more, I guess.

6 MR. MCBRIDE: Free.

7 MR. RIDER: Essentially free and, you know, fuel
8 cost is lower, why would anyone buy, I guess, like what's
9 driving the diesel consumption?

10 MR. MCBRIDE: Well, familiarity for one. But
11 really the core of --

12 MR. RIDER: But the (indiscernible). I mean, how
13 does the model react to that?

14 MR. MCBRIDE: Yeah, the core of this truck choice
15 model has adoption curves built into it. It's assumed,
16 you know, pattern of innovation, diffusion, it's a
17 logistic curve. So you're seeing that in the early years
18 there. The later decline in electric, I think, I haven't
19 tested, but it looks like it's due to the hybrids coming
20 on.

21 MR. RIDER: Okay. Thank you.

22 MR. MCBRIDE: So in this slide, the large blue
23 bar shows the in-state tractor trailers and it's labeled
24 GVWR, gross vehicle weight rating 8, Class 8, combo,
25 which is combination, meaning you've heard trailer on a

1 tractor as opposed to having a single unit. So this one
2 class uses more California fuel by far than other
3 classes. It might even in total, I didn't do that sum.

4 The interstate tractor trailers to their right in
5 blue consume a similar amount but shown here is the
6 portion pumped in California. So the remainder fueling
7 in other states where diesel's often cheaper.

8 Shown in red are the various straight truck
9 classes. It's proposed advanced clean trucks regulation
10 will require manufacturers to produce at least 50 percent
11 ZEV and near ZEV PHEVs by 2030. And actually the Class 3
12 on the left, it's actually slightly lower. There's
13 another multiplier that goes into advanced clean trucks,
14 so their requirement for Class 3 is a bit lower than
15 others. So because the tractor trailer dominates other
16 classes and because no models to these things as ZEV or
17 near ZEV are yet commercialized, we now examine this
18 class in a little more detail.

19 When I was four, I was a four year old, I
20 remember being able to recognize the make and model of
21 every car by its front grill which entertained my dad and
22 his friends. That's out the window here. The Tesla on
23 the lower left and the Aeos, a California startup, upper
24 right, look like the vehicle from Sleeper. The Nikola
25 prototype is the only one that actually looks like a

1 truck. The upper left, this is a Cummins prototype
2 battery electric. I think this body looks like one of
3 those low slung Disneyland people movers. The fuel is
4 different and the manufacturers want to make the look
5 different as well.

6 So the fuel cost per mile here for mid case and
7 high case for the in-state tractor trailers, it looks
8 quite similar. It's a slight shift downward for the
9 alternative fuels in the high as opposed to the mid. The
10 one dramatic difference is the diesel price. Closer to
11 electric in the mid case and closer to hydrogen in the
12 high case. We'll come back to this.

13 Small diversion. Alternative fuels are easier to
14 implement when trucks return to a home base every day or
15 take predictable routes hauling for a single shipper such
16 as Wal-Mart, FedEx, UPS, Budweiser, on long haul, or
17 medium hauls, regional even. These fixed route fleets
18 are called dedicated fleets since they aren't dispatched
19 to an unpredictable origin and destination. As you might
20 imagine, the fraction the tractor trailer fleets that
21 operate locally, regionally, are on dedicated routes.
22 It's the ceiling on alternative fuel adoption at least by
23 2030.

24 In this table from a report by SJ Consulting
25 Group, the percentage of the dedicated hauls moved from

1 35 percent in 2017, 39 percent in 2018. Whether these
2 fleets are representative of all fleets or the change
3 from '17 to '18 is a permanent trend is yet to be seen,
4 but the takeaway is that something on the order of a
5 third to two-fifths of hauls are on dedicated routes.
6 This portion of long haul goods movement by trucks lends
7 itself to ZEV trucks or near ZEV trucks as opposed to the
8 relatively intractable dispatched trucks that go who
9 knows where.

10 So here we see the market share of trucks for
11 fuel in this class, in-state tractor trailers for mid and
12 high scenarios. Now one thing about this class, we
13 lumped together port trucks, regionally hauling, and a
14 certain amount of in-state longer hauls, things that go
15 up and down 5.

16 So anyway, diesel share. The black line
17 decreased in both of these, but in the high it reaches
18 less than half of the mid case share by 2030. For both
19 scenarios, battery electric reaches about 30 percent
20 share, but in the high case, hydrogen also reaches
21 something like 27 percent in 2030. That's the green
22 line.

23 Recalling our incentives, 99 percent of the
24 incremental costs, hundred percent of the incremental
25 cost is incentivized in the high scenario. So the

1 biggest influence of market share in this model is the
2 cost per mile, so the fuel cost and the fuel economy.

3 Returning to the cost per mile, Slide 28 says
4 here --

5 MR. RIDER: Question on this graph here.

6 The direct -- what is direct electric? I don't
7 understand this.

8 MR. MCBRIDE: Okay, very good. Good observation.

9 Now in 2014, Energy Commission published a report
10 on catenary electric trucks that would be applicable in
11 places like hauling from the ports to the railyards.
12 These look like the San Francisco Muni buses, they have a
13 line overhead. And in those particular regions, I don't
14 think there's much of a NIMBY concern.

15 So and they make a little bit of economic sense.
16 Their share is pretty low mostly because we've
17 constrained the population of trucks that it applies to.
18 So it's really, you're looking at that's a fraction of
19 the port trucks. And that is a good observation. So.

20 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: One second. Can we stick
21 with this one for a second?

22 So the truck market share in-state tractor
23 trailer, what share of total VMT is that? Or do you have
24 a sense of like of all the VMT of heavy-duty, what share
25 is this that we're looking at?

1 MR. MCBRIDE: I can -- I can easily get that. I
2 don't --

3 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Okay.

4 MR. MCBRIDE: -- have it here. But the fuel
5 consumption here, assuming that your interstate blue bar
6 is going to be higher, that fairly representative of VMT
7 and fuel economy.

8 Now these things are bigger but they tend to have
9 pretty good fuel economy considering their size. So,
10 yeah, there's a lot of miles. This is a very important
11 sector.

12 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: And so can we go back to
13 the next -- keep going, there, no, the next one.

14 MR. MCBIDE: Oh, okay, there you go.

15 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: There you go.

16 MR. MCBRIDE: Okay.

17 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: So -- so this is a pretty
18 high percentage of -- in the high case and even in the
19 mid case, the mid case looks like it's 30 percent. Is
20 that -- I'm having a hard time seeing the electric share.
21 In the high case, it's a little more than 30 percent.
22 That's a lot of -- do we -- how many vehicles is that?

23 MR. MCBRIDE: I'm going to have to get back to
24 you. I'm not --

25 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Okay. Sorry. I just sort

1 of ask all these -- it's just that it's -- it's high.
2 Higher than I would have guessed.

3 MR. MCBRIDE: Well for one -- one mitigating
4 thing is that the interstate trucks are not included
5 here. So --

6 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Right.

7 MR. MCBRIDE: -- a lot of what you see are those.

8

9 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: It's only intrastate trucks.

10 MR. MCBRIDE: Yeah. So and some of the
11 populations like the port trucks are very concentrated.
12 You might never normally seem them.

13 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Uh-huh.

14 MR. MCBRIDE: So I don't know. This is -- this
15 is a particular truck choice model --

16 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Uh-huh.

17 MR. MCBRIDE: -- and this is where it went.

18 And --

19 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Yeah.

20 MR. MCBRIDE: -- I think it's not out of line
21 with -- with the numbers we put in anyway.

22 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Uh-huh.

23 MR. MCBRIDE: So I wanted to look back at the
24 cost per mile for a second. I see the high with diesel
25 and hydrogen are in the same neighborhood in the

1 forecast. That's -- those two lines, that's enough to
2 give hydrogen some umph in the high case, even though the
3 price is still a bit higher than diesel.

4 Next slide. So if your -- market share alone
5 doesn't dictate the number of ZEVs or near ZEVs.
6 Economic growth in the aging and turnover fleets and some
7 other factors drive the number of new trucks purchased in
8 total of all fuel types.

9 Here we see a low in the second half of the
10 forecast, maybe 58,000 trucks a year and up to 73,000-ish
11 in the high. Suppose market share of 50 percent ZEV in
12 that high case. It's actually a little bit higher
13 according to these numbers. That's around 36,000 for the
14 high scenario between battery electric hydrogen fuel
15 cell, catenary electric. And, again, we're not
16 including, we haven't included plug-in hybrids and
17 general trucking for truck choice. Mostly because none
18 are commercial.

19 So any case, this is -- this is the size of the,
20 of the pond that is divided up by different fuel types.
21 So tiny bit of fun.

22 Introduction to the Volvo VNR Electric models,
23 this -- the interesting paint job on the right. Part of
24 a partnership called LIGHTS, Low Impact Green Heavy
25 Transport Solutions between Volvo truck and the South

1 Coast Air District. This demonstration fleet will be
2 studied carefully, you know, and improve the second
3 generation of these guys. The smaller Class 6
4 freightliner M2 on the left, well actually in the middle,
5 also has a similar demonstration fleet, it was delivered
6 to Penske in December last year.

7 The white freightliner eCascadia, you notice
8 that's a sleeper cab. It's one of a handful of trucks
9 that's tooling around the northwest somewhere. They're
10 not actually in California as I'm aware.

11 So we did test the price - prices announced by
12 manufacturers for the Tesla semi and for the Nikola 2
13 tractor trailers that we think might fit nicely in our
14 in-state tractor trailer sector. Both achieved
15 sufficient market shares to get large production runs or
16 what's considered a large run for medium and heavy. But
17 since there are no commercialized ZEV tractor trailers
18 delivered to date at a known price, uncertainty over the
19 ability to produce these trucks at the announced prices
20 over a period of years sort of muddies our Magic 8-ball.

21 So for the in-state tractor trailers, we turn to
22 our component based bottom up price attribute for
23 modeling market share. Regardless, in the high and mid
24 cases, 99 percent or 80 percent of the incremental cost
25 is incentivized anyway.

1 So retail hydrogen prices are simply too high for
2 commercial trucking. And most stations built today can't
3 accommodate the heavy duty trucks in any case. The high
4 price is cost by expensive, underutilized capacity as a
5 retail stations and by the high cost of compressing that
6 additional 5,000 PSI up to 10,000 for light-duty
7 vehicles. However, if our homebased and dedicated fleets
8 can be built, paired with electric hydrogen production
9 and dispensing station sized exactly to meet the needs of
10 that fleet, higher utilization can drive down the cost of
11 hydrogen. Also heavy- duty truck hydrogen tanks pressure
12 at 5,000, they can be a bit larger than you can fit in a
13 light-duty vehicle. So they can also save.

14 According to the California hydrogen fuel cell
15 partnership, these factors support hydrogen priced from
16 \$5 to \$7 a kilogram, but we've seen more optimistic
17 prices from Blumberg and similar prices from other
18 sources. Nikola plans for 2021 include a fleet and a
19 station for Anheuser-Busch in Southern California. So
20 we'll see if these announced prices are going to work.

21 So here's some medium and heavy-duty ZEV truck
22 and bus forecast. The low scenario's mostly buses as
23 trucks barely take off due to high electricity and low
24 petroleum fuel prices. No incentives after 2021. The
25 mid scenario reaches 78,000 total ZEVs in 2030 and the

1 high reaches about 120,000 in 2030. Actually a hundred -
2 - okay, about 120,000 in 2030.

3 So thank you. We now turn to Aniss Bahrenian for
4 the fuel consumption forecast. Any questions? From the
5 dais questions, otherwise? Thanks.

6 MS. PETERSON: Just -- can I make a quick, just a
7 quick comment?

8 It would be helpful to see the breakout of fuel
9 cell to BEV in the forecast. Not just have it be ZEV
10 stock forecast, but broken out by the fuel type, just.

11 MR. MCBRIDE: Sure. Absolutely. There are a lot
12 of ways to slice it. The data's there.

13 MS. PETERSON: Okay.

14 MR. MCBRIDE: So not a problem.

15 MS. PETERSON: Yeah, I'd love to be able to see
16 that.

17 MR. MCBRIDE: Okay. Thank you.

18 MS. PETERSON: Thank you.

19 MS. BAHRENIAN: Good morning -- good afternoon
20 now.

21 My name is Aniss Bahrenian and I'm presenting the
22 total fuel consumption this afternoon.

23 It will be good to see the concentration of fuels
24 in different sectors. It will help with looking at fuel
25 consumption in the later slides. If you look at the bar

1 charts here, we can see that about 89 percent of LDVs
2 currently are gasoline. They used to be even higher, it
3 has declined now. So the dominant fuel for light-duty
4 vehicles is gasoline versus diesel which is a dominant
5 fuel for medium and heavy-duty vehicles. So when we
6 are -- when you look at the results for those two, then
7 you can see which sector it is coming from.

8 This fuel consumption forecast, we are just
9 marrying light-duty vehicles with the medium and heavy-
10 duty vehicles as well as rail, so the total consumption
11 is also going to reflect what is being consumed by the
12 rail too. In some other forecast or future scenarios,
13 you might see future scenarios that relate to on road
14 vehicles and they exclude LDVs. We do -- and they
15 exclude rail from those but we do include rail in this
16 forecast as well. We do not include military or marine
17 movements in our forecasts.

18 So light-duty vehicles are everything that is up
19 to 10,000 pounds. This is -- this is gross vehicle
20 weight. If you look at EPA or so that would be one
21 source of difference between our forecast and others, is
22 that EPA and CARB limit LDVs to 8500 pounds but we have
23 up to 10,000 pounds. Medium and heavy-duty vehicles are
24 more than 10,000 pounds and of course rail is rail.

25 And within the LDV, I should indicate that we

1 have 15 different classes of vehicle and for the
2 questions on some of the ZEVs for instance, we need to
3 consider how many classes are introduced in each of these
4 sectors, 15 classes of LDVs. In other words, we can
5 generate a forecast for each of those 15 classes of
6 vehicles. Our models are light-duty vehicle models
7 actually substitute, they reflect the substitution
8 between classes, not just substitution between field
9 types. And that is important to know.

10 Now when it comes to light-duty vehicles and the
11 fuels that we are incorporating in the forecast, the
12 fuels that are choices for light-duty vehicles are
13 gasoline, hybrid flex fuel vehicles, diesel, BEV, PHEV,
14 FCV, and PH -- PHFCV, which is important to note here.

15 We are only -- the only forecast I think in the
16 country probably that where we are forecasting plug-in,
17 hybrid fuel cell vehicles. These vehicles do exist in
18 Germany right now and Mercedes was planning to bring it
19 to the U.S. market in 2019. I think they have delayed it
20 now to 2020 or 2021.

21 So when you look at the high light-duty hydrogen
22 vehicle forecast and there are a lot of questions about
23 that, please keep in mind that we include two types of
24 hydrogen vehicles. It is FCEV and plug-in hybrid FCV
25 which are more attractive particularly in light of the

1 limited station availability because people have the
2 choice of either plugging it into electricity or just go
3 to the hydrogen station and fuel it right there.

4 And another reason for the higher hydrogen
5 forecast that you would see if our forecast that was more
6 than you expected is that we also introduced them --
7 introduced different classes of vehicle. The more
8 classes we introduce in the market, the more demand there
9 is going to be. And so in the mid, low, and high
10 scenarios we have different number of classes that are
11 introduced in different times. That's one of the reasons
12 why those are higher.

13 When it comes to medium and heavy-duty vehicles
14 as Bob McBride mentioned, there are six different weight
15 classes there between Class 3 and Class 8. And the fuels
16 that we have listed here are not introduced for each of
17 those six different classes of medium and heavy-duty
18 vehicles. They are introduced in selected classes. For
19 instance, hydrogen vehicles are introduced in the Class 8
20 only, not in the other classes. That is the tractor
21 trailers.

22 But we do have gasoline, gasoline hybrid
23 dedicated E85 where owners cannot put anything other than
24 ethanol in their vehicle. This is in comparison to flex
25 fuel vehicle when people have the choice of either

1 fueling their vehicle with gasoline or with ethanol.

2 We also have diesel, diesel hybrid, battery
3 electric buses and trucks. Direct electric which was the
4 catenary buses, catenary buses and trucks. FCV, fuel
5 cell vehicles. We don't PHFCV in the medium and heavy-
6 duty vehicle category. We have CNG, LNG, and propane.

7 When it comes to rail, essentially here we have
8 diesel and then we have direct electric which is
9 essentially light rail that you see right across the
10 street here. That is direct electric and that is rail so
11 it is included in our forecast. If you go to Germany, in
12 Germany they also have hydrogen rail. So you can also
13 use hydrogen there, but we don't have it here in this
14 state, and I'm not sure how much authority the State of
15 California has over the rail to mandate use of hydrogen
16 for rail.

17 So when you're adding everything up together,
18 this is our high transportation fuel demand forecast by
19 fuel type. You can see here again that the dominant
20 fuels are still gasoline and diesel by 2030. But you do
21 see that there is a decline and that there is an increase
22 in alternative fuels here.

23 The increase in alternative fuels obviously
24 drives down consumption of gasoline and diesel, but there
25 is also another factor that results in decline of

1 gasoline and that is increased fuel economy. That too is
2 going to reduce consumption. In general, what we can say
3 is that over time California is becoming more efficient
4 so the fuel consumption would go down.

5 Now you couldn't really tell from the previous
6 graph how much of the alternative fuels there was so for
7 this one we are using only the 2030 consumption and we're
8 showing the distribution between different alternative
9 fuels. As you can see here for the pie chart on the
10 left-hand side, these are alternative fuels by fuel type
11 and you can clearly see that electricity rules the
12 alternative fuels followed by natural gas which is for
13 medium and heavy-duty vehicles.

14 And then hydrogen, which is the gray one, which
15 goes both for light duty and heavy -- medium, heavy duty.
16 Or actually, heavy duty only.

17 For the pie chart on the right-hand side, you can
18 see electricity demand distribution by vehicle type. So
19 we take the electricity part of the chart on the left-
20 hand side and we divide it between light duty, medium,
21 and heavy duty, and rail. As you can see here, the big
22 chunk of electricity, transportation electricity comes
23 from light-duty vehicles. A smaller portion of that is
24 coming from medium and heavy-duty and even smaller
25 portion from rail consumption. I think the distribution

1 is about 86 percent for light duty, 10 percent for medium
2 and heavy duty, and 4 percent for rail.

3 This is the revised transportation electricity
4 demand by different scenarios. So in the previous
5 graphs, you saw only the high case. This one shows low,
6 mid, and high. Again, the kink here in these three
7 curves reflects the fact that -- that incentives are
8 being discontinued in 2025. If we had shown the graphs
9 that included aggressive and high scenarios, you could
10 see that in the aggressive and high scenarios, we
11 definitely exceed the 5 million PEVs or ZEVs that
12 Governor has mandated, or Governor has ordered.

13 But here, this is the low case. In the low case,
14 we are exceeding the CARB's scoping plan over there.
15 They have 4.2 million ZEVs, we have about 4.6 or 4.9 here
16 actually. So we do exceed that but we don't quite reach
17 5 million in Governor's Executive Order.

18 In the high case, as you can see here, we have
19 about 21,000 gigawatt hour. And going back to Cary
20 Garcia's graph showing about 320,000 gigawatt hours of
21 electricity consumption. Consumption to consumption, we
22 are still going to be significantly lower than 10
23 percent.

24 Ten percent of the total consumption is
25 transportation electricity and that is reflected here,

1 but it is definitely higher than what we have at the
2 present time. I think right now is maybe even 1 percent.
3 Something between 1 or 2 percent now and we are going to
4 get close to 10 percent but not quite there, in 2030.

5 This is the revised transportation hydrogen
6 demand forecast. You can clearly see the mid and the low
7 are lower than the high case. This reflects the fact
8 that we don't have any hydrogen trucks. We don't have
9 anything in the medium and heavy-duty sector in the mid
10 case, but we do introduce that in the high case. Well I
11 should say with the exception of the buses, the transit
12 buses, some of them are hydrogen. But when it comes to
13 trucks, we don't have any hydrogen trucks in the mid
14 case.

15 MR. RIDER: May -- may I ask a question --

16 MS. BAHRENIAN: Yes. Sure.

17 MR. RIDER: -- about this?

18 So a lot of this production of hydrogen is
19 expected to come from or could come from electricity.
20 How -- so when you're talking about the previous slide,
21 that's really electricity just to service battery
22 electric and direct electric vehicles. But the
23 transportation sector itself in some of these forecasts
24 would have a higher, as a percentage of state
25 consumption, would have a higher percentage than --

1 MS. BAHRENIAN: That's an excellent point. Thank
2 you for making that point. Yes, a good portion of it is
3 going to come from electrolysis, as you mentioned. So
4 that should increase production of electricity but that
5 increase in production is not reflected in the
6 transportation forecast.

7 MR. RIDER: Oh, okay. All right. Thank you.

8 MS. BAHRENIAN: Thank you for that point.

9 We should also say that the lower prices that we
10 mentioned before -- Bob McBride mentioned for the fleet
11 prices, one of those fleet providers is Nikola and what -
12 - the assumption that they are making or the plan, their
13 business plan includes producing green hydrogen. And
14 when you produce green hydrogen using solar energy and
15 then using excess electricity at night at a much lower
16 rate, price could reach the levels that Bob McBride did
17 use. And that makes a difference in fleet adoption of
18 hydrogen.

19 Now the next graph is going to show the
20 transportation natural gas demand. This is -- this is
21 almost exclusively medium and heavy-duty vehicles. So
22 that includes everything from the garbage trucks, all the
23 way to the trucks that are going to be tractor trailers
24 that are going to be adopting natural gas. As well as
25 transit buses that are currently using natural gas but

1 gradually they're going to lose market to electric buses.

2 So this shows our total natural gas demand forecast.

3 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Aniss, a quick question on
4 that.

5 MS. BAHRENIAN: Sure.

6 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Is that -- is that all natural
7 gas so sort of the renewable gas that folks have been
8 talking about in addition to fossil gas? Or is it just
9 fossil natural gas?

10 MS. BAHRENIAN: Thank you very much for that
11 question. One of the things that we don't do in our
12 forecast, we do not differentiate between renewables and
13 nonrenewables. The only renewable that we do identify
14 and we have a separate forecast is ethanol and that is
15 the E85 which you're going to find later. But even the
16 diesel consumption that we are forecasting, that includes
17 renewable diesel as well as regular diesel.

18 Same thing is true here. This includes renewable
19 hydrogen -- I'm sorry, renewable natural gas as well as
20 nonrenewable natural gas.

21 MR. RIDER: Aniss, just quickly. On these, these
22 aren't -- are these the same cases? So when you say low,
23 medium, high here on the natural gas --

24 MS. BAHRENIAN: Uh-huh.

25 MR. RIDER: -- demand forecast, that's high for

1 natural gas but, you know, if battery, the other forecast
2 we were looking at were high in terms of that would drive
3 electricity consumption.

4 MS. BAHRENIAN: Sure.

5 MR. RIDER: So what drives high and natural gas
6 consumption is like almost, not necessarily but sometimes
7 the opposite of what drives high electricity consumption.

8 So are these the same cases that we were looking
9 at in the other forecast? Or are these separate
10 forecasts for the natural gas?

11 MS. BAHRENIAN: Again, thanks for that question.

12 We are using, when we talk about the high demand
13 here, we have all of the alternative fuels at lower
14 prices, not just electricity. It's electricity,
15 hydrogen, and natural gas.

16 MR. RIDER: Got it.

17 MS. BAHRENIAN: So natural gas has lower prices.
18 So in this case, both natural gas and electricity have
19 lower prices or both natural gas and electricity have the
20 higher prices.

21 MR. RIDER: Got it.

22 MS. BAHRENIAN: So you would limit the
23 substitution that way. If you have used different prices
24 as you were suggesting, then there could be more of any
25 one of these.

1 MR. RIDER: Okay, got it.

2 MS. BAHRENIAN: Thank you.

3 MR. RIDER: Thank you.

4 MS. BAHRENIAN: Any other questions?

5 All right. And here's the team. We have, as

6 Commissioner McAllister mentioned, small but mighty team.

7 January '18 Transportation and Energy Demand Forecast.

8 It takes a lot of people to generate this. And I'm sure

9 all of you know, use billions and billions of -- Jesse

10 Gage actually was keeping track of how many billions of

11 data you're using. And it is mind-numbing, actually.

12 Thank you very much. Any questions?

13 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: I asked mine as we went along.

14 Any other questions from the dais? All right.

15 Thank you very much.

16 MS. BAHRENIAN: Thank you.

17 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: So I think with that, now we

18 are at 12:35. We'll take a little break for lunch.

19 Let's come back at 1:30, right at 1:30, and we

20 will pick up with the Self-Generation and Storage

21 presentation.

22 So see everyone at 1:30.

23 (Off the record at 12:35 p.m.)

24 (On the record at 1:34 p.m.)

25 MR. COLDWELL: Okay, everybody, we're going to

1 pick back up here.

2 So starting this afternoon, we have Sudhakar
3 Konala coming up to do two presentations, one on the --
4 the first one on behind the -- his behind-the-meter PV
5 forecast, and then the second one Behind-the-Meter
6 Storage.

7 So Sudhakar?

8 MR. KONALA: Okay. Good afternoon,
9 Commissioners, stakeholders, and members of the public.
10 I'm going to do two forecasts today, as Matt had
11 mentioned. I'm going to start out with talking about the
12 PV and self-generation forecast and, after that, talk a
13 bit about energy storage.

14 So to get started with the PV forecast, okay, I
15 just want to start off with a slide that I've had in
16 previous presentations. But to anyone that might be new,
17 it could get really confusing if this information isn't
18 conveyed.

19 So for the forecast, we have three cases, the
20 high, the low and the mid. These are electricity demand
21 cases. But in terms of the PV forecast, it's actually
22 kind of reversed. In the high electricity demand case,
23 we're assuming low PV adoption. And in the low
24 electricity demand case, we're assuming high PV adoption.
25 So throughout this presentation, you'll see me using the

1 terms low and high, I'm referring to the electricity
2 demand cases, but PV adoption is actually going to be
3 reversed, so just something to keep in mind.

4 Another slide that I've --

5 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Really quick, I'm sorry to
6 interrupt you on that. It's me over here.

7 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

8 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: The previous slide, I think,
9 is excellent for explaining the high PV adoption versus
10 low PV adoption.

11 And I wanted to make the suggestion, Matt, I
12 guess to you, to the Transportation Team, if we could
13 right the scenarios in this kind of same way so that it's
14 really clear what we're talking about in each scenario?
15 I think that would be really helpful.

16 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

17 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: So sorry to interrupt you on
18 that but thank you.

19 MR. KONALA: Yeah. Here, I have very high-level
20 overview of how the Energy Commission PV models work.
21 Essentially, we take in a lot of different inputs. We
22 consider historically statewide installed PV capacity.
23 And then we consider economic and demographic data that
24 Cary Garcia talked about, such as household growth and
25 commercial floor space. And we also consider our fuel

1 price forecasts, especially the electricity price
2 forecasts. And then we also look at other system-level
3 data for PV systems in terms of cost and performance and
4 how the systems are installed and oriented. And we feed
5 that into our models and we get a forecast of capacity
6 for the entire state.

7 We run these in different models, depending on
8 which sector, so we have the residential sector model,
9 the commercial sector model, and then everything else.
10 And the residential and commercial sector models actually
11 predict PV penetration based on a calculated payback or
12 bill savings.

13 Once we have behind-the-meter PV capacity, we
14 then use that to forecast generation.

15 So just an overview of what's changed in the 2019
16 revised forecast.

17 We have new updated demographic and economic
18 data. This includes households, commercial floor space,
19 and, of course, a GSP deflator. In terms of households,
20 we have higher growth in households compared to the
21 preliminary forecasts across all of the scenarios. In
22 general, for commercial floor space, we have a lower
23 forecast compared to the preliminary forecast. And this
24 is going to be reflected in the forecasts by sector for
25 PV.

1 In addition, for the forecast of electricity
2 rates, we generally have higher electricity rates than
3 the preliminary forecast. And this is most evident in
4 the 2018 to '21 period where rates are significantly
5 higher than the preliminary forecast.

6 But before I move on to the forecast, I just
7 wanted to do a recap of what we're seeing in terms of PV
8 adoptions in 2019 year to date. So this is data that I
9 pulled just last week when the data became available.
10 It's installations in 2019 through September 30th of this
11 year. And I'm comparing it to installations in 2018
12 through September 30th, so the first three quarters of
13 both years.

14 And what we're seeing is we're seeing higher PV
15 adoptions in the residential sector across the three
16 different IOUs with significantly higher levels in San
17 Diego's territory. And in the commercial sector, we're
18 seeing lower adoption compared to 2018 and, in some
19 cases, significantly lower.

20 Overall, the residential sector, since there's
21 just so much more adoption in the residential sector than
22 PV -- than the commercial sector, we tend to see that,
23 overall, adoptions tend to mirror closer to what's
24 happening in the residential sector.

25 So one of the questions that people might have is

1 what's happening in the commercial sector? We don't have
2 a great idea but it looks like it has to do with broader
3 economic conditions, specifically, there seems to be a
4 lot of uncertainty in the business sector. And so I've
5 posted a snapshot of an article from the New York Times
6 from early November which says that a lot of companies
7 are cutting back in capital expenditures. This is due to
8 uncertainty with the economy, maybe the trade wars, a
9 multitude of conditions. But this decline in capital
10 expenditures most likely is affecting the forecasts --
11 the adoption of PV in 2019 since solar projects are a
12 capital expenditure to most companies.

13 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Sudhakar, do you chalk
14 that up to just having sharper pencils or less favorable
15 rates or something like that --

16 MR. KONALA: No, the rates --

17 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- (indiscernible)?

18 MR. KONALA: -- the rates are actually more
19 favorable, so this is happening despite the rates.

20 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Interesting.

21 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

22 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay. So, in general,
23 the commercial rate that a net-metered commercial
24 customer would face are more favorable for PV adoption
25 than the residential, like a net-metered --

1 MR. KONALA: Well, I wasn't --

2 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- residential?

3 MR. KONALA: -- I wasn't comparing the

4 residential versus the commercial, I was comparing versus

5 the previous forecast. Sorry.

6 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Oh. So I'm actually

7 asking about the rates that commercial customers face and

8 whether they're just having a harder time finding cost

9 effectiveness for that investment decision that they

10 would make on solar?

11 MR. KONALA: I'd have to compare it. I don't

12 have the -- I'm not sure what the rates are for

13 commercial versus residential in relation. I can look

14 that up and come back. But overall I think it's just

15 when businesses are uncertain about what's going to

16 happen in the future, they just tend to hit the pause

17 button because they want to see what's going to happen.

18 I think that's --

19 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah.

20 MR. KONALA: -- essentially what's happening.

21 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. It makes sense.

22 MR. KONALA: But that doesn't explain --

23 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: The demand charges.

24 The demand charge, you know, the shift, you know,

25 commercial rates are going to, you know, have an ongoing

1 demand charge on them.

2 MR. KONALA: Yeah. Yeah.

3 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So, you know, they're

4 having to offset only the energy fees, so it's a less

5 cost effective. But --

6 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

7 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- I'd be interested in

8 some insight from you and your team, just on the rate

9 environment itself --

10 MR. KONALA: Okay.

11 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- for non-res.

12 MR. RIDER: And that doesn't explain, you know,

13 the different between Northern California and Southern

14 California.

15 MR. KONALA: Yeah. Exactly.

16 MR. RIDER: It's a huge difference. I mean, all

17 those factors that you mentioned here are global --

18 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

19 MR. RIDER: -- right? And there's a huge -- I

20 mean, like -- and these are real numbers; right? These

21 aren't forecasts?

22 MR. KONALA: These are real numbers, yes.

23 MR. RIDER: So, I mean, there's something further

24 to be digging. Do you have -- is there a working -- or

25 is there any initial information that would help tease

1 out what the north versus south trends --

2 MR. KONALA: Well --

3 MR. RIDER: What's causing that?

4 MR. KONALA: -- in terms of north versus trend,
5 we're seeing a lot of commercial adoption in the Central
6 Valley, actually, and that largely falls into PG&E's
7 territory, so that's what making the north look higher.

8 So the final point I wanted to point out is the
9 Federal Investment Tax Credit for solar starts to
10 decline. So 2019 is the last year we have the full
11 federal tax credit at 30 percent. Next year, it declines
12 to 26 percent. And then in 2021, it declines to 22
13 percent. And then starting in 2022, it goes away
14 completely for the residential sector but is maintained
15 at a 10 percent rate in the commercial and utility-scale
16 sector.

17 Okay, so now, just to get into the forecast, here
18 is a chart showing historical self-generation in the
19 state, and also the forecast. So I have both -- I've
20 separated it by behind-the-meter PV and all other
21 technologies. So the other technologies includes large-
22 scale industrial co-generation. It's not utility-scale,
23 though, it's still behind-the-meter, but most of it is
24 industrial co-gen. But you also have behind-the-meter
25 wind, some fuel cells, and some other technologies, like

1 microturbines.

2 So in 2018, in terms of the non-PV self-gen, we
3 estimate about 14,000 gigawatt hours was generated,
4 compared to 13,800 gigawatt hours for the PV. In 2019,
5 PV went up to over 16,000 gigawatt hours. And by 2030,
6 we expect PV to go up to 40,000 gigawatt hours, and this
7 is just the mid case that I'm showing here.

8 So in terms of installed statewide capacity, in
9 2018 there was about 8,100 megawatts of installed PV
10 capacity. We expect that to increase between 20,000 and
11 27,000, between the different cases, by 2030 with about
12 23,000 in the mid case.

13 Overall, the revised forecast is pretty much
14 similar to the preliminary forecast but, as you can see,
15 we have a slightly faster adoption happening in the first
16 half of the forecast period and slightly slower adoption
17 happening in the second half. This is --

18 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Sudhakar, it would be
19 helpful to have that green bit, the solar, separated out
20 in a res and non-res.

21 MR. KONALA: Okay.

22 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah?

23 MR. KONALA: Yeah. Okay.

24 So in terms of the faster growth in the first
25 half of the forecast period, it's generally due to a

1 forecast of higher rates, both in the residential and the
2 commercial sectors. So I do have a forecast by res and
3 non-res, but for the individual utility service area
4 forecast, not for statewide.

5 Also, I just want to briefly talk about the
6 contribution of the Title 24 Standards in this year's
7 forecast. So starting next year the standards require
8 that PV be installed on new homes. So in the 2019
9 forecast, we've incorporated these standards into the
10 baseline PV forecast. Previously, we accounted for them
11 as the additional achievable AVR/AAPV forecast. But I'm
12 going to restate past PV forecasts to include AAPV so
13 it's a direct apples-to-apples comparison.

14 So just a review. PV adoption in new homes is
15 now, essentially, a forecast of regulatory compliance
16 with these standards. And the AAPV is directly going to
17 be correlated to forecasts of new home construction. So
18 if the forecast of new home construction changes between
19 forecasts the adoption of PV, due to the standards, is
20 also going to reflect that change.

21 For the most part the assumptions are the same as
22 previous AAPV forecasts, so the expected level of
23 compliance is 90 percent in the low case, 80 percent in
24 the mid case, and 70 percent in the high case. And the
25 average PV system size for new homes remains the same,

1 although the average system size is different depending
2 on the different planning areas and household size, so
3 it's different between different planning areas and
4 different household sizes but it's the same between
5 different forecasts, so none of the information has
6 actually changed from the previous forecast.

7 Finally, I have a chart summarizing the
8 contribution of AAPV in terms of capacity between the
9 last three forecasts. So in the 2019 revised forecast
10 the contribution from AAPV is higher than the preliminary
11 2019 forecast, and also the 2018 update. And this is
12 generally due to a higher forecast of new household
13 growth in the 2019 revised forecast.

14 MR. RIDER: In this table, is this backwards on
15 the demand? Because wouldn't you get more capacity in
16 the low demand?

17 MR. KONALA: No. So this is where the
18 definitions of the scenarios is kind of confusing.

19 MR. RIDER: Okay.

20 MR. KONALA: So earlier I had stated that in the
21 high demand case, you expect low PV adoption. But in the
22 high demand case, we're also assuming higher household
23 growth and more new home construction. So the AAPV is
24 kind of going to be higher in the high case.

25 So the AAPV is kind of counter to the overall PV

1 forecast. And the affect it has, it narrows the range of
2 the PV forecast. So thank you for pointing that out
3 actually. Okay.

4 So that is the general overview of the statewide
5 forecast. I'm going to go through each individual
6 planning area really quickly.

7 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I have like the most basic
8 question in the world. Feel free to mock me.

9 So can you go back to the 2019 revised PV
10 forecast?

11 MR. KONALA: Uh-huh.

12 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Can you explain, why is
13 the installed capacity highest in the low electricity
14 demand scenario?

15 MR. KONALA: It's -- so it's how we define the
16 scenarios. In the low electricity demand scenario, we
17 have the highest level of PV penetration. That's just
18 how we can get the lowest electricity demand. So, yeah,
19 it was my first slide.

20 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: I missed the first slide.
21 I wasn't here for the first slide, so how I've been
22 educated. Thank you.

23 MR. KONALA: Okay.

24 COMMISSIONER MONAHAN: Thanks for not mocking me,
25 too, but --

1 MR. KONALA: No. I present this and I get
2 confused sometimes, so that first slide is there to keep
3 myself straight, as well, so I completely understand.

4 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: While we're on slide seven,
5 just another thing that I really like about this slide,
6 how you have your numbers here. So in 26, 700, for
7 example, up at the top bubble, I think it's handy to have
8 those numbers. On the previous slides we've had up until
9 now, we're sort eyeballing where we think that number is.
10 And so I think if we can update the slides, at least in
11 the report, so that they look like this, that would be
12 fantastic.

13 MR. KONALA: Okay.

14 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: That was not specific to yours
15 but --

16 MR. KONALA: Well, thank you.

17 So moving on to the planning area forecasts, I'm
18 going to just give a general overview of the forecasts.
19 There's a lot of numbers here. And stakeholders and
20 members of the public are welcome to dig into it and just
21 contact me if they have more questions. But I don't want
22 to get too much into numbers because I don't want to bore
23 everyone with it.

24 So for PG&E, we forecast the energy generated to
25 grow to about 19,000 gigawatt hours by 2030 in the mid

1 case, compared to about 6,400 gigawatt hours in 2018.
2 The forecast is slightly higher than the previous
3 preliminary forecast and the 2018 forecast, as well.
4 This is primarily due to higher electricity rates in the
5 residential and commercial sector. And we do have higher
6 growth in both of those sectors compared to the previous
7 forecasts.

8 On the next slide, I have a breakdown of the
9 forecast by different sectors. So you can see here, the
10 residential sector, this is a forecasted capacity. The
11 residential sector is in blue, the commercial sector is
12 in green, and everything else is in red.

13 So in the residential sector, we have the
14 capacity growing at a compounded annual growth rate of
15 about 8.4 percent between 2018 and 2030, in the
16 commercial sector about 10.8 percent, and overall about 9
17 percent.

18 I want to point out that almost half of the
19 state's statewide PV capacity is installed in PG&E's
20 service territory. There is solid growth across the
21 entire service territory but there's -- it's especially
22 robust in the Central Valley.

23 Okay, so now I'm moving on to Southern California
24 Edison. PV generation is forecasted to more than 13,500
25 gigawatt hours in 2030, compared to about 4,500 in 2018.

1 The forecast is pretty similar to the preliminary
2 forecast in 2018 -- sorry, preliminary forecast in 2019
3 except there's a slight slowdown in 2025 to 2030, and
4 that has nothing to do with the inputs. We found a small
5 error in actually the way -- a small error in the code
6 for the commercial PV model and we fixed it and that was
7 the result. This was not specific to Edison. It was
8 throughout all of the service territories, it just shows
9 up more prominently in Edison.

10 So in terms of the sector forecasts, there's
11 robust growth in the residential sector for Southern
12 California Edison, growing at 10.5 percent between 2018
13 and 2030, a slightly slower forecast in the commercial
14 sector of 7.6 percent. This is due to like slower
15 forecast in commercial floor space compared to the
16 previous forecast.

17 Overall, Edison has the lowest penetration of PV
18 in 2018 compared to the other IOUs. But as a result they
19 have a lot more room to grown, so they have a faster
20 growth in PV adoption over the forecast period compared
21 to the other IOUs.

22 Rounding out the last IOU, San Diego Gas and
23 Electric, so PV generation is forecasted to grow to about
24 4,300 gigawatt hours by 2030 in the mid case, up from
25 1,700 gigawatt hours in 2018. The range in the forecast

1 is slightly narrower for San Diego than the other service
2 territories. And this is largely due to the impact of
3 the Title 24 Standards. The difference between the low
4 electricity demand and the high electricity demand
5 without the Title 24 Standards would have been about 350
6 gigawatt hours, and half of that is eliminated because of
7 the Title 24 Standards, so it narrows an already narrow
8 range even narrower because of the Title 24 Standards.

9 So one main difference from the revised forecast
10 compared to the preliminary forecast is we have far more
11 robust growth in the residential sector in the revised
12 than the preliminary. This is due to a stronger growth
13 for households in our forecast. And that, essentially,
14 allows -- it just provides more stock for PV installation
15 to occur. So I believe in the preliminary forecast the
16 residential sector only grew at about four to five
17 percent between 2030 and 2018, and that's up to seven
18 percent in this forecast.

19 Overall, San Diego has the highest PV penetration
20 rate, especially in the residential sector. So we
21 anticipate that they're also going to reach a saturation
22 point earlier than the other planning areas. So around
23 2024-2025, we see that saturation point being hit. It
24 actually happens in the low case. But as I've previously
25 stated, the mid case is an average of the low and the

1 high case, so we see that saturation also appearing in
2 the mid case as well.

3 (Off mike colloquy)

4 MR. RIDER: On the last slide, but also you can
5 see it in the slide you were just on --

6 MR. KONALA: Okay.

7 MR. RIDER: -- the fundamental shape between the
8 initial projection versus where you are now, there's this
9 interesting new inflection point --

10 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

11 MR. RIDER: -- a very different shape from the
12 other utilities and different than the preliminary
13 analysis.

14 Can you explain what kind of fundamental modeling
15 choices were changed to get to that kind of different
16 outcome?

17 MR. KONALA: Yeah. I'd be glad to.

18 So there's two different things that are
19 happening. The first is in the residential sector. As I
20 had said, the forecast for household growth is much
21 higher this time. So in the preliminary forecast in
22 2018, we were reaching that saturation point earlier in
23 the forecast, so the growth in the residential solar
24 market was slowing earlier. Since there is more -- since
25 there are more households, that forecast is being -- that

1 inflection point in the residential sector is being
2 delayed until 2024-2025.

3 And then there's another inflection point in the
4 previous forecasts in the later half. That was due to
5 that error in the commercial model that we found that was
6 having growth be faster. Once we fix that, we don't see
7 as much growth in the latter half of the commercial
8 sector forecast, so you don't see that going up in the
9 new forecast. So, thank you.

10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So I thought -- just
11 I'm a little confused because earlier we talked about the
12 Department of Finance having, you know -- or San Diego
13 having, basically, a lull in the growth of the number of
14 households until the latter half of the decade and then
15 it was accelerating. And this would seem to be sort of
16 the opposite of that.

17 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

18 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So the penetration
19 argument doesn't quite seem appropriate.

20 MR. KONALA: I'm only speaking relative to the
21 previous forecasts.

22 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Oh, right. Okay.

23 MR. KONALA: So --

24 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

25 MR. KONALA: -- in terms of the absolute value of

1 the households, I'm not too familiar with that but I'm
2 sure --

3 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Well, just looking at
4 the, you know, the --

5 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

6 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- whatever, the change
7 in slope there where it's accelerating earlier and then
8 tapering off later, which seems to be the opposite of the
9 households.

10 MR. KONALA: Cary, microphone?

11 MR. GARCIA: Same thing. I think I can hear
12 myself now.

13 The overall households I was referring to gets
14 into single multi-family, mobile home, the whole slough
15 that's modeled in the residential sector.

16 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

17 MR. GARCIA: Sudhakar is primarily going to be
18 focusing on single-family households, so there's going to
19 be a difference there, single-family. And I think in San
20 Diego, in particular, just single-family itself, there's
21 a little bit more growth in comparison to some of the
22 multifamily. But his is going to be primarily focused on
23 single-family --

24 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay. So --

25 MR. GARCIA: -- so you'll see a slightly

1 different trend.

2 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- so the department
3 of -- the DOF numbers would reveal that difference?

4 MR. GARCIA: Yeah. We could see --

5 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

6 MR. GARCIA: We would see that. In the
7 residential model we handle, as I said, multifamily high,
8 mid and low, single-family, and then mobile homes --

9 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

10 MR. GARCIA: -- whereas Sudhakar is primarily
11 focused on --

12 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Got it.

13 MR. GARCIA: -- single-family households.

14 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Got it.

15 And then just one other, I guess it's a question,
16 but based on an observation that in SDG&E territory, you
17 know, they don't have as much seasonal load because the
18 climate is so mild. And they have pretty aggressive --
19 you know, now everybody is on time-of-use.

20 And so I guess my sense is that people are
21 getting some pretty outrageous summertime bills,
22 particularly inland in San Diego in SDG&E territory where
23 that time-of-use is really hitting people hard. And that
24 may be what's driving the uncommonly, you know, heavy
25 solar adoption in that single-family.

1 It would be good -- I guess my question is: How
2 much are you looking at the rate environment in either
3 residential, you know, and/or commercial? Because those,
4 you know, that's -- the value proposition for behind-the-
5 meter solar is all about the rates.

6 MR. GARCIA: Yeah.

7 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: And so it would be good
8 to understand, in terms of modeling adoption, how that's
9 playing in.

10 MR. KONALA: Yeah. So we definitely look at the
11 rate environment. We get a forecast of electricity rates
12 and that's exogenous input into the PV model. But in
13 terms of the rate structure, the time-of-use payers, all
14 of that is incorporated. So we look at the current rates
15 and we grow the current rates according to the forecast
16 that's provided. The only thing that we don't do is we
17 don't assume any changes in the time-of-use periods. We
18 keep that constant over the forecast period.

19 And, I mean, I understand that it could change,
20 it's just so hard to forecast what -- how time-of-use
21 periods could change over time.

22 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. No. So you're
23 basically -- you think it's roughly similar across the
24 investor-owned utilities or you think there's some
25 difference with SDG&E?

1 MR. KONALA: In terms of the time-of-use periods,
2 they're essentially the same. But in terms of the rate
3 difference between peak versus non-peak, there's a huge
4 difference.

5 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Okay. It would
6 be good to understand that a little bit better.

7 MR. KONALA: Okay. In my next presentation, I'll
8 be talking about storage and, actually, I'll get a little
9 bit into that.

10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Same set of
11 issues.

12 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

13 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Thanks.

14 MR. KONALA: So I'm going to round, okay, I'm
15 going to round out the PV forecast by just talking about
16 the two largest POUs. So here, I'm presenting LADWP.
17 Generation is forecasted to grow to about 1,300 gigawatt
18 hours in 2030 in the mid case, up from about 500 in 2018.
19 The forecast is higher than the 2019 preliminary forecast
20 and that's due to us finding an error with the household
21 forecast in the preliminary and fixing it, especially for
22 new home construction. So the change is essentially due
23 to that.

24 And in terms of the sector forecast, most of the
25 forecast for PV is coming from the residential sector and

1 there's robust growth, about nine percent annually
2 between 2018 and 2030. And this robust growth is
3 essentially because for all of the POUs, there's a lot --
4 there's initial lower PV penetration than the IOUs, so
5 there's just a lot more room for growth.

6 So a similar case with SMUD, we're forecasting
7 generation to grow to about 12,000 -- 1,200 gigawatt
8 hours by 2030 in the mid case, from about 300 in 2018.
9 That forecast is slightly higher than the previous
10 preliminary forecast and the 2018 forecast. Overall,
11 SMUD is seeing the fastest growth in behind-the-meter PV
12 of all of the major utilities, about 11 percent per year
13 between 2030 and 2018, which robust growth in the
14 residential sector.

15 Okay, so that concludes the PV forecast. With
16 that completed, if there aren't any questions, I'll move
17 on to the storage forecast.

18 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: I think we asked them as we
19 went along.

20 MR. KONALA: Okay. Thank you.

21 MR. RIDER: I would just point out that -- well,
22 it's not really -- just bringing it back to the
23 transportation forecast in terms of scale, I mean, this
24 was 40,000 gigawatt hours of behind-the-meter storage and
25 the demand for the transportation is 17,000 gigawatt

1 hours. So just why are you not seeing the growth in the
2 loads? I mean, behind-the-meter, itself, is much larger
3 scale in the forecast that we're looking at right now, in
4 the next ten years.

5 So, anyway, just thought I would put that in
6 perspective from an earlier comment that you made.

7 MR. KONALA: Yeah. We're seeing, we're
8 definitely seeing the forecast of robust growth in
9 behind-the-meter solar.

10 Okay, so I'm now going to get into behind-the-
11 meter energy storage forecast. I'm going to apologize
12 beforehand because this is going to get a lot more
13 technical and wonkish than the other forecast, and
14 probably too wonkish for a workshop, but we felt it was
15 kind of necessary to give stakeholders a good
16 understanding of what we're doing.

17 So is the first time we've done a forecast like
18 this, so a lot of this stuff is going to be new, so I'll
19 be going slower. But if you have any questions, just
20 feel free to stop me and ask me.

21 So, again, the objective of this presentation is
22 just to describe the methodology used in the Energy
23 Commission's behind-the-meter storage forecast. I'm not
24 going to be presenting a lot of numbers, per se, but
25 those are available.

1 So this presentation is broken down into three
2 sections. First, I'm going to describe the methodology
3 used to calculate historical storage adoption. That's
4 actually a hard number to come up with. The second part
5 is just going to describe the methodology for forecasting
6 adoption. And then the third part of the presentation is
7 going to describe how we use that adoption forecast to
8 generate energy consumption due to storage and, more
9 specifically, the hourly charge and discharge behavior of
10 those batteries.

11 So just, first, the methodology on how historical
12 storage adoption was determined.

13 The data source I used to get the energy storage
14 information is the Self-Generation Incentive Program, or
15 SGIP. It published a list of distributed generation
16 systems that apply for state incentives. The program has
17 been going on since 2001 but we've seen a change in the
18 program over the years.

19 Specifically, since 2016, it's become largely
20 oriented toward energy storage projects. So since 2016,
21 there were over 15,000 applications for behind-the-meter
22 energy storage projects. In comparison, I only counted
23 24 applications for all technologies. That comes out to
24 like a 99.98 percent rate for storage. So you can --
25 SGIP is, effectively, an energy storage incentive program

1 these days. And I have a chart just showing applications
2 by technology type over the years, so you can see, that's
3 all storage in the last three years.

4 So once we look at the energy storage data,
5 there's a methodology that we have to use to determine if
6 a storage system or a battery is actually installed. And
7 I just want to briefly go over -- through that
8 methodology. So if anyone is interested, they could
9 download the data themselves, use this methodology, and
10 come up with numbers that are very similar to what I come
11 up with later on. So you can download the SGIP on their
12 website.

13 Once you download that data, essentially, there's
14 a field that says -- that lists projects by equipment
15 type. So I select -- if the equipment type has storage
16 in it, so it could be electrochemical storage, mechanical
17 storage, thermal storage. But if it says, no, then it's
18 not a storage project and I ignore it. If it says, yes,
19 then it's a potential system that I keep in the pool.

20 Then I look to see if it's actually been
21 interconnected. And for that, I see -- I look if there
22 is an interconnection date. And if there is an
23 interconnection date in the date, then I count it as an
24 interconnected system, that's actually on the ground and
25 working. If it doesn't have an interconnection date, I

1 look at the program status of the application. If the
2 program status is canceled, I ignore it, the system is
3 not installed. If it's not canceled, then I look at what
4 the actual project status is. And if the project has --
5 if payment has been completed or if payment is in
6 progress, or if the status is called ICF, which in
7 Incentive Claim Form, if they filed that the developers
8 are required to have the project installed before they
9 can make that claim, then I assume that the system has
10 been installed, even if there isn't an interconnection
11 date. So that's how I come up -- that's how I determine
12 if an energy storage project is installed.

13 And once I go through this process, I also
14 estimate an interconnection date, if it doesn't have one,
15 and then use that as the base data for the forecast.

16 So once I do that process, here are the numbers I
17 came up with.

18 At the end of October, I estimate there are about
19 10,000 stationary home energy or commercial behind-the-
20 meter storage installations in the state, equaling about
21 267 megawatts. In terms of storage capacity, about 80
22 percent of that is in the non-residential sector and 20
23 percent is in the residential sector. Although, if you
24 look at the actual number of installed systems, most of
25 it are in the residential sector. So what that says is

1 the size of the non-residential systems are just so huge
2 that even though there are fewer installations, the
3 overall installed capacity, they make up the majority of
4 that.

5 In addition to the 267 megawatts of installed
6 storage, there is about another 108,000 -- 180 megawatts
7 of energy storage that's in the SGIP application queue,
8 most of which will likely be installed.

9 So now I'm going to move on to a description of
10 the methodology for forecasting storage adoption.

11 So in the past, for forecasting adoption, we used
12 a trend analysis looking at historical installation of
13 storage and, essentially, drawing that trend out into
14 future years. We stuck with that same methodology for
15 the most part with some changes, which I will describe in
16 this presentation. So, but before I get started, just a
17 few observations from analyzing SGIP data.

18 So for residential storage systems, we find that
19 about 97 percent of them are actually installed together
20 with solar, and only 3 percent are standalone
21 installations without solar. But things are quite
22 different in the non-residential sector. About 63
23 percent of battery storage in the state are standalone
24 installations, and only 32 percent are paired with solar.
25 So depending on what sector or what customer installing

1 storage, there is a trend to either associate with
2 storage or not to associate -- I'm sorry, associate it
3 with solar or not associate it with solar. So this is
4 going to affect how we forecast storage.

5 Okay, so first I'd like to talk about how we did
6 adoption forecasts for the non-residential storage. So
7 we continue to the base the forecast on a historical
8 trend for non-residential storage. This is because most
9 non-residential storage systems were standalone. They
10 were not paired with PV. And, also, the number of
11 installations the system size really fluctuate from year
12 to year, so there is no discernible pattern that we can
13 relate to some other item, like solar.

14 So here's the methodology for the trend analysis.
15 It looked at the total capacity installed in the last
16 historical year, 2018, information from the current year,
17 2019, and then we looked at the total number of systems
18 in the SGIP Program queue, and then allied a factor of
19 the likelihood of installation.

20 From that, we used that to calculate an average
21 capacity as in the forecast year. So this is how the
22 trend analysis works.

23 Because the SGIP Program is an incentive program
24 with applications, it gives us a lot of visibility into
25 what's in the queue. So we feel confident that the

1 program closely forecasts what not only is going to be
2 installed for the rest of this year but, also, probably
3 next year as well.

4 I see a question. I think questions from the
5 public are --

6 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Yeah. We'll take --

7 MR. KONALA: Take them at the end.

8 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: -- three minutes of comment
9 from anybody who would like to make a comment at the end
10 of the meeting.

11 MR. KONALA: Okay.

12 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: I do have a question for you
13 though.

14 MR. KONALA: Yes.

15 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: So you mentioned at the
16 beginning here that you think that most of the non-res
17 storage systems are the standalone system, they're not
18 paired with storage.

19 And so do you -- so in the future, you also think
20 that they will standalone systems and not paired with
21 solar and that's why you're going to continue to base it
22 on the historical trend?

23 MR. KONALA: Yeah. I mean, we reserve the right
24 to --

25 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Well, update, of course.

1 MR. KONALA: -- update the adoption forecast.
2 But for now, there's a slight tick up between like five
3 years ago and now. But it's still less than 50 percent,
4 even if you look at us, current year, it's still not,
5 it's standalone.

6 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Okay.

7 MR. KONALA: So we just don't have enough
8 information to make an assumption to change what we're
9 seeing.

10 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: I see. Okay. Thanks.

11 While you're pausing, let me just note, if you'd
12 like to make a public comment, just grab a blue card.
13 They're right up in front. And you can hand it to Matt,
14 who's kind of sitting there waiving by the window there.

15 Or if you're on the WebEx, you can raise your
16 hand and we'll get to that part when we're done with the
17 presentations.

18 MR. KONALA: Okay, so I just talked about how we
19 forecasted option in the non-residential sector. Now I'm
20 going to talk about the residential sector and how we
21 forecasted option.

22 So we actually, for the non-residential sector,
23 we only had one scenario. For the residential sector, we
24 actually did three scenarios. In the high energy demand
25 scenario where we're forecasting low storage adoption, we

1 also continued to use the historical trend, just like the
2 non-residential and like we did in the previous forecast.
3 But in the low energy demand case where we're forecasting
4 high storage adoption, we asked -- I'm sorry, we actually
5 linked storage adoption to PV capacity. And I'll
6 describe the methodology in a second. And in the mid
7 case, we just used an average between the high and the
8 low, so there's going to be an indirect link to PV
9 capacity through the low case.

10 So in terms of the methodology for the low case,
11 first, I calculated an adoption rate for storage, which
12 was, basically, I looked at the total storage that was
13 installed in 2018 and I divided it by the total installed
14 capacity of PV. So adoption rate of storage for people
15 who already had PV or are looking to add PV. And then I
16 held that adoption rate constant throughout time and then
17 multiplied it by the forecast of PV capacity for each
18 forecast year and from that arrived at a forecast of
19 storage adoption each year. When I do that the result
20 was that in the low case there was about 3.4 times more
21 storage capacity in the low scenario versus the high
22 scenario by 2030.

23 So in this chart, I'm summarizing the adoption
24 forecast between the three scenarios, and also
25 summarizing just exactly what I did. So that chart shows

1 the residential and non-residential sectors by scenarios
2 and the methodology that I applied, as well as just the
3 overall numbers. So about -- we're forecasting about
4 1,300 megawatts of installed storage capacity in the mid
5 c case by 2030, up from about 200 in 2018. And that is
6 higher than the 2018 forecast in the mid case.
7 Obviously, there was only one scenario in 2018, so the
8 high and the low did not have a comparable from previous
9 forecasts.

10 So this concludes the adoption forecast part.
11 But I'm still going to talk about the energy generation
12 part and the hourly and discharge profile. So if there's
13 any questions on this, I'll take that. Okay. Okay.

14 So the energy generation forecast for energy
15 storage is completely -- something that's completely
16 brand new for the revised forecast. This is actually the
17 first time we developed an hourly forecast of energy
18 storage. We've never done that before. And we did that
19 to better account for the effect of storage during peak
20 demand.

21 We also have an annual energy consumption
22 forecast for storage, but that's just a summation of each
23 individual hour.

24 Like the adoption forecast for storage, Staff
25 used different approaches for forecasting hourly energy

1 consumption for the residential and the non-residential,
2 and this is primarily due to data availability, and I'll
3 get into that.

4 So for the non-residential hourly storage
5 forecast, we used charge/discharge profiles from a report
6 published by the CPUC, actually, the CPUC's contractor,
7 Itron and E3. It's called the 2017 SGIP Advanced Energy
8 Storage Impact Evaluation. You can download it from the
9 CPUC's website. But what's significant about the report
10 is they sampled about 150 non-residential storage systems
11 and they published charge/discharge profiles for these
12 systems by building type. So the building types included
13 industrial buildings, food and liquor stores, hotels,
14 retail establishments, schools, and if it didn't fit in
15 one of those categories, into a general category called
16 other. And they also broke down these profiles by
17 systems that were smaller than 30 kilowatts and then
18 systems that were 30 kilowatts or greater.

19 These profiles for charge and discharging are
20 published by month and hour but they are statewide, so
21 they're utility specific. So our charge and discharge
22 profiles are going to be the same for all of the
23 utilities because we don't have utility-specific data
24 yet.

25 Finally, the hourly charge/discharge profiles

1 are -- the way they're specified is they're specified in
2 either charging or discharging in kilowatts per rebated
3 capacity of that system. So they're normalized for the
4 system size.

5 So in terms of the methodology that we used for
6 the non-residential forecast, we applied these hourly
7 charge/discharge profiles to the forecast of storage
8 capacity in the previous part of this presentation to get
9 an hourly storage charge and discharge information.

10 So here I lifted a figure from the SGIP report
11 that just shows those charge/discharge profiles. So this
12 is average hourly charge and discharge per rebated
13 capacity. This is a statewide number for all non-res
14 projects for all building types. So the darker the
15 value, it's either charging or discharging at a higher
16 rate. If it's closer to white, then it's charging or
17 discharging at a lower rate. But we scrapped this data
18 from the report and we applied to these to our forecast
19 of capacity to get a total hourly charge and discharge
20 information.

21 Referring back to something that Commissioner
22 McAllister had brought up, so an analysis of the SGIP
23 data and a conclusion of the SGIP report is that non-
24 residential storage systems mainly used batteries to
25 reduce demand charges and not necessarily time-of-use

1 charges, or the demand charges were predominant, just
2 looking at the patterns of charging and discharging. So
3 these customers are primarily looking to decrease their
4 own demand to avoid those charges.

5 Okay, now I'm going to move on to describing the
6 methodology for describing charge and discharging for the
7 residential sector.

8 So unlike the non-residential sector, we could
9 not use the SGIP report for the residential sector. This
10 is because the SGIP report had only a very limited sample
11 size, only about 28 systems, and all 28 systems were on
12 tiered rates, not TOU rates. So we believe that the
13 profiles were unlikely to reflect the way the residential
14 storage systems would be deployed.

15 So to model hourly charge and discharge profiles,
16 Staff used the System Advisor Model, developed by the
17 National Renewable Energy Laboratory, for modeling
18 residential storage. SAM is able to model battery
19 storage when it's coupled with the PV system. So we
20 downloaded the model and we used it for the residential
21 sector.

22 The general approach that we used is we used --
23 we modeled a single battery and then we scaled that up to
24 the installed capacity throughout the state to get
25 statewide numbers. And I'm going to describe exactly

1 what we did for that.

2 So when we're using SAM, we have to specify
3 systems' information regarding the PV system and the
4 battery that we're using. So for the PV system, we
5 modeled a six kilowatt system which was close to the
6 statewide average that I calculated, which was about 5.8
7 kilowatts. And for the battery, we modeled a Tesla
8 Powerwall. The reason why we chose a Powerwall is
9 because Tesla has about a 50 percent market share in the
10 residential sector. And when I looked at the average
11 residential battery size over the last three years, it
12 was very similar to what the average system size for a
13 Powerwall is. So, essentially, most of the state, the
14 batteries that are being sold look like a Powerwall, so
15 that's why we used it.

16 I do want to point out one limitation from using
17 SAM, is that we couldn't model the self-discharge of
18 lithium-ion batteries. Anybody that has a cell phone
19 knows that if you leave -- even if you turn off your
20 phone and leave it unplugged for a couple of days, when
21 you turn it back on the level of the battery is going to
22 be lower than when you turned it off. That's because the
23 nature of the technology of lithium-ion batteries is that
24 there's going to be a self-discharge. It's just the
25 physics. So that's going to be the case with any

1 lithium-ion battery, whether it's an electric car or, in
2 this case, home batteries.

3 So it's something that needs to be taken into
4 account, too, but we weren't able to model that in Sam
5 specifically, so that's going to be a limitation of the
6 forecast for energy storage, but hopefully we can rectify
7 that in the future.

8 So in terms of the overall methodology, we
9 selected a PV system and battery that corresponded to the
10 average statewide characteristics. And then we selected
11 about 32 regions across the state between each utility
12 service territory to capture regional variance in solar
13 production. This is going to affect how the batteries
14 are charged. And then we ran these -- we ran SAM at that
15 these 32 different regions for these PV and battery
16 characteristics but we used the default household
17 electricity load profiles that come with SAM, so we
18 didn't use California-specific load profiles. That's
19 something we hope to do in the future.

20 But what we did do was we scaled the load
21 profiles to match annual household consumption in
22 California for each of the 20 different forecast zones
23 that we forecast to.

24 We input utility rates and rate structures for
25 each of the three IOUs. And then we specified battery

1 charging and discharging behavior based on those rates,
2 and I'm going to get into that in the next slide.

3 So SAM has several dispatch models for how
4 batteries are charged and discharged. The first one
5 is -- it's a day -- looking forward one day. And then
6 the second profile is looking back at a day. But both of
7 these dispatch models are geared towards minimizing
8 impacts to the grid, ignoring benefits to the consumer.
9 And we felt that most -- consumers mostly control how
10 these systems are going to be charged or discharged or
11 installers are going to program these batteries so that
12 they maximize consumer's benefit. It didn't make sense
13 to use these dispatch models that were going to maximize
14 the benefits to the grid and not the consumer.

15 So what we did instead was we used a setting
16 called a manual dispatch model within SAM where the user
17 can determine when and how the batteries are charged and
18 discharged.

19 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Hey, Sudhakar, can --
20 sorry to step out there for a little while, but on this
21 point, does this include the batteries that would be
22 installed in new construction, along with PV required by
23 Title 24?

24 MR. KONALA: So for the adoption of energy
25 storage, we just mostly did a trend analysis or we linked

1 battery adoption to PV. So in terms of that, we didn't
2 incorporate any specific regulations, like Title 24, into
3 that --

4 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

5 MR. KONALA: -- into the adoption forecast.

6 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Because it's --
7 the adoption of batteries in new construction is
8 voluntary but it does get a compliance credit.

9 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So there will be some
11 chunk of the market for residential behind-the-meter
12 storage that will be in new construction.

13 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

14 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: And compliance with
15 Title 24, using it as a compliance option, using storage
16 as a compliance option requires that the consumer abide
17 by JA12, which is a dispatch, essentially, guidance for
18 dispatch of the battery.

19 MR. KONALA: Okay.

20 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So you might want to
21 check that because it is not what you described in terms
22 of the just customer dispatched. It is actually
23 emphasizing behind-the-meter consumption, self-
24 consumption.

25 MR. KONALA: Okay.

1 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So that, you know,
2 depending, we may reopen that and revisit as storage
3 becomes a more mature marketplace. But I just thought
4 I'd bring that up as something that might impact your
5 demand analysis.

6 MR. KONALA: We'll definitely look into that.

7 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

8 MR. KONALA: It's not incorporated into this
9 forecast --

10 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay.

11 MR. KONALA: -- per se.

12 But -- so the things that we did require in terms
13 of charging and discharging behavior is we -- when we
14 used the manual dispatch model, we required it to meet
15 all incentive requirements, so there are two of them that
16 are specific.

17 So when storage is installed with solar, or if
18 there's an existing storage system, storage can get the
19 Federal Incentive Tax Credit. But one of the
20 requirements is that the battery must charge using solar
21 or renewables. So this was a requirement that we used in
22 the manual dispatch model.

23 Another requirement, which is of the SGIP
24 Program, is that the battery must fully charge and
25 discharge at least 50 times a year, or at 687 kilowatt

1 hours per year. So this was a requirement that we had as
2 well.

3 We also assumed that the consumer is going to be
4 rational, that they're going to maximize their bill
5 savings, so the battery is going to be charged and
6 discharged in a way that maximizes bill savings. So it's
7 going to be charged during daytime because it's required
8 to charge in the daytime using solar for the Federal
9 Incentive Tax Credit, but that's also when the lowest
10 electricity rates also occur. But it's only going to be
11 discharged during hours where it makes sense financially.

12 Finally, a requirement was placed that the
13 battery is not allowed to discharge below 20 percent of
14 its reserves -- of the total capacity, which is a reserve
15 for backup power. This is fairly consistent, what we're
16 seeing, with systems that are being deployed by the large
17 battery manufacturers and installers, like Tesla and
18 Sunrun.

19 So, okay, so next I'm going to get into charge
20 and discharge profiles for the three big utilities, the
21 IOUs.

22 So here's a chart showing the discharge behavior
23 that we programmed for batteries for PG&E's territory.
24 So this chart shows by month and by hour when a battery
25 is allowed to discharge and when it is not allowed to

1 discharge, with the green representing the hours where it
2 is allowed to discharge.

3 So, basically, the battery is allowed to
4 discharge in the summer months during peak hours.

5 MR. RIDER: By allowed, you mean it's economical?

6 MR. KONALA: Yes.

7 MR. RIDER: Okay.

8 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

9 Obviously, PG&E also has peak rates during the
10 winter months. But the rate difference between peak and
11 off peak in the winter months was only 1.5 cents. And
12 since we don't, in our forecast, we don't -- we keep that
13 ratio the same because we do a forecast of average rates.
14 So at that difference of 1.5 cents, and taking into
15 effect the roundtrip efficiency of batteries, which is
16 only about 90 percent, it is actually uneconomically to
17 do a charge and discharging during the winter months at
18 that peak rate. So for the purposes of PG&E, for the
19 customer, it doesn't make sense to charge and discharge
20 during the winter months.

21 So we --

22 MR. RIDER: And just out of curiosity, when you
23 say discharge, you mean onto the grid, not into the self-
24 consumption?

25 MR. KONALA: We're mainly looking at self-

1 consumption.

2 MR. RIDER: Okay. So, okay, just trying to
3 understand then --

4 MR. KONALA: so --

5 MR. RIDER: -- I mean, the battery is not being
6 utilized for most of the months?

7 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

8 MR. RIDER: It's just sitting there?

9 MR. KONALA: It's -- it can be. But from a
10 financial standpoint, it doesn't make sense to do it.

11 MR. RIDER: From a sense of wear and tear on the
12 battery?

13 MR. RIDER: Not -- wear and tear on the battery,
14 true, but also from the rate difference. So I don't
15 remember the exact rate for the winter months but the
16 difference was 1.5 cents between peak and off peak. That
17 difference is not very big.

18 There's an energy penalty to using your battery;
19 right? There's a 90 percent roundtrip efficiency. So if
20 you're charging up the battery, what you can get out of
21 it is only going to be 90 percent. That ten percent loss
22 is going to be greater than the 1.5 cent gain that you
23 get.

24 MR. RIDER: And -- but there's also a difference
25 in export value of exported solar production; right? And

1 so if we're assuming that all these systems have solar
2 production, there's -- I mean, NEM 2.0 has a lower
3 compensation rate for exports than -- also, on top of
4 that, and so that's not enough to overcome the efficiency
5 difference?

6 MR. KONALA: Yeah. I has to be like at least
7 five cents, I think, for PG&E.

8 MR. RIDER: Okay. All right.

9 MR. KONALA: But I can recheck that and get back
10 to you.

11 So assuming these charge and discharge profiles,
12 we're estimating that there will about 72 to 90 full
13 charge/discharge cycles for systems installed in PG&E's
14 territory, depending on where they're actually installed.
15 So we're meeting the minimum requirements of the SGIP
16 Program, that it be charged and discharged at least 52
17 times.

18 So moving on to Edison, a similar chart here but
19 a different charge and discharge profile because of the
20 different time-of-use rates.

21 So for Edison, it makes sense to allow the
22 battery to charge and discharge year-round. Edison's
23 time-of-use rate structure incentivizes arbitrage, end
24 during the winter months. And based on the rates, which
25 I've shown to the figure on the right, we estimate that

1 the battery systems are going to be fully charged and
2 discharged a about 250 times a year.

3 In terms of energy consumption, I calculated a
4 capacity factor for Edison for the storage systems and it
5 came out to about 2.3 percent, which is very similar to
6 what we've seen in the literature for the capacity factor
7 for storage systems that charge on a -- charge and
8 discharge on a daily basis, so it seems to be in line.

9 And then, finally, for San Diego, this is more
10 like PG&E, the systems are allowed to discharge during
11 peak hours in the summer months. But the time-of-use
12 rate difference between peak and off peak in the winter
13 months, again, is very low. So I took this figure off of
14 San Diego's website. There's only a one cent difference
15 between peak and off peak. And, again, economically, it
16 doesn't really make sense to discharge the battery, the
17 wear and tear on the battery, you know, and then loss in
18 roundtrip -- the losses due to roundtrip efficiency. So
19 we only have it charging during the summer months.

20 Overall, we estimate that the battery will be
21 charged and discharged about 100 -- for 100 cycles for
22 the -- for each year of the forecast.

23 Okay, so with those charge and discharge
24 profiles, we incorporate that into Sam and then we run
25 Sam using the 5 kilowatt, 13.5 kilowatt hour Tesla

1 Powerwall battery and SAM provides us results. We
2 convert the SAM hourly charge and discharge data into
3 charge and discharge profiles for our rated capacity per
4 kilowatt. And then we apply these profiles for all 32
5 regions to create a charge/discharge profile for the 20
6 forecast zones. And then we add up those forecast zones
7 to get profiles for each of the three utilities. From
8 that, we're able to generate an hourly forecast for
9 residential storage systems for each of the different
10 planning areas for the IOUs.

11 So I don't have final energy numbers for storage
12 systems. That's because the total energy consumption due
13 to storage -- net consumption due to storage is actually
14 very small. We're only talking about on the range of
15 about 100 to 150 gigawatt hours. That's very small
16 compared to the 40,000 gigawatt hours for behind-the-
17 meter solar. So it's basically a rounding error for the
18 rest of the forecast. But where it does make an impact
19 is on the peak forecast, which Nick is going to talk
20 about.

21 I did want to make several comments. So this was
22 our first attempt at doing this type of forecast for
23 storage but we expect it to continue to evolve over time
24 as we get a lot more data and as we incorporate feedback.
25 And we expect there to be a lot of incremental

1 improvements over time, including as we get more data on
2 charge and discharge behavior for battery systems.

3 There's a new SGIP report on storage that's
4 scheduled to come out. It was supposed to be out but
5 it's scheduled to come out soon. So once we get more
6 data, I think from that, we'll probably make some more
7 changes to the methodology and have better forecasts in
8 the future.

9 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Thanks a lot. I
10 think this is great. I mean, we have to -- it's a really
11 good foundation and then we have to figure out what that
12 marketplace is doing with storage so that we can model
13 that; right?

14 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

15 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: And I think we kind of
16 don't quite know what's going on quite yet.

17 But to Ken's point earlier, I'm not sure it's
18 always the right comparison to compare on peak and off
19 peak. It may be that a given kilowatt hour either goes
20 in the grid or it goes into the battery. Like if you're
21 producing PV, it either goes into the grid at given
22 moment or it goes into the battery.

23 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

24 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: And the difference
25 there could be actually quite significant because if it

1 goes into the grid and the accounting and the NEM rate is
2 such that it's only giving you the avoidable wholesale
3 cost, which is like two cents or three cents, then that's
4 your comparison with whatever the on-peak, you know,
5 retail rate that you're saving by using it onsite.

6 So I think we need to really dig into the -- how
7 the rates are being applied in each, you know, in each
8 time period, in each service territory, each season to
9 make sure that we're doing that accounting properly and
10 understanding what the difference in value for any given
11 PV-generated kilowatt hour actually is. Because that
12 really is going to drive the value proposition for
13 storage, in addition to any, you know, on-peak/off-peak
14 difference.

15 MR. KONALA: So we'll definitely look into that,
16 but just -- I just remembered something.

17 So we did talk to some of the storage installers.
18 And one of them has stated that they only do charging and
19 discharging in the summer months and not during the
20 winter months in PG&E's territory. So, in practice,
21 they're actually following what we're trying to model, at
22 least for the time period. That could change going
23 forward.

24 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Okay. That's helpful.
25 And as the rules of that metering, you know, get tweaked

1 and morphed and stuff, that will interesting to keep
2 track of.

3 MR. KONALA: Yeah.

4 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Thanks for all the hard
5 work.

6 MR. KONALA: Thanks.

7 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: All right. Thank you very
8 much.

9 I want to be mindful. We've gotten lots of great
10 presentations and a lot of very good detail but we are
11 quite a bit behind time.

12 So, Nick, I'm hoping you can do your presentation
13 between now and about 3:05, 3:10.

14 And then, Mike, if you start around 3:05, 3:10,
15 if you can be wrapped up, maybe around 3:45? And then
16 that will leave us some time for comments and get us a
17 little bit back, closer to schedule, just to be
18 respectful time who's here listening in. That would be
19 great. And I am looking forward to additional
20 interesting presentations. So, Nick, please take it
21 away?

22 MR. FUGATE: I'm sorry to say, no one has ever
23 accused me of talking fast but let's see what I can do
24 here.

25 All right, good afternoon, Commissioners. Nick

1 Fugate. And I'll presenting the results of our hourly
2 forecast. I'll be referring to it as CED 2019, or
3 California Energy Demand 2019 to 2030 revised forecast.
4 And we're employing, again, the hourly load model that we
5 used last cycle. This is our top-down model specified at
6 the system level for each TAC in the CAISO control area.
7 And has been stated in previous workshops this year, we
8 will soon have a second hourly model. Our updated hourly
9 electric load model, our HELM 2.0, which is a bottom-up
10 model, making use of load shapes developed by ADM for
11 each of our end uses, sectors, building types, forecast
12 zones, that we used in our annual demand models, as well
13 as shapes for important demand modifiers.

14 Although it's in our -- it's in the final stages
15 of development, the HELM 2.0 was not -- wasn't complete
16 in time to make use of in this forecast, which is why we
17 are -- everything I'm going to be showing here is coming
18 from our HLM model.

19 But regardless of the specific model, the
20 motivation for doing an hourly forecast is the same, and
21 we've already touched on that quite a bit today in other
22 presentations. Demand modifiers, such as PV, storage,
23 electric vehicles, alter the observed net-system load
24 profile relative to what we've traditionally seen.

25 I've included here for illustration a sample

1 modeled hourly profile for PG&E TAC area on July 30th,
2 which is a weekday in each of the years that I'm showing.
3 You can see the pronounced impact that significant
4 amounts of behind-the-meter are having, creating this
5 steep ramping period between the early afternoon and
6 evening, and also you see the peak hour shifting from
7 hour 18 in 2020 to hour 19 in 2025. And in 2030, on this
8 particular day, so electric vehicle charging very nearly
9 shifts the peak hour even later.

10 So peak load is an important consideration to
11 system planners. And anticipating the timing of the peak
12 hour is important so that we can accurately capture the
13 contribution of demand modifiers.

14 So I've just touched on a couple of these uses
15 case but, more directly, we used the results of our
16 hourly model to derive annual peaks for the IOU TAC areas
17 and for the CAISO system as a whole. Our annual peak
18 load forecast is something we routinely adopt as part of
19 the IEPR. It feeds into some of the planning cases that
20 Commissioner McAllister mentioned at the start of this
21 workshop.

22 Beginning last year, with the 2018 update, we
23 also began adopting monthly peaks for use and resource
24 adequacy. And then the detailed hourly results are
25 actually an important input for any sort of detailed

1 system modeling, such as production cost modeling that we
2 do internally here at the CEC.

3 So a little bit about the method. I'm going to
4 keep this high level as the structure hasn't changed
5 since the last time we ran this model.

6 HLM is actually modeling load ratios for each
7 hour of the day. That is the ratio of load in each hour
8 of a year to the annual average hourly load for that
9 year. This is a convenient way to do it as the model
10 doesn't have to account for economic and demographic
11 drivers that can impact the absolute magnitude of load.
12 Those sorts of considerations are taken up in our annual
13 forecast that Cary discussed earlier which we -- that's
14 the forecast that we then apply these average hourly load
15 ratios to derive the hourly projections.

16 So this hourly consumption load is then adjusted
17 to account for the impacts of incremental demand
18 modifiers, such as PV and electric vehicle charging,
19 battery charging efficiency, et cetera. And for each of
20 these load modifiers, we've developed a distinct set of
21 profiles.

22 So there's a weather normalization step to this.
23 The model takes, as an input, hourly weather effects,
24 such as temperature and dew point. We've detailed
25 historical hourly weather data for the last 18 years that

1 we use to run simulations. And then we alter the day of
2 the week that the simulation starts on so we get
3 different calendar effects to. And this is gives us
4 about 126 -- or exactly 126 simulations, each with 87:60
5 ratios. And we rank order them in each simulation from
6 highest to lowest. And for each rank we select a median
7 across all simulations and this becomes our weather-
8 normalized ratio.

9 But then there is a final and tricky step of
10 assigning these load ratios to actual days and hours of
11 the year. And doing the calendar assignment we want to
12 be sure to preserve coincidence across different TACs so
13 that the results of the hourly TAC forecast can be summed
14 across ours to get an hourly forecast for the CAISO as a
15 whole, so we do this using average historical loads since
16 the sum of an average is equal to the average of a sum.
17 However, if we were to stop after just that first step
18 we'd be understating peaks in the shoulder months, which
19 have significantly wider distributions of load relative
20 to the summer and winter.

21 So we add a few more steps to this process, that
22 is within each month, we rank the ratios and find the
23 rank average across historical years. Similar to what we
24 did at the annual level, instead of averaging across
25 specific hours of each month, which will have wide

1 distributions, we find the average of the highest
2 historical ratio in the month and then the average of the
3 second highest, and so on. Then we assign the highest
4 average peak ratios to the day type and hour within the
5 given month that has the highest historical average load
6 ratio. The second highest is assigned to the second
7 highest and so on.

8 So we do this for every month, and then we look
9 at the entire year, and then we rank every hour of the
10 year. And this gives us the 87:60, basically, calendar
11 that we use to assign the load ratios from the first
12 step.

13 So here's our key inputs. The set of load ratios
14 that we're using for the revised forecast are identical
15 to the preliminary. What has changed is that we are
16 applying these ratios to the revised consumption forecast
17 that Cary discussed, including impacts from the revised
18 PV projections and storage projections that Sudhakar just
19 described. We are also calibrating to the results of our
20 2019 annual estimates of weather-normalized peak load for
21 each TAC. So this is something -- we didn't have this
22 weather-normalized annual peak estimate for the
23 preliminary because summer had not ended yet. We need to
24 wait for that summer data.

25 So although our forecast of PV adoption has

1 changed, the actual generation profiles that we're
2 applying to this forecast are the same, the ones
3 developed by E3. We're using newly developed efficiency
4 and vehicle charging profiles taken from the EPIC-funded
5 Load Shape Project with ADM. This is the same project
6 that is -- that the HELM 2.0 is going to be coming out
7 of. And I've included a link here to the detailed report
8 of that work for anyone that wants to dig into it.

9 Our annual climate change impacts are no longer
10 being distributed as they were in the previous forecast
11 in proportion to hourly load. Instead, what we've done
12 this time is we've estimated an elasticity for every hour
13 of the year. That is a percent change in load relative
14 to a percent change in temperature. And we've combined
15 that with the hourly climate change impacts -- sorry, the
16 hourly climate change temperature impacts that Scripps
17 has developed for us.

18 And then impacts from the rollout of default TOU
19 rates were developed by Lynn Marshall, who made use of
20 the various pilot studies and load impact assessments
21 that were conducted by the IOUs.

22 So Sudhakar discussed the development of behind-
23 the-meter storage charge and discharge. Since this is
24 the first time we're including storage impacts in the
25 forecast, I thought I'd show an example of what this

1 profile looks like, or these profiles.

2 This is the overall res and non-res profile taken
3 from a summer weekday in a PG&E TAC in 2030. Negative
4 values here represent charge. Positive values represent
5 discharge. The residential systems, you can see charging
6 with PV production and discharge during the time-of-use
7 window. And the non-res PV systems, as Sudhakar
8 mentioned, are being utilized mostly to defer demand
9 charges, so they appear to be discharging during the day
10 and charging at night.

11 I also wanted to show an example of an EV
12 charging profile, this one taken from a summer day in
13 2030 from the SCE TAC area. I included a weekend and
14 weekday profile to show the increased workplace charging
15 between 6:00 a.m. and noon during the week. In either
16 case, you can see a pronounced response to the time-of-
17 use peak rate window. Also, the highest charging loads
18 are late at night or in the very early morning.

19 Which circles back to my first graph. The
20 transportation electrification is a significant
21 contribution to long-term growth in our consumption and
22 sales forecast. But we'll have something of a lesser
23 impact on peak growth. And while we eventually reach a
24 point where adding more PV by itself will have no
25 incremental impact on the timing and magnitude of peak,

1 this demonstrates our other demand modifiers could
2 continue to shift the peak hour, potentially even past
3 sunset.

4 So, as I mentioned, one of the other key inputs
5 is our annual weather normalization -- weather-normalized
6 peak estimate. So I'll describe this process as well.
7 It's relatively straightforward.

8 We fit a linear regression model to the last
9 three years of summer load and temperature data. The
10 idea is to capture the daily peak load response to
11 temperature apparent in recent history. And once we've
12 estimated that model, we then simulate daily peak loads
13 for an entire summer, using the last 30 years of
14 historical temperature data. Then we take the maximum
15 peak from each simulation, so 30 in all, and select the
16 median value as our one and two normalized value for
17 2019.

18 And you can, the model here is pretty simple. As
19 predictors, we use the maximum daily temperature, as well
20 as the maximum temperature from the previous two days.
21 We also include daily minimum temperature and dummy
22 (phonetic) variables for year and month, as well as an
23 indicator for a normal business workday.

24 So here I'm showing our model fits statistics for
25 this weather normalization process, both for the model

1 performance across the entire range of predicted values,
2 and then just for the top five peak load events in the
3 estimation years. We make that top five distinction
4 because, ultimately, it's the peak values that we really
5 care about.

6 The thing I want to call attention to here is
7 that the root mean squared error, which is the statistic
8 that gives us an indication of how wide or narrow your
9 distribution of errors is. It improves for PG&E when
10 evaluating just the extreme values, which is fantastic,
11 but it worsens for SDG&E and SCE in particular,
12 indicating that our -- potentially indicating that our
13 predicted extremes are relatively far from the observed
14 values.

15 So some of you may recall, that last cycle our
16 forecast staff agreed to retain the same model from one
17 forecast to the next so as to avoid any movement in our
18 weather-normalized peaks that could be introduced purely
19 through methodological inconsistencies in how we're doing
20 this, so we've done that. So the results I'm showing you
21 are from the same model and method. But we also
22 committed to routinely showing these performance
23 statistics in case the model seemed to be
24 underperforming.

25 So that large error band around the extreme

1 values, as I mentioned, in SCE TAC is worth keeping in
2 mind as we look at the model results here.

3 I'm comparing the weather-normalized values for
4 2019 to the 2018 normalized peak from last year's
5 forecast update by each TAC area. And we're slightly
6 lower across the Board but, especially in the SCE TAC, a
7 nearly 500 megawatt drop from 2018 to 2019.

8 I'll make a point of saying that we're interested
9 to hear -- we've provided all of our -- all of this.
10 This was discharged at a DAWG meeting a couple weeks ago
11 and we provided information to, about our forecast, to
12 SCE. We're interested in hearing their perspective or
13 reaction to this weather-normalized peak.

14 I, perhaps, should have shown the observed peaks
15 as part of this table, but you can actually see that in
16 the next series of slides here.

17 So here's our one and two non-coincident peak
18 forecasts for the PG&E TAC. That top red line is our
19 end-user consumption peak forecast which represents peak
20 demand on the customer side of the meter, regardless of
21 whether that demand is being met by grid or by -- by the
22 grid or by onsite generation. The bottom three plots
23 are, from top to bottom, are our mid baseline net peak
24 which accounts for self-generation but which is unmanaged
25 by additional achievable efficiency, or AAEE. Then our

1 mid baseline peak managed by low AAEE. And then the
2 bottom plot is our mid baseline managed by mid AAEE.

3 I'm showing these two manage scenarios
4 specifically because they're the ones that the joint
5 agencies have agreed to use for system planning, the mid-
6 mid for statewide analysis and then the mid-low for local
7 studies. And all of the net-peak scenarios begin from
8 our 2019 weather-normalized value. The purple dot there
9 by itself is the recorded peak for 2019. So you can see
10 here, for PG&E, we have approximately a 500 megawatt
11 downward adjustment from the observed peak.

12 The addition of PV drives the forecast downward
13 in the first couple of years. But in 2020 -- no, I'm
14 sorry, in 2021 the peak hour shifts from hour 17 to hour
15 18. And so at that point the marginal impacts from
16 additional PV taper off. And then a year later, in 2022,
17 the peak hour shifts yet another hour later, further
18 reducing the impact of additional PV. And after that
19 point, the peak forecast continues to grow.

20 So by the end of the forecast period the
21 difference between the mid baseline and the mid-mid
22 managed peak forecast is almost 1,000 megawatts of load
23 reduction from additional achievable energy efficiency.

24 And here's a similar set of plots for SCE. In
25 2019, our weather-normalized estimate amounts to nearly a

1 700 megawatt downward adjustment. The model peak hour
2 shifts from hour 16 to hour 17 in 2025, and then to hour
3 19 in 2026. The SCE TAC sees relatively greater peak
4 contribution from climate change and electric vehicle
5 charging, each adding a couple hundred megawatts to peak
6 growth by 2030.

7 And I should mention that at the very end of my
8 presentation, I have a set of appendix slides which
9 include the contribution at the hour of managed system
10 peak of all the different demand modifiers that we layer
11 into this hourly analysis.

12 Also, in 2030 the mid-mid managed peak is
13 impacted by over 1,100 megawatts of AAEE savings. And
14 that mid-mid managed peak declines by about a half a
15 percent a year in the first half of the forecast, then
16 grows at about the same rate, netting almost no change
17 over the ten-year forecast horizon.

18 SDG&E saw a slight upward adjustment in their
19 weather-normalized value. SDG&E sees no peak shift
20 during the forecast because, you know, as Sudhakar
21 mentioned, they have a significantly high penetration of
22 PV already and so the peak shift has, essentially,
23 already happened.

24 Additional PV has now marginal impact on peak.
25 And so the consumption peaks and the unmanaged peaks

1 track very closely. AAEE accounts for a 238 megawatt
2 spread between the mid baseline and the mid-mid managed
3 peaks in 2030.

4 I have three more TAC-specific slides, each
5 showing our monthly peak projections this time, plotted
6 against the last ten years of observed system peaks in
7 each month. All the peaks shown here, projected and
8 observed, are non-coincident. Each colored line
9 represents a forecast year. I've included only 2021,
10 2022 and 2023 to keep the graph readable, and also
11 because those are the years that stakeholders identified
12 as being the most important for R.A. And the black dots
13 are the distribution of historical peaks.

14 So for PG&E, it fits nicely, if a little high in
15 the distributions.

16 SCE, on the other hand, sits a little lower and,
17 you know, a little lower in the summer months and
18 actually higher in the winter months. And a portion of
19 this has to do with the variable contributions of solar
20 in different months. But also a portion is likely an
21 artifact of the model calibration to the weather-
22 normalized peak. The calibration step is a linear
23 transformation of every hour such that the rank order of
24 the consumption load ratios and the total annual energy
25 are preserved. Calibrating to a lower peak has the

1 effect of reducing high load ratios, such as those that
2 are common in the summer, and then increasing the low
3 ones that are common in the winter.

4 And for SDG&E, again, this sits pretty low in the
5 historical distributions. But, again, SDG&E has seen
6 significant penetration of behind-the-meter solar in
7 recent years.

8 And for completeness, I've included the CAISO
9 system. This is actually just the combined TAC, so VEA
10 is not included here. But adding VEA won't change the
11 appearance of this graph noticeably.

12 So this is the -- no, I'm sorry. There's some
13 concern on a recent stakeholder call as to whether the
14 system peak might shift to a different month with this
15 forecast. And I'm showing here that the system peak is
16 still assumed to occur in early sept.

17 MR. RIDER: Nick, a question on the San Diego Gas
18 and Electric TAC on month seven, I guess that would be
19 July?

20 MR. FUGATE: Um-hmm.

21 MR. RIDER: I mean, given the month-by-month
22 adjustment that you've been doing, I find it odd, and the
23 and at least the square progression methods and things,
24 that the lines fall outside of every single recorded
25 piece which would really up your error. What -- can you

1 explain why? I mean, literally, every other line falls
2 within the distribution. Why -- what's going on with the
3 methodology on July?

4 MR. FUGATE: So I'm not surprised that someone
5 noticed that. So this is not dissimilar to what we saw
6 in the previous forecast. The hourly load model, you
7 know, for SDG&E, it was always the poorest fit for our
8 model. And, in particular, relative to average observed
9 peaks, that month seven and eight have come in a little
10 low. But you're also, on top of that, you know, we are,
11 you know, expecting this to be relatively -- the peaks to
12 be relatively low in the summer months compared to recent
13 history.

14 MR. RIDER: Well, I guess you were describing in
15 the beginning of your presentation a monthly -- a month-
16 by-month fit that you do of whether to try to --

17 MR. FUGATE: Right. That's for the --

18 MR. RIDER: -- get it (indiscernible).

19 MR. FUGATE: -- for the assignment of the load
20 ratios.

21 MR. RIDER: Right.

22 MR. FUGATE: So for the calendarization effect.
23 It works pretty well for most of the TACs. And -- but
24 for SDG&E, we still get a slightly understated, and it
25 just shakes out, we get a slightly understated month

1 seven.

2 MR. RIDER: Okay.

3 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: I mean, it actually
4 looks kind of odd, not just for month seven. I mean,
5 all, you know, all the points are above the curve there.
6 But even for August and September, it looks, you know, it
7 looks a little bit low and you've got the --

8 MR. RIDER: Yeah. I'm a little confused because
9 I thought that this was like the least squares fit of
10 some kind based on historical data in terms of
11 calibration. And I don't know how that wouldn't correct
12 the --

13 MR. FUGATE: Right. So let me back up a little
14 bit.

15 We do have a slight -- so the calibration is to
16 the annual weather-normalized peak in 2019, so we do have
17 an initial slight decline in the first couple of years to
18 the annual peak. And, actually, that 2019 observed value
19 is in this data set. It is, I believe, the second to the
20 lowest value there in September.

21 So, I mean, you know, we're fitting the hourly
22 model, the estimation. The number -- the years that
23 we're using for the estimation I think are the 2018 back
24 to -- we're using six years of recent data to fit the
25 model. But as you, you know, add more --

1 MR. RIDER: Right.

2 MR. FUGATE: -- add more PV, you're going to

3 have -- you know, expect to be at the low end of that --

4 MR. RIDER: Okay. Thank you.

5 MR. FUGATE: -- distribution.

6 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: All right. Okay.

7 That makes sense.

8 MR. FUGATE: So this is my closing slide.

9 Everything after this, I've included only for reference.

10 I want to just summarize where we're at here in terms of

11 finalizing the hourly forecast and, by consequence, the

12 annual and monthly peaks that we'll be putting forward

13 for adoption in January.

14 We've already provided the IOU TAC area peak

15 forecasts and the detailed hourly results to key

16 stakeholders for the planning scenarios, like I said, the

17 mid baseline, paired with the mid-mid and mid-low AAEE.

18 We'll be docketing the full hourly results for all

19 scenarios, hopefully tomorrow or Wednesday.

20 The comment window following the workshop closes

21 in two weeks. And during that time, our staff will be

22 available to -- for additional discussion with

23 stakeholders. So you can reach out to me or to Cary and

24 we'll arrange to have the necessary people on a call.

25 And, again, we're particularly interested in

1 additional perspective or reaction or analysis on that
2 weather-normalized 2019 value for Southern California
3 Edison. And also be very grateful for any feedback we
4 receive before the comment window closes on that, even if
5 it's just informal, so that we can, you know, have as
6 much time as possible to consider any adjustments that
7 might need to be made.

8 So with that, I will -- if there are additional
9 questions from the dais?

10 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: I don't have any additional
11 questions. I'm seeing shaking heads.

12 I do want to underscore, though, Nick, what you
13 said to our stakeholders and the utilities, especially,
14 that the staff is available for the additional
15 discussion, and that we are looking for the reactions to
16 the 2019 weather-normalized peak estimates. So we hope
17 that folks will take that call seriously and engage with
18 the staff and help us improve an already expert analysis.
19 So thank you very much for that.

20 Let's turn now to the final presentation today,
21 and that's going to be by Mike Jaske.

22 MR. JASKE: Good afternoon. For the record, Mike
23 Jaske with Energy Assessments Division. And what I'm
24 going to do today is describe an exploratory study of the
25 impacts of fuel substitution. This is not part of the

1 baseline or managed forecast. It's a parallel study that
2 is too uncertain to include in baseline or managed
3 forecasts and presented here today to receive comments
4 and input from stakeholders so that we can improve our
5 analysis and bring forward something, eventually, when
6 fuel substitution programs start emerging and become more
7 mature.

8 So the objective here was really to understand
9 the relative importance of alternative assumptions. And
10 it's limited to the residential and commercial building
11 sector. We wanted to develop a tool that could look at
12 both annual energy and hourly electric load impacts and
13 provide a starting point for looking at the generation
14 resource addition issues associated with the loads that
15 I'll be showing you.

16 And I should say that a version of this analysis
17 was provided to our Electric Analysis Office. And
18 they'll be presenting their generation assessment at the
19 workshop on Wednesday of this week.

20 So trying to be quick here.

21 I presented a sort of an initial layout of this
22 project back at the September 26th workshop. And what
23 I'm going to do here in part two is sort of tell you the
24 -- more of the results, particularly focusing on some
25 sensitivities and the hourly profile side of things, and

1 less so on the annual energy. Oh, and there's a detailed
2 report that it's in review right now. And that report,
3 plus some Excel files that lays out the inputs and the
4 results, will be posted in the next couple of weeks to
5 aid stakeholders.

6 So these are the same scenarios that I described
7 back in September, there's five of them, two having to do
8 with new construction electrification, two of them having
9 to do with retrofit of existing residential space and
10 water heating, and then the last one, what I'm now
11 calling pseudo AB 3232, looks at the 40 percent reduction
12 from 1990 fuel use, not from the GHG inventory. So it's
13 a must more simplified scope of what the eventual AB 3232
14 analysis has to tackle.

15 And there is an error in the first sub bullet.
16 At that point in September, I was trying to conform what
17 I did to what was included in SB 350 analysis. And that
18 was a scenario that rose up to 15 percent. In fact, I
19 have reverted back to the original analysis which is only
20 a ten percent increase in -- or penetration of new
21 construction by 2030.

22 So very quickly, the approach, we start with the
23 staff's 2019 IEPR Natural Gas Demand Forecast by utility,
24 by sector, and by end use. We devise electrification
25 scenarios at the sector and introduce level. We quantify

1 the annual amount of natural gas that's displaced, and
2 then the electric energy that's added at the utility
3 sector and end-use level. And then in the last step,
4 that hourly -- that annual electricity energy that's been
5 added is spread across all the hours of the year using
6 load profiles to get an hourly load impact by sector and
7 end use, which we can then add across all the individual
8 hours to get sector, utility, and even multi-utility
9 impacts.

10 This flowchart essentially shows you all of what
11 I just said in a graphical form. I'll just note that the
12 middle box there, where it says, "incremental electric
13 hourly load calculation," that's an adaptation of the
14 tool that we developed several years ago for hourly AAEE.
15 And it's really just an Excel method of taking that
16 annual energy, whether it's positive savings from energy
17 efficiency or negative savings from fuel substitution and
18 smearing it across the hours of a year using a load
19 profile.

20 And then just for completeness, being specific
21 here about what levels of disaggregation exists. So
22 there are five electric utility service areas. And I
23 should say these are, the way the staff's natural gas
24 demand forecast is projected is on an electric service
25 area basis. So PG&E gas service area is the combination

1 of PG&E and SMUD. And, correspondingly, SoCalGas is sort
2 of the summation of Edison and LADWP, leaving out a few
3 little pieces, like Burbank and Glendale. So this
4 coverage is about, roughly, 90 percent of the electric
5 load of the state and that was sufficient for this
6 exploratory project.

7 Two sectors, residential and commercial building,
8 ag, industrial and other commercial left out, within
9 residential there are five end uses, as noted there, and
10 in the commercial building sector there are six end uses.

11 So the key assumption and equation that drives
12 all of this at the individual sector end-use level is the
13 presumption that the level of service, before and after
14 fuel substitution is the same. So if you take something
15 simple, like a natural gas water heater, the consumption
16 of that natural gas water heater is the product of the
17 level of service that's being provided in terms of hot
18 water times the efficiency with which that's delivered.

19 And we want that level of service, the amount of,
20 essentially, the amount of hot water that end users have
21 available to them to be the same when we have an electric
22 appliance that is generating the heat, the heated water.
23 And so that amount of energy is the level of hot water
24 service divided by the average electric efficiency. And
25 so that is shown in this equation that says, "Incremental

1 electric energy is displaced natural gas energy times the
2 ratio of the natural gas efficiency and the average
3 electric energy efficiency." And we'll repeat that,
4 essentially, over and over again across all the sectors
5 and end uses.

6 So this is an example of how that basic construct
7 is applied. On the left-hand panel we have all of the
8 end uses in the residential sector, and the total, the
9 amount of natural gas that's been displaced in one of
10 these scenarios. We have the assumptions in the middle
11 panel of what the natural gas efficiency was and what the
12 electric efficiency was for each of those end uses. You
13 can compute the amount of annual electric energy that
14 corresponds to that amount of fuel substitution.

15 And you can see in the original assumption panel
16 that all of the end-use efficiencies were assumed to be
17 the same. These were the values that were first
18 developed as part of the original Fuel Substitution
19 Project that we undertook as part of the 2017 SB 2350
20 study. And initially, I just took those very same ones
21 and applied them across all of the end uses.

22 In the revised panel on the right-hand side of
23 this slide are, obviously, much more specific numbers for
24 each end use. These were some of the initial values that
25 came to us back in September from Navigant Consulting,

1 who is assisting Staff in developing a more sophisticated
2 model of this whole fuel substitution process. And so
3 these are particular -- a result of an analysis of
4 individual technologies within the named end uses here.

5 And you can see that, even though there's quite a
6 variety in the change from the middle panel to the right-
7 hand side panel, the total amount of energy added is
8 actually only about seven percent less. Some end uses go
9 down, some end uses go up, and the mix didn't change so
10 much.

11 These are the actual annual energy impacts. I
12 think these are the same, except for one, the very first
13 scenario, the first row, the reference case, SB 350. As
14 I reported in September, you can see that these all are
15 sort of ordered in the same size impact as the way I
16 described them. New construction, even at the 25 percent
17 share level, doesn't really get you very much gas
18 displaced or energy added, compared to just relatively
19 low levels of residential retrofit.

20 And, of course, the so-called pseudo AB 3232
21 scenario that brings in the commercial sector has a much
22 larger amount of gas displaced or electric energy added.
23 And that is the scenario that the Electricity Analysis
24 Office has assessed and will be describing in the
25 workshop on Wednesday.

1 So let me now turn to how we take those annual
2 electricity impacts and convert them into hourly electric
3 loads.

4 So one of the really important goals of this
5 exploratory project was to try to understand the hourly
6 load impacts. And to do that, of course, we need load
7 profiles to match up to those amounts of electric energy
8 by sector and end use. There were a series of different
9 sources that were explored and various versions of the
10 basic tool, made use of different combinations of these
11 sources over a period of some months as we were just sort
12 of trying to understand, if you assumed this profile,
13 what would that translate in terms of overall result?

14 So we started with the package of end uses that
15 were developed in conjunction with the 2017 AAEE
16 projections. These have, actually, been substantially
17 updated and replaced in the 2019 AAEE study, as Ingrid
18 Neumann has indicated in several presentations. These
19 were probably sufficient for simple end uses, like
20 cooking or maybe even water heating, but very deficient
21 in that we don't have any experience in the AAEE realm of
22 electric space heating. So electric space heating was a
23 big deficiency in terms of that original source

24 There was a SoCalGas study that a team of
25 Navigant Consulting people did for that utility. That

1 was published, I think, in the summer of 2018. We
2 contacted Navigant to get the profiles that they assumed
3 in that study. It turned out they were actually traced
4 back to an E3 IRP analysis. There's a lot of circularity
5 going on in the industry. They turned out not to be very
6 satisfactory.

7 So we moved on to another source which was open
8 E.I. They had residential space heating profiles that
9 were developed using the building simulation model
10 situated in the climate of hundreds of different
11 locations around the country. We downloaded 20 or 25 of
12 those and sort of mapped them into electric utility
13 service areas and tried those.

14 And then lastly, as Nick mentioned earlier, the
15 HELM 2.0 Project delivered profiles to us somewhere
16 around February or so of this year. And even though the
17 HELM 2.0 model that made use of those profiles isn't yet
18 ready, we're able to update the profile selection by
19 making use of those ADM profiles.

20 And so what I will be presenting in all the rest
21 of these slides is kind of a composite of mostly ADM
22 profiles with a few minor end uses traced all the way
23 back to the 2017 AAEE package.

24 And just to give you an idea of what the
25 different profiles mean in terms of results, there's

1 three different vintages of this tool that I'm showing
2 here as rows. And the columns are the date at which the
3 maximum impact across both residential and commercial
4 building sectors and all the end uses within them result.

5 So in the original version that I'm reporting
6 here, the Version 9C, all of the maximum impacts take
7 place on the same date in November, which was a little
8 surprising, one of the reasons to sort of move on to
9 another source.

10 The middle version there with open E.I. profiles
11 by zone, weighted together with utility service area sort
12 of composite profiles and all the other profiles the same
13 as the previous version, now is starting to show come
14 diversity. So the multiplicity of zones and the
15 individual climates associated with those obviously lend
16 themselves to having different results. And so PG&E and
17 Edison are now peaking in December. And San Diego,
18 curiously, is peaking in March. And the composite
19 across, on a coincident basis, across the ISO is the same
20 date as Edison in December.

21 And in the last row, bringing in the ADM load
22 profiles with a few of the 2017 AAEE package, even more
23 diversity. We understand that these profiles are a
24 composite of several different weather years. And I
25 think that's leading to this increased diversity of the

1 date of the maximum incremental load. So PG&E remains in
2 December a little bit earlier in the month. Edison
3 shifts over to January. San Diego moves into late
4 November. And then the coincident across the three TAC
5 areas within the ISO is not quite the same date as Edison
6 but, perhaps, part of the same cold weather event.

7 And so this is instructive to us in terms of
8 understanding how space heating profiles cause the
9 results to change the diversity of approaches in how
10 these profiles were developed, the weather assumptions
11 that go into them, and are they appropriate for the
12 purpose that we have? It raises, you know, lots of
13 issues, and this was part of the whole idea is to
14 understand what kind of sensitivity the results might be
15 encountered.

16 So all of the next few slides I'm going to show
17 are this kind of hourly result. They're all going to be
18 for the year 2030. They're all going to be for the
19 pseudo AB 3232 scenario. And I chose that to show here
20 today because that's the scenario that has the greatest
21 amount of electric energy on an annual basis of the five
22 scenarios. And so all of these effects are magnified,
23 you know, like the hourly level at the same level that
24 they're magnified at the annual energy level.

25 So here we're looking at three days, January

1 21st, 22nd and 23rd. The peak day that I showed on the
2 last slide of January 23rd has a composite of a little
3 over 14,000 megawatts of incremental electric load on a,
4 quote, "statewide basis," meaning it's the five electric
5 service areas, some together on a coincident hourly
6 basis.

7 You can see right away that each day has two
8 peaks, a primary and a secondary, so it's a very bimodal
9 distribution. All of the service areas have that same
10 basic shape, although it's more extreme in some compared
11 to others. The blue and orange lines here are PG&E and
12 Edison respectively. And since they're so much bigger,
13 they really drive the overall composite statewide
14 results. The other three utilities don't matter nearly as
15 much.

16 And you can see, again, that they all behave in a
17 very similar fashion. There's a morning peak around hour
18 seven or eight. There's an evening, which is the
19 secondary peak. And there's a primary peak in the
20 evening hour around hour 19. And that pattern just
21 repeats over and over again.

22 Drilling down a little bit into sectors, so same
23 scenario, same days, summing across those five utilities
24 to give the residential total and the commercial building
25 total. You can see here that the residential total in

1 orange is far larger than the commercial building total
2 in blue. And so the residential pattern is driving the
3 gray that is the composite of the two.

4 And, again, we have these primary and secondary
5 peaks each day that I showed before. They have to be the
6 same. But the sectors differ quite a bit. The
7 commercial building peak is in the morning and there
8 really isn't a secondary peak. There's a big plateau in
9 the afternoon. And so the secondary peak of the
10 residential sector, when added with this commercial
11 building load, drives that secondary peak up so that the
12 gap between secondary and primary on each day across all
13 the sectors is narrower than it is just for the
14 residential load. So there's a synergy between the
15 residential and commercial building sector that, in some
16 respects, makes this issue even more difficult because
17 you have two relatively similar peaks to this incremental
18 load.

19 So going even further down into how it is that
20 result was developed, this is just looking at the
21 residential sector of that same previous slide but
22 decomposing it down to individual end uses. Here, it's
23 slightly different days. It's the day before the peak
24 day and the day after, just so you can see what's
25 happening from that progression across time. Clearly,

1 what is being shown here is that space heating, in blue,
2 is the largest single component. Water heating, in
3 orange, is the second. And the other three really hardly
4 matter.

5 Again, we have this bimodal pattern which, of
6 course, has to be caused by these underlying end-use
7 shapes themselves. And again, the same kind of idea that
8 showed between residential and commercial building is
9 showing up within the residential sector itself. The
10 bimodal shape of a secondary peak in the morning and a
11 primary peak in the evening is being somewhat mitigated
12 by having the primary peak of water heating in the
13 morning and its secondary peak in the evening. And so in
14 the green line, that's the composite across the
15 residential sector, that differential is muted somewhat.

16 MR. RIDER: Mike, may I ask a question here?

17 MR. JASKE: You may.

18 MR. RIDER: These shapes are translations of
19 natural gas heater shapes; correct? Like you said you
20 were keeping things -- you said you were using a
21 multiplier to move it into energy and you're trying to
22 keep the delivery of the outcome the same.

23 MR. JASKE: But --

24 MR. RIDER: I guess what I'm asking, is this just
25 a translation of the natural gas profile into electricity

1 profiles as if they were able to deliver energy at the
2 same time and rate?

3 MR. JASKE: No. I think you're
4 misinterpreting --

5 MR. RIDER: Okay.

6 MR. JASKE: -- what I said, so let me clarify.

7 MR. RIDER: Okay. Thank you.

8 MR. JASKE: That equal amount of energy service,
9 that equivalence, is only on an annual basis. So we have
10 natural gas consumption on an annual basis translated to
11 electricity consumption on an annual basis. And then
12 that electricity is spread across all the hours of the
13 year with electricity load profiles. We did not make use
14 of natural gas load profiles at all. And for some
15 electric applications, it's probably very clear that the
16 load profile of gas and electric are going to be
17 different, if not across the seasons, at least within a
18 day. And I'll get -- I'll elaborate on that point a
19 little bit later. But, basically, you don't run a space
20 heating heat pump the same way you run a natural gas
21 furnace in your house.

22 MR. RIDER: Great. So that data that you're
23 accessing from the HELMs and other previous sources are
24 heat pump-specific load profiles?

25 MR. JASKE: These are generally not heat pump

1 profiles. And that is one of the areas of further
2 work --

3 MR. RIDER: Oh.

4 MR. JASKE: -- that I'll get to later.

5 MR. RIDER: Thank you.

6 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah, Mike, I was just
7 going to chime in here. So, I mean, it looks like -- so
8 just on these substituted loads, we're adding, just
9 gauging from the graphs here, you know, 8,000 megawatts
10 of ramp a couple times a day, somewhere between 5,000,
11 6,000 to 8,000 megawatts of ramp over and above. I guess
12 it would be nice to map onto, maybe you're doing this
13 with the ISO, but map the specific load substitution, you
14 know, substituted loads onto the overall load shape to
15 see where they stack.

16 MR. JASKE: Voila.

17 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: But that's a lot of --
18 yeah.

19 MR. JASKE: Here's --

20 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: So I was jumping ahead
21 to the next slide.

22 MR. JASKE: -- it's doing exactly that.

23 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: But that's -- I mean, I
24 saw Delphine here earlier, there she is, but -- so I
25 guess that leads to -- and maybe there's a punchline here

1 that I haven't scrolled down to yet, but --

2 MR. JASKE: Well --

3 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- how we can manage
4 these loads so that we don't get these ramps? You know,
5 to kind of Ken's point about the load shapes, in part at
6 least, we could drive by policy. And maybe, you know,
7 one goal that we should have here is to figure what
8 policy would help smooth out these impacts.

9 MR. JASKE: Let me explain this slide and then
10 I'll directly address your point.

11 So let me start with the orange line. The orange
12 line is the hourly adopted forecast from the 2018 IEPR
13 update mid-mid case for the ISO. So unlike the previous
14 slides that were -- included SMUD and LADWP, this is just
15 the three IOUs that contribute to ISO loads.

16 The blue at the bottom are the hourly incremental
17 electric loads for just those three utilities. The gray
18 at the top is the summation. So you can see that we
19 already had kind of a bimodal pattern but it's not quite
20 as crystal clear as it is in the incremental load. And what
21 the incremental fuel substitution does is make that
22 underlying base forecast more bimodal and sharper peaks
23 at those morning and evening maximums than was the
24 baseline forecast.

25 So here on the peak day or peak of the electric

1 load impacts, in January that 12,500 or so megawatts just
2 within the ISO service area, added to about 31,000,
3 32,000, something like that, results in about 44,000
4 megawatts of that hypothetical future day with a lot of
5 fuel substitution. That compares to the summer peak of
6 about 45,000 in 2030 in that case. And so we're very,
7 very close to becoming a winter-peaking utility if
8 nothing is done.

9 And so to your question, what could be done?
10 Well, the supply side of the system is going to have a
11 really hard time satisfying that gray line. And so one
12 idea -- well, and so is that truly the right shape?
13 We're not confident that's the right shape yet.

14 And so the staff is embarking on a whole
15 parametric study of heat pump performance in different
16 climate zones with different vintages of buildings, with
17 different thermal integrities and different consumer
18 behaviors, set points and so forth, and try to better
19 understand how a heat pump space heating future may or
20 may not be the same as what we're estimating here in blue
21 right now, but it's something like that.

22 And if -- and it may well be the case that it
23 continues to line up with these other points at which the
24 base forecast is peaking, so there may be a shape
25 something like that gray one. And if that's the case,

1 perhaps there's a role for demand response, either
2 programmatic or automatic, rate induced, you know, some
3 combination of those that will help make this a shape
4 that's easier for the grid to supply because solar is
5 not -- at the end use, behind-the-meter level, is not
6 going to do anything to these particular morning and
7 evening times in the winter. There's just --

8 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. I mean, that
9 morning peak is extra, you know, x-thousand megawatts at,
10 you know, 5:00 a.m., 5:00, 6:00, 7:00 a.m.

11 MR. JASKE: Correct.

12 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah.

13 MR. RIDER: I think that would be a valuable
14 update --

15 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah.

16 MR. RIDER: -- with the profiles because the BTU
17 inputs on heat pumps is so much lower than natural gas,
18 it takes a lot longer to heat up.

19 MR. JASKE: Yeah.

20 MR. RIDER: So, you know, that's the mismatch
21 that I was a little -- I mean, you're working on it. It
22 sounds like you're doing a good job and heading the right
23 way with the profiles but --

24 MR. JASKE: Well, and we've actually looked at
25 some residential building simulation model results and

1 they are more bimodal and less uniform than common
2 thought heat pump performance is going to be. And we're
3 not quite sure why we're getting that result but it's
4 going to be an interesting challenge to try to really
5 understand how heat pumps work in a multiplicity of
6 thermal integrity building.

7 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. I mean, you
8 might want to -- I mean, that's -- again, you know, I'll
9 often say this, but it goes back to the building shell in
10 a lot of ways because that gives you more flexibility, is
11 when you run the darn thing; right? Whereas, if you
12 don't --

13 MR. JASKE: Right.

14 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: -- at least on the
15 heating side, on the space heating side and, you know,
16 the space cooling side.

17 So, also, I guess I would encourage, you know, a
18 diverse, I'm sure you're having this, but a relatively
19 in-depth discussion about what the different parameters
20 for that might be? Like, you know, we might want to
21 consider, you know, what does oversizing a heat pump look
22 like? Does that give us more flexibility in recharging
23 quickly when we have the energy available, instead of
24 running, you know, the heat pump, a smallish heat pump
25 for longer, that kind of thing?

1 MR. JASKE: Um-hmm.

2 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: But we need that
3 flexibility, so how can we build that in?

4 MR. JASKE: Yes. That's --

5 MR. RIDER: And one last thing is the northwest,
6 the folks in the northwest, they talk about this, where
7 we'd clearly already be, I mean, probably at 40 percent
8 of peak winter load is the concern of performance
9 deterioration in cold weather. And then your peak gets
10 really peaky because the efficiency of the heat pump
11 falls off.

12 So, I mean, it's going to be tricky, especially
13 given we just looked at the overall forecast, and trying
14 to get to the peaks correctly, the winter peaks are going
15 to be extra tricky in, what was it, a quasi AB 3232 --
16 it's not quasi -- pseudo --

17 MR. JASKE: Yeah. And the --

18 MR. RIDER: -- AB 3232 world.

19 MR. JASKE: -- and the points that Nick was
20 making that you were questioning him about concerning
21 weather-normalization of summer peaks, I mean, we don't
22 have any experience in understanding this kind of winter
23 peaking and what kind of weather, you know, is driving
24 the outcomes that are more severe. It may even be the
25 case that the cold temperature itself is not the most

1 severe predictor of bad -- of maximum loads. It could be
2 that something that's not quite as severe but has a lot
3 of cloud cover that kills, you know, solar, you know, and
4 ramps up the commercial building side of things, you
5 know, is the worst, or prevents batteries from recharging
6 to mitigate some of this by load clipping.

7 So there's a long way to go to really bring
8 ourselves to the point where we have confidence in the
9 shapes and how to deal with moving them around as a
10 result of programs.

11 All of what I've said so far has been focusing on
12 wintertime. I just wanted to draw your attention to the
13 fact that there are summer and, of course, non-summer
14 impacts as well. This is showing the maximum summer load
15 defined to be from June 1st to the end of September. And
16 you can see here that we are very close to the end of
17 September. These three days that are being shown, this
18 is a little over 4,000 megawatts in the middle day.
19 There are peaks in the morning, not in the evening and,
20 again, has that very bimodal shape. So that's about a
21 ten percent increment relative to the kind of peaks we
22 were just talking about in Nick's presentation.

23 So what did we learn from all this?

24 We certainly got a relative sense of the
25 importance of the different sectors and end uses from an

1 annual energy and hourly load perspective. We certainly
2 learned that these winter results are highly sensitive to
3 the space heat profile but we're not so confident that we
4 really understand that we have a good space heat profile
5 yet.

6 We've learned that summer incremental load
7 increases aren't trivial in a commercial building --
8 well, I guess I didn't get into that. The commercial
9 building is really more important in the summer period.

10 But we're not fully addressing some residential
11 air conditioning load issues yet because if we're
12 replacing gas space heating with heat pumps, there's
13 probably some gas space heating dwellings that haven't
14 had air conditioning or only have room air conditioning
15 that are going to have an air conditioning capability.
16 And that exercise -- that capability is, presumably,
17 going to be exercised, at least on peak or near-peak
18 days. So there's some incremental residential air
19 conditioning load that we may yet need to track down and
20 address.

21 And, of course, as I showed in that one chart
22 about the alternative assumptions about relative
23 efficiencies between the gas side and the electric side
24 by end use, those were averages. This -- a real
25 limitation of this project was only looking at things at

1 the end-use level.

2 We really need to understand the technologies
3 within an end use and are there variations in particular
4 slices of gas consumption that are the first ones or the
5 best ones or the least -- or most cost-effective ones to
6 displace and what do we replace them with? And how to
7 match those up from a program design perspective to
8 actually accomplish, you know, these hypothetical
9 penetration levels is something that we will be exploring
10 more in the AB 3232 project because we are having
11 Navigant help develop a tool that is at the sub end-use
12 level, so we can really understand at the technology
13 level what the costs and the ramifications are.

14 I've said AB 3232 several times. This isn't an
15 AB 3232 study. It's not really addressing the primary
16 focus of a GHG emission reduction. This is just the fuel
17 substitution portion of things. But we think that's, by
18 far, the dominant component of GHG emissions, so this is
19 at least in the right ballpark.

20 There's a lot of limitations here. I won't
21 repeat them in the interest of time.

22 And we are working with Navigant Consulting to
23 develop a better impact projection capability. We are
24 hoping to bring that into the formal AB 3232 project
25 somewhere around the first of the year or a little bit

1 after that. There's some interesting analysis of
2 technology cost and performance there. A number of other
3 issues that are extra challenges to high levels of
4 displacement of natural gas. And I think I've already
5 said what needs to be said about this parametric space
6 heat load profile project.

7 In conclusion, these scenario projections are
8 interesting but they're too uncertain to include in
9 official Energy Commission managed demand forecasts, so
10 that's why this is just an exploratory study in parallel
11 to but not merged into those managed demand forecasts.

12 And with that, I am finished. And if there are
13 any questions --

14 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah.

15 MR. JASKE: -- I'm available.

16 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah, I have a
17 question.

18 So I guess just on the timeline, building on this
19 a little bit, you know, it's not an AB 3232 study, but I
20 guess how is this work -- this work seems critical for AB
21 3232. And so how are you going down these parallel
22 tracks and crosspollinating with that team that is doing
23 the AB 3232?

24 MR. JASKE: We're talking with them every week as
25 they're working on developing the project. So this was -

1 - their project scope was sort of designed after most of
2 this had already been done. And so this technology-
3 specific point I've made a couple times about
4 understanding, you know, the individual gas technologies
5 and how they might be appropriately displaced with
6 electric ones is something that they've already largely
7 completed. And they're building a tool now that will --
8 at that sub end-use level, you know, respond to sort of
9 what-if scenarios. And that will, in turn, reveal by
10 adding in the GHG emission consequences, sort of this
11 whole idea of a GHG-per-dollar --

12 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah.

13 MR. JASKE: -- curve that could be constructed by
14 looking at all of that sub end use diversity. And from
15 that, we'll have a bunch of questions for policymakers
16 about how it is we actually can choose to pursue
17 particular things that are the most cost effective to
18 pursue and design programs to go out and cause that to
19 start happening?

20 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. That's great. I
21 guess -- and then I would -- specifically, right, we have
22 SB 49 which allows us some inroad to looking at appliance
23 flexibility in greenhouse gas emissions. And, you know,
24 I think if some recommendations could come out of this
25 work, sort of cycling, you know, the virtuous cycling

1 between -- or virtually cycling between this work and the
2 3232 work, you know, maybe we can figure out a way to --
3 maybe we can distill some recommendations for SB 49
4 implementation that can help us get a handle on
5 communicating with controlling these electric heating
6 loads in a way that makes sense and is cost effective for
7 customers, et cetera, et cetera. I think that's going to
8 be really critical.

9 So thanks. Thank you. I really appreciate all
10 this work. This is a really good start.

11 MR. JASKE: Thank you.

12 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: It's very good stuff.

13 I would also add, I was kind of, Mike, as you
14 were speaking, hearing some possible EPIC projects --

15 COMMISSIONER MCALLISTER: Yeah. Exactly.

16 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: -- if we don't have any
17 already, especially with the double peaks and the
18 potential impacts that those might have on the grid, and
19 even looking into what the space heat load profile looks
20 like are things, maybe, that the EPIC team can help with,
21 as well, so it's more of a comment than a question.

22 Any other questions from the dais? All right.
23 Great.

24 Thank you for you thorough and interesting
25 presentation.

1 So we are now going to turn to the public comment
2 portion. I will give the team just a second to get our
3 timer up. And I will get my blue cards here.

4 And let's see, maybe while I'm waiting for them
5 put up the timer, I'll just make a couple of observations
6 from today's workshop.

7 I mean, I think that this was, as usual, sort of
8 chalk full of useful data that it takes some time to
9 really wrap your brain around and dig into. I think the
10 level of sophistication and the robustness of the
11 analysis that our team is doing is, really, is pretty
12 incredible. And it's also just really important, you
13 know, on the transportation side, the natural gas side,
14 the electricity side, in a time when so many of our
15 variables are changing; right? So we've got that behind-
16 the-meter PV, we're looking at electric cars, we're
17 talking about peak shifts, we're talking about fuel
18 switching, I mean, all of these things. And then we're
19 looking at them in a very granular way where we're
20 moving, you know, from annual to monthly to weekly to
21 hourly, and then across the state and trying to get more
22 specific regionwide. And then on top of all of that,
23 climate is changing, so it's, you know, it's a lot going
24 on.

25 But I feel like the team has done a very nice job

1 taking a lot of complex data and assembling it in a
2 robust way that the state can then take action on.

3 So, okay, I see that we're ready.

4 Did anybody else want to make comments before we
5 jumped in? Okay.

6 So public comments. I just have a few. The
7 first one is V. John White, followed by Ken Schiermeyer.
8 I might have butchered Ken's name. Sorry about that.

9 Oh, you have to push your button there.

10 MR. WHITE: Very interesting day today to cover a
11 lot of ground. As you said, a couple of points.

12 I wanted to go back to this morning to the energy
13 efficiency cost effectiveness conundrum. This is a
14 problem that's not getting solved at the PUC, okay?
15 We're missing energy efficiency investments that, in
16 light of Dr. Jaske's -- Mr. Jaske's analysis, would be
17 very, very valuable, okay?

18 One thing I was going to suggest is to have the
19 PUC have Mr. Jaske's presentation in their Aliso Canyon
20 phaseout strategy and maybe have a scenario of what would
21 it take to get rid of Aliso Canyon by the time the
22 Governor had asked it to be shut down? But the cost
23 effectiveness of energy efficiency needs to be overhauled
24 and it needs to be done this next year.

25 Secondly, I think the question of load growth

1 needs to be forefront in our thinking. We have lived in
2 an era for the last 50 years of flat load growth and
3 that's starting to change. And as a consequence, we're
4 starting to get off in our projections. The PUC is
5 having us revisit the once-through cooling deadlines
6 because we misjudged the capacity needs, okay? And so
7 that's a telling example.

8 In Oakland, to give an example, they did a very
9 fine analysis to get rid of their peaker and add some
10 transmission and some storage. It turns out there's 100
11 megawatts of load growth in the Port of Oakland between
12 the baseball stadium, between electrification.

13 And so we've got to be conscious of these
14 interactions. And this agency does a better job of
15 breaking through the silos but those silos still remain.

16 Briefly on hydrogen, I think you need to rethink
17 the business model that we have with regard to stream
18 reformation of natural gas and really push us ahead to
19 renewable hydrogen on a more distributed basis.

20 In case you didn't know, this summer, we had
21 almost a total blackout of hydrogen fuel supply in
22 Northern California and it's not helped the market for
23 the light-duty vehicles. Heavy-duty vehicles, I think,
24 are very important for hydrogen, so it's important to get
25 that right.

1 Lots of things to talk about today that I could
2 go on with but I'll leave it at that. And thank you for
3 a very good presentation and we'll hope to have some
4 opportunity to comment in the future.

5 Thank you.

6 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Great. Thank you.

7 Next we have Ken S. I will let you get your name
8 right when you come up. And you're followed by Delphine.

9 MR. SCHIERMEYER: Thank you. It's Ken
10 Schiermeyer. And I'd like to, first of all, thank the
11 CEC staff for working hard on this forecast. And we
12 appreciate the collaborative effort that they took to go
13 over all the components of the forecast throughout this
14 process. And we look forward to working with them over
15 the next couple weeks to continue that.

16 My comment is about we didn't talk about
17 community choice aggregation in the forecast but that's
18 what my comment is about, of including new CCAs in the
19 forecast, particularly the load-serving entity forms.

20 For SDG&E, we're expecting two new CCAs
21 representing eight cities to start service in 2021, and
22 so this will be a big change for us, where we have one
23 city currently that is less than one percent of our load,
24 and these eight cities will combine to be over 50 percent
25 of our load, and so it's a big change for us.

1 The deadline to file the Implementation Plan with
2 the PUC is December 31st of this year. And this may not
3 give the CEC much time to, you know, do something about
4 that, to include it in the forecast, but I'd like to make
5 the CEC aware of this potential. And we'd also like, if
6 possible, to include them, you know, if they do file.

7 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Thank you.

8 Delphine is next. And that's the last blue card
9 that I have.

10 MS. HOU: All right. Thank you. This is
11 Delphine Hou from the California Independent System
12 Operator. Thank you, Commissioners, and for your time.

13 I also want to thank and congratulate the whole
14 CEC team. Nick, Cary, Siva (phonetic), Matt, you guys
15 have been incredible, very responsive. We're thankful
16 for the incredible job they've done and responsiveness to
17 feedback.

18 So I'll make a couple of points in reaction to
19 what we heard today.

20 First of all, we definitely agree with Staff's
21 assessment that it seems like SCE and SDG&E peaks seem a
22 bit on the low side. So we do encourage the IOUs, and
23 then to Ken's point, maybe the CCAs to step forward to
24 kind of verify that and kind of comment on what they're
25 seeing in their own territory.

1 I also want to commend Sudhakar for his excellent
2 work on behind-the-meter storage, very difficult, very
3 groundbreaking. We do know that, anecdotally, we've
4 heard very similar things to what he has mentioned.

5 And on the transmission side, we're struggling
6 with it as well. Battery is very new. We have very
7 limited amounts operating at the moment. And we're also
8 seeing a big disconnect between what we've optimized the
9 batteries to do in the modeling framework and what
10 they're actually doing. So even for us, we are learning
11 as we're going. And what we're, in fact, doing is trying
12 to add in an additional cycling cost because we think
13 that's probably what's missing.

14 And I think Sudhakar is definitely on the right
15 path in trying to figure out what is motivating the usage
16 of behind-the-meter storage which I think will be very
17 different than the transmission side? So we commend him
18 for that great work.

19 Also, we commend and are very grateful to Mike
20 Jaske for, once again, being a thought leader here and
21 otherwise, for taking the lead on fuel substitution.
22 We're very grateful that he's thinking forward ahead of
23 the curve to, at minimum, get us to a good methodology so
24 that when it really comes, we hit the ground running.
25 We're seeing it as well. But again, you know, CAISO

1 takes the forecast from the CEC and so we're sort of on
2 the end of the process. So we're glad to be working with
3 Mike and the CEC at the beginning of it.

4 I will also note, at the end of the conversation
5 and back and forth you had with him is not only would you
6 see less solar in the winter period, but you would have
7 less capability to charge storage, and that's what
8 concerns us as well. As we become a more storage-heavy
9 system, we already have instances where we have, you
10 know, four to five days of cloud coverage, so the
11 question is how do you charge those batteries, either
12 existing ones that are coming on, or even the autonomous
13 option that we're also expecting?

14 So those are things we're all thinking about.
15 And we're very thankful that the CEC is ahead of the
16 curve and thinking about it as well.

17 So thank you very much and congratulations to the
18 team.

19 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Thank you.

20 Those are all the blue cards I have in the room.
21 Let me turn -- and if you have a business card that you
22 would please give our Court Reporter, he'll be very happy
23 to make sure he gets your name spelled correctly in the
24 transcript.

25 Let me turn to my team and see if we have any

1 comments on the WebEx?

2 MR. COLDWELL: No. We don't have any.

3 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: Okay. They're telling me, no,
4 we do not have comments on the WebEx.

5 So with that, public comment is closed, and I
6 will turn to Matt to wrap us up.

7 MR. COLDWELL: Okay. Well, thank you.

8 (Colloquy)

9 MR. COLDWELL: Just some quick next steps to
10 mention.

11 Written comments are due December 16th.
12 Information for using the e-filing system is here on this
13 slide, along with the docket number that goes along with
14 this proceeding, and then the instructions.

15 And other than that, I think we're --

16 VICE CHAIR SCOTT: That's everything. So
17 comments due December 16th. You've got your information
18 there on the slide.

19 I also want to say thank you very much to our
20 staff for excellent analysis and great presentations
21 today. And we look forward to hearing from the public.

22 And with that, we're adjourned. Thank you
23 everybody.

24 (The workshop concluded at 4:00 p.m.)


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MARTHA L. NELSON, CERT**367

January 15, 2020