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1	COMMITTEE HEARING
2	OF THE
3	CALIFORNIA ENERGY COMMISSION
4	STOCKTON PORT DISTRICT
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6	SEPTEMBER 18, 2018
7	SACRAMENTO, CALIFORNIA
8	
9	BEFORE HEARING OFFICER CARYN HOLMES
10	
11	Present:
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13	Commission
14	COMMISSIONER DAVID HOCHSCHILD, California Energy
15	Commission
16	JENNIFER NELSON, Advisor, California Energy
17	Commission
18	LE-QUYEN NGUYEN, Advisor, California Energy
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22	MONA BADIE, Office of Chief Counsel, California
23	Energy Commission
24	DREW BOHAN, Executive Director, California Energy
25	Commission

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2	STEVE ESCOBAR, Deputy Port Director, Port Stockton
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23	Transcribed by: Carlee Gaylor eScribers, LLC
24	Phoenix, Arizona
25	000

1 **HEARING OFFICER:** Good afternoon, my name is Caryn I'm the Hearing Officer for the proceeding for Holmes. the complaint against the Stockton Port District for RPS 3 noncompliance. 4 5 I'd like to welcome everybody here this afternoon. 6 We have the committee for this proceeding here. 7 Commissioner Douglas is on my right and her two advisors 8 are on her right, Jen (phonetic) Nelson and Le-Quyen 9 Nguyen. And on my left is Commissioner Hochschild who's the second member of this committee. 10 11 I'd like to have the parties introduce themselves, 12 beginning with the moving party's staff. 13 MR. HERRERA: Yeah, good afternoon. Gabriel Herrera 14 with the Energy Commission's Office of Chief Counsel. 15 MS. BADIE: Mona Badie, also representing staff of 16 Chief Counsel's Office. 17 **HEARING OFFICER:** The Port? 18 Justin Wynne with Braun, Blaising, MR. WYNNE: 19 Smith, Wynne, here on behalf of the Port of Stockton. 20 MR. ESCOBAR: Steve Escobar, Deputy Port Director, 21 Port of Stockton. 22 HEARING OFFICER: Thank you. MR. BOHAN: And I would just say, Drew Bohan from 2.3 24 the Energy Commission staff.

The purpose of today's

HEARING OFFICER:

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committee conference is to receive evidence admitted by
the parties into the record and to hear oral arguments on
the legal issues in the proceeding. We'll also take
public comment and we may deliberate in closed session.
At the end of today's hearing we plan to issue a briefing
schedule.

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Before we begin, are there -- before I turn it over to the Commissioners for any opening remarks, are there comments from either of the parties about this approach?

MR. HERRERA: Just a quick question, Ms. Holmes.

Gabriel Herrera representing staff. Are we going to discuss the fact that we do not have a court reporter and whether we should move forward in the absence of the court reported based upon the WebEx recording?

HEARING OFFICER: We can talk about that right now.

We do not have a court reporter but we do have a WebEx recording. Nonetheless, given that we don't have somebody doing recording in real time right now, we have an option for the evidentiary issues. The committee memo that was issued yesterday, or the memo from me that was issued yesterday, asks staff to provide some additional foundation and additional information about some of the staff's exhibits, and I suggested that you be prepared to discuss that today. Perhaps it would be equally workable for staff to do that in writing after today's hearing

since there does not appear to be any dispute about any of the factual issues. Do the parties have a response to that proposal?

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MR. HERRERA: Commission's staff wouldn't be -would welcome that opportunity to file written comments
clarifying the questions you had.

HEARING OFFICER: Do you have a time frame by which you could complete that task?

MR. HERRERA: We think within a week, just to give ourselves a little breathing room.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay, I will hear from the Port of Stockton next.

MR. WYNNE: The Port has no objection to that.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay, I'll just let you know that specifically what I'm looking for when I am looking at these exhibits is to know exactly what a document is and when it was filed and by whom. For example, in some instances I don't know -- there'll be a document that's entitled the staff assessment, but I don't know whether it was provided to the Port, it doesn't have a date associated with it, so I'm looking for information that provides a complete foundation for all of that.

I'm also, as you know from the memo yesterday, interested in making sure that I can attribute a date and a document and an author for each page. In several

instances, multiple pages were given for a document that was identified with a single title, several dates were given. So for example, it says that -- the filing said that pages 1 through 50 were filed on March 3rd and April 10th. Well, I need to know which pages were filed on which date.

So if you can provide that kind of foundation by, you said the -- was it the end of next week, or one week from today?

MR. HERRERA: I said within a week, but by the end of next week would work well, too.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay, thank you. We sort of skipped Commissioner comments. Would either of the two Commissioners like to make any comments before we begin?

(No audible response)

## **HEARING OFFICER:** Okay.

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I'll give a very, very brief procedural history.

This complaint was filed on January 8th, 2018. It was filed with a motion to bifurcate. A number of filings were made in the ensuing months regarding the motion to bifurcate and the question of whether or not there were factual disputes. At the end of May, the committee denied the motion to bifurcate and directed the Port to provide evidence supporting some of its factual claims.

In July, the parties reached a stipulation as to all the

facts. And there was a hearing notice that was posted 10 days ago on September 7th, and today is the hearing to address the legal issues.

Since we're deferring receipt of evidence into the record, we don't have to talk about that anymore. And with that, I guess I would begin with the oral argument. We said that the parties have 45 minutes each, you don't need to feel compelled to use the entire 45 minutes. You will have a subsequent opportunity to present opening and reply briefs in writing, and you do not have to address the questions in any specific order, but the committee address and you are also, of course, you are also able to address any other issues that you think are important that you'd like the committee to hear.

And with that, I'll open with the staff as the moving party.

MR. BOHAN: Good afternoon. Again, Drew Bohan with the Energy Commission. And you will be hearing mostly from Mr. Herrera and Ms. Badie, but I wanted to just provide a quick framing before they begin.

The overall RPS legal framework is complex and not always crystal clear, but in this case it is. POUs are required to adopt an optional compliance measure rule if they wish to use it. Stockton didn't adopt a rule. Stockton didn't send it to us within 30 days of adoption,

as required. In fact, Stockton didn't even draft a rule, so there was nothing to be adopted. You'll hear Stockton's argument today that they substantially complied with the law, and we'll demonstrate that they did not.

Finally, as we've argued in our filings, we think there are compelling equitable considerations that Energy Commission staff believes the committee should consider before finally adjudicating this matter. With that, I'll turn it over to Gabe and Mona.

MR. HERRERA: Just really quick, Commissioners.

Mona and I are going to handle this in a tag team

fashion. She's going to handle the questions dealing

with substantial compliance, and then turn it over to me

and I will respond to the mitigating factor related

questions. Thanks.

MS. BADIE: Good afternoon. As you're aware,
California's RPS establishes increasingly progressive
renewable energy procurement targets for the state's load
serving entities, including POUs.

The complaint before you alleges that the Stockton

Port District failed to satisfy two separate RPS

procurement requirements for compliance period 1,

procurement target requirement, and the portfolio balance requirement. Under the RPS, if a POU does not meet the

procurement requirements for a given compliance period, the POU may apply optional compliance measures to satisfy its RPS procurement requirement, and therefore be deemed in compliance with the RPS. This is a generous, optional off-ramp available to POUs dependent on meeting certain regulatory requirement.

In the complaint before you, staff allege that the Port sought to apply both the cost limitation and delay of timely compliance optional compliance measures but did not meet the requirements to do so and therefore, the Port should be found in noncompliance with the RPS for compliance period 1 unless the Commission finds that mitigating circumstances allow for the waiver of the Port's noncompliance. Specifically, staff position is of the Port does not have any optional compliance measures to apply that satisfy RPS regulatory requirement.

CEC's regulations, enforcement procedures for the renewables portfolio standard for local publicly owned electric utilities, require that adopted optional compliance measures be in place and described in the POUs Renewable Energy Resource Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program for a given compliance period in order for the POU to rely on them to satisfy its RPS procurement requirement. The Port's RPS Procurement Plan does not have any optional compliance measure rules in it, and the

port does not have an enforcement program for compliance period 1. Therefore, a finding of substantial compliance is not warranted.

Furthermore, this is not a case about deficiency of procedural adoption requirements, although that has been alleged by staff. Consequently, the importance of the distinction between directory and mandatory for purposes of this proceeding is misplaced. Here, staff is not alleging just that the Port failed to adopt the optional compliance measures it seeks to apply, but that the Port doesn't have any optional compliance measures which meet RPS regulatory requirements to apply, adopted or not.

Now, onto the committee's questions. Questions 1 and 2 of the committee's September 7th hearing notice ask, "What are the elements of the cost limitation and delay of timely compliance options, and which of these elements did the Port satisfy fully or and which partially, and what facts support these conclusions?"

I'm going to go into brief detail but provide further details in the written briefing. The cost limitation optional compliance measure requirements are set out in CEC's enforcement regulations, specifically sections 3206 and 3207 of the California Code of Regulations Title 20 and consists of the following elements.

First, the POUs optional compliance measure rules must be adopted at a noticed public meeting and must be in place and described in its Renewable Energy Resources Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program for a given compliance period. The POUs adopted rules for cost limitations on the procurement expenditures used to comply with its RPS procurement requirements also must ensure various elements, such as preventing disproportionate rate impacts, crediting costs, and not including any indirect expenses for procurement expenditures.

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In adopting its cost limitation rules the POUs must also rely on various items, such as their most recent Procurement Plan, procurement expenditures, approximate the cost of building, owning, and operating facilities, and also the potential that some planned resources may be delayed or canceled. Additionally, the POU has to apply only those types of procurement expenditures that are permitted under its adopted cost limitation rule. The POUs adopted cost limitation rules must also include planned actions to be taken in the event the projected cost of meeting it's RPS requirements exceed its cost limitation, and the POU must report to the Energy Commission the cost limitation in dollars spent, an estimate of what the total cost for compliance would have

been, and actions it took in response to RPS procurement expenditures meeting or exceeding the cost limitation.

Since the first requirement applies to both the cost limitation, delay of timely compliance optional compliance measure, I'm going to cover both at the same time. This requirement was not satisfied the Port (sic) fully or partially.

First, the Port's RPS Procurement Plan in place during compliance period 1, which is Exhibit 2005, pages 145 through 152, does not include any mention of optional compliance measures in it, and the Port did not have an RPS Enforcement Program in place during compliance period 1.

Second, there is no evidence showing that the Port
Board of Commissioners adopted the RPS Procurement Plan.

In paragraph 5 of the joint statement of stipulated facts
and remaining contested factual issued filed by the
parties, the Port agreed that the Port's Renewable

Resource Procurement Plan, dated November 20, 2012, does
not describe or otherwise include RPS optional compliance
measures.

Additionally, the November 20, 2012 RPS Procurement
Plan was the only Procurement Plan approved during
compliance period 1, per the Port's response to staff's
September 5th, 27 (sic) data request, which is also part

of the record. In paragraph 6 of the joint statement, the Port also agreed that the Port did not have a Renewable Energy Resources Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program in place during compliance period 1 describing RPS optional compliance measures, such as a delay of timely compliance or a cost limitation.

Paragraph 7 and 8 of the joint statement also confirm that the Port Board of Commissioners did not take any action on or before December 31st, 2015, which is the end of compliance period 1, in the form of adopted resolution ordinance or otherwise take formal action regarding an optional compliance measure for compliance period 1.

Furthermore, the record does not contain the evidence demonstrating the Port Board of Commissioners adopted its RPS Procurement Plan dated November 20, 2012. During the staff evaluation of the Port's application of optional compliance measures, staff did ask for documentation and the Port directed staff to Resolution 7681, which is part of the record, as well as a notice to attend and -- for a public meeting to go over and receive comments to the plan. However, as stated in the joint statement, paragraph 1, the Port admits that resolution 7681 does not include any items related to the Procurement Plan or optional compliance measures. And in the joint statement, paragraph 2, the Port admitted that

the December 20, 2012 public meeting was not a meeting of the Port Board of Commissioners and they didn't take any formal action regarding the Procurement Plan or RPS optional compliance measures.

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As to requirements 2 through 6, staff found that the Port could be said to have partially satisfied these requirements in relation to its general rate cap and reserve policy. But since the Port did not have an adopted RPS optional -- sorry, cost limitation optional compliance rule, none of the elements of this requirement are fully met in relation to the RPS optional compliance measure requirements. The closest thing the Port had to an RPS cost limitation was the general rate cap and reserve policy, and that applied to their entire budget. So staff evaluated the requirements against that general rate cap and reserve policy but did not find that the regulatory requirements were met since there was no actual cost limitation rule.

For further specifics facts applied to each element and due to the limited time we have today, I'm going to provide more detail in our briefings and also in the record is the staff evaluation of the Port's optional compliance measures.

Now, onto the delay of timely compliance optional compliance measure requirements. They are also set out

in sections 3206 and 3207 of the regulation. Now, for the delay of timely compliance optional compliance measure, a POU must show that one or more of the enumerated causes, of which there are three, was the cause of this delay of timely compliance. Here, the Port presented information responding to the second cause of delay, which is that permitting interconnection or other circumstances delayed procured eligible renewable resource projects, or there was an insufficient supply of resources available to the POU. And the further requirements are that the one, again, the POUs optional compliance measure rules are adopted at a noticed public meeting, are in place and described in their Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program for the given compliance period, the rules adopted by the POU prevent the POU to make a finding that conditions exist beyond the control of the POU to delay timely compliance, and the POU demonstrates that it would have met it's procurement requirements but for the cause of delay.

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Additionally, the POU must show that a prudently managed portfolio risks. And then there's some certain actions that it's including, but not limited to, holding solicitations for resources, outreach, and other such items. Additionally, the POU was required to have sought either its own eligible resources, transmission to

interconnect eligible resources, or energy storage to resources. The POU must also have procured an appropriate minimum margin of procurement above the level necessary to comply to compensate for foreseeable delays for insufficient supply, and the POU also is required to take reasonable act measures to procure cost effective distributed generation and allowable bundled RECs.

So I already covered requirement 1 in relation to cost limitation, which is the same requirement. As to requirements 2 through 7, I'm again going to be providing, in brief, that explains the facts supplied those elements, and also you have the staff evaluation in the record.

Questions 3 and 4 from the committee hearing notice ask what the legal standard should be used for determining whether the Port's actions constitute with substantial compliance, and then also if their -- the procedural requirements for the adoption are directory rather than mandatory, rendering substantial compliance available as a defense, and then also asking that staff -- the parties apply the facts in the record to the standard, and explain why or why not the Port's action meet applicable legal standards (indiscernible) substantial compliance.

As to substantial compliance, the doctrine of

substantial compliance has been defined and applied by the courts in Hall v. City of Los Angeles, California Supreme Court, stated that courts have held that a defect in the form of compliance is not fatal, so long as there is substantial compliance with the essentials of the requirement, but went on to find that if there is an entire failure to comply with one of the mandates of the statute, substantial compliance cannot be predicated on no compliance and they will not apply the doctrine of substantial compliance. Similarly, in the City of San Jose v. Superior Court of Santa Clara County, the California Supreme Court that held that only where there had been some compliance with all the required elements, the compliance has been defective, will the test of substantial compliance control. However, the court noted, again, that when there has been a failure to comply entirely with a particular statutory requirement, the more liberal test of substantial compliance has not been applied. The court's recognizing quote, "Substantial compliance cannot be predicated on no compliance." Case law on this area, including the case previously cited by the Port, Downtown Palo Alto Committee for Fair Assessment v. City Council Palo Alto, also hold that for substantial compliance, one of the primary considerations is the objective of the statute.

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What the Committee had before is deficiency in an essential element of the regulations and the statutory and regulatory objectives, and under the case law, substantial compliance cannot be found under such circumstances. 3206 B of the regs, which applies to all optional compliance measures, requires that optional compliance measures be adopted and in place and described in the POUs Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program for a given compliance period if the POU intends to rely on these rules to satisfy or delay it's RPS procurement requirements.

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Looking to the statutory and regulatory provisions concerning optional compliance measures, we clearly have a theme in the language of requiring that optional compliance measure rules be adopted by the POU. I've got references to section -- regulatory section 3206 A, 3206 A2A, A3A, A3C, A3D, A3E, 3206 B, 3206G, these all use the words adopt, adoption, adopting, adoptive, when referencing optional compliance measures. Additionally, the applicable statutory provision public utilities code, section 399.30, also use the word adopt when referencing optional compliance measures.

Under the case law, substantial compliance cannot be found when there is no compliance to an essential element or objective, and that is what you have here.

Now, onto the question concerning mandatory versus directory requirements. It is staff's position that this inquiry is not relevant here. Also, I would like to point out that the case law encountered allows for the application of substantial compliance to mandatory requirements. The California Supreme Court has held a distinction of whether a requirement is directory or mandatory turns on whether an entity's failure to meet the requirement has an invalidating effect on the entity's subsequent action. If the failure is driven to have an invalidating effect, the requirement is said to be mandatory. And if the failure does not invalidate the subsequent action, the requirement is directory. The distinction of whether a requirement is mandatory or directory is most commonly used in the context of procedural requirements.

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The basis of staff's allegation of the Port has not met the regulatory requirements for application of optional compliance measures does not just rely on the allegations that there was no adoption of optional compliance measure rules by the Port for compliance period 1. It also relies on the allegations the Port does not have any RPS optional compliance measure rules for compliance period 1, adopted or not. This requirement is not procedural and is not concerned with

invalidating a Port action. It is an essential requirement that goes to the purpose behind providing these off-ramps to POUs in the first place. regulations rightly require that a POUs adopted optional compliance measure rules be in place during the applicable compliance period and allows the Commission to consider the date of adoption of any optional compliance measure rules relied on by the POU. If this weren't the case, then any POU could fail to meet its RPS renewable energy procurement requirements and could claim, after the fact that it is in compliance, by alleging it can apply optional compliance measure rules created after the fact with or without evidence of its rules, such as inclusion in its RPS Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program adopted by its governing body in a public

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process.

So at this time, I'd like to turn it over to Gabe for the remaining questions.

MR. HERRERA: Commissioners, I will now turn to the mitigating factors. There were four questions, or I should say a series of four questions that the committee asked, so I'll just go through those in order.

The first question deals with the mitigating factors -- the additional mitigating factors that the Port raised in its March 30th, 2018 response. There were

three. The first one deals with staff delays in evaluating the optional compliance measures for the Port. The second factor deals with the Port's status as a notfor-profit utility and the fact that it serves as an economic driver (indiscernible) to harm to the Port -- financial harm to the Port. And then third factor they raised deals with the cost of legal proceedings and potential penalty impacts to the Port, should the Port be found in noncompliance and be exposed to penalties.

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Let me just quickly address those. First of all, staff does not agree with the Port that it's delays in evaluating the optional compliance measures is a mitigating factor. And the reason is because nothing staff did after the end of the compliance period affects what the Port did before the compliance period ended. While it's true that it took a while for staff to get going on the optional evaluation -- excuse me, the evaluation of the optional compliance measures, it really didn't impact the Port before then. Moreover, the staff -- excuse me, the Port is arguing that by staff's delay, what it did was it prevent the Port from being able to provide relevant information concerning what it did with respect to optional compliance measures or the application of optional compliance measures. And the problem there is that the Port is not asserting or

arguing that they were unable to find documents, merely that the potential existed for them not to find documents.

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Second of all, as Mona might have mentioned, there are regulatory requirements that the Commission has in place. It says once a POU has adopted optional compliance measures, it was obligated within 30 days to provide information concerning the optional compliance measures. So if the Port had adopted optional compliance measures and submitted information within 30 days, it wouldn't have been a problem in terms of being able to locate information to support the adoption of those measures. Additionally, if the Port had wanted perhaps, and earlier assessment as to whether any optional compliance measures that they did adopt, that hose satisfied the Energy Commission's requirements, they could have made a request to the Energy Commission's Executive Director and asked for a review of those option compliance measures. So the Commission's regulations actually set up whereby a POU can request for an early assessment of those optional compliance measures to see how they compare with the Energy Commission's regulations.

So the second fact that the Port identified was the fact that it's a not for profit utility and that it

serves as an economic driver, both of which gets the fact that it would suffer financial harm if the Energy

Commission found that it was not in compliance and that it could be exposed to some potential penalties. We staff think this is a valid factor to consider. In fact, when you look at the Energy Commission's regulations, section 1240 D1 lists out a number of mitigating circumstances or factors that a POU may consider in its response to a complaint. Factor 1241 D1 capital E identifies the financial burden to a POU. Clearly, what the Port has identified are things that could be classified as a financial burden, so therefore should be considered mitigating circumstance.

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The other factor that the Port identified were the costs associated with the legal proceedings, these proceedings, as well as potential penalties and the fact that these costs could impact viability of the Port and preclude it from procuring additional renewable energy in the future, thereby causing it perhaps to miss subsequent compliance period obligations for RPS procurement. Staff believes that this is also a valid factor to consider. Clearly, this is a financial harm to the District and one that's identified in Energy Commission's regulations that the Port could identify and has identified in its answer to the complaint.

So let me now turn to the second question the Port -- the committee raised, and that's dealt with the mitigating factors that are identified in the Energy Commission's regulations, section 1240 D1. Let me just list what those are, and then I'll go through each one of them. First one A, the extent to which the alleged violation has or will cause harm, the nature and expected persistence of the alleged violation, the history of past failed violations, any action taken by the POU to mitigate the alleged violation, and the last one is the financial burden to the POU.

will the violation cause harm? It's presumed that a violation of the RPS requirements by the Port will cause indirect harm to the state because it means that the Port's under procurement of renewable energy results in additional amounts of nonrenewable energy being generated and procured to satisfy the Port's retail sales needs. That thereby increases the negative impacts to the state associated with environmental and greenhouse gas emissions from the nonrenewable energy that was needed. That said however, the state would have suffered the same negative impacts from nonrenewable energy had the Port adopted an optional compliance measure for cost limitations or delay of time and compliance, so this is

kind of a net offset. No real harm, no real benefit.

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The second factor, the nature and expected persistence of the alleged violation. So we know what has happened for the first compliance period, 2011 and 2013, but staff really has no basis for assessing whether another violation is likely to occur. We have information from the Port indicating that they have procured sufficient renewable resources during the second compliance period to meet their RPS requirements. We've got information from the Port indicating that they anticipate being able to meet the procurement requirements for the third compliance period, 2017 through 2020. That compliance period is still ongoing. Certainly, if the Port was exposed to penalties or additional proceeding costs as a result of litigation, then they would have to redirect resources for that purpose. Arguably, that means that they would have to take resources budgeted for other activities, including possibly the procurement of renewable energy. So there could be a nexus between penalties and additional legal proceedings that could affect the Port's ability to procure additional renewable energy going forward.

Regarding past history -- excuse me, history of past violations, since this is the first compliance period that we're dealing with here, there's really no basis for

staff to assess whether there's been a history or pattern of violations by the Port. With respect to actions taken by the Port to mitigate the alleged violation, what you see in the staff's evaluation of the optional compliance measures, which is included I believe as Exhibit F, now numbered Exhibit 205, what's included in there is a discussion of the steps the Port took to procure solar energy. They had a development contract that was in place for a 15 to 20-megawatt solar plant to be installed in one of their facilities. After much work associated with that, that project fell through. They had another project lined up, a smaller one, 1.5 megawatts to 2 megawatts in size that they also did work on, but that also fell through and ultimately the Port decided it made more economic sense for them to procure renewable energy from the market. So these are measures the staff believes the Port reasonably undertook to satisfy the requirements that never panned out.

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Let me turn to question number two. So the applicability of the mitigating factors in section 1240. Excuse me, question number three. So this question is the committee pointed out the fact that staff applied a rule of reason with respect to the reporting deadline and other similar procedural deadlines for the Energy Commissions regulations in finding that the Port and

other POUs had satisfied these requirements. However, we did not apply a rule of reason with respect to the procurement target requirements of the portfolio balance requirement, in part because those are statutory requirements. Unlike the reporting requirements that are in the Energy Commission's regulations, an additional thing to note is that, with respect to the reporting requirements and some of the other procedural requirements, because the Energy Commission had only adopted its regulations in 2013 and required POUs to file reports starting in 2014, that we provided some degree of latitude to POUs in providing those reports. reports were submitted late or they weren't complete when initially submitted, POUs were given an opportunity to resubmit information, make sure it was complete. Again, this was just in an effort to implement the regulations in a reasonable manner. I initially indicated the staff does not think it's appropriate to apply a rule of reason with respect to the portfolio or other procurement requirements.

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The last question the Port asked -- excuse me, the committee asked deals with the authority the Commission has to consider the mitigating factors raised by the Port and by staff on the Port's behalf to excuse the Port's noncompliance. So I think this authority is implied when

you read the statute. The Commission is set up as the trier of facts when it comes to violations. We're charged with determining whether the POUs have satisfied the RPS requirements. Our regulations set the Commission up to prepare a decision and if we find noncompliance, we have to put notice of violation and forward it to the ARB for their assessment penalties. Within the context of that, ARB has indicated that they do not want to reajudicate the Energy Commission's findings. We think that's appropriate; they should not serve as a appellate jurisdiction second-quessing our factual findings, and Commission, therefore, should submit to the ARB if necessary, their decisions, findings of fact that address everything, including mitigating circumstances. And if those mitigating circumstances show that there are good reasons for excusing the POU, then staff thinks that there's nothing more for the Commission to do in terms of forwarding a notice of violation or issuing a notice of violation for the Port.

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In terms of next steps at the conclusion of this proceeding and the Commission's decision, if the Commission decides one, that the Port, their optional compliance measures or their alleged optional compliance measures don't excuse them, and if mitigating circumstances don't excuse the Port's actions, then what

staff would recommend is that a notice of violation be prepared and along with the record for this docket be handed over to the ARB so that the Air Resources Board can then asses penalties.

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If the committee here and the Commission decide that either there are optional compliance measures that the Port adopted and applied and that excuses the Port, or that there are mitigating circumstances that excuse the Port's procurement deficits, then in that case we recommend that the Commission find that the Port is not out of compliance and not issue a notice of violation and not forward the matter to ARB, but rather forward a copy of its decision to ARB for ARB's decision -- or excuse me, for its information. And that concludes my remarks.

MR. WYNNE: Thank you, good afternoon. So in this proceeding, the Port is asking the Commission to dismiss this complaint on the merits — on the grounds the Port has substantially complied with both the cost limitation provision and the delay of timely compliance provision. Alternatively, the Port ask the that the Commission dismiss the complaint on the grounds of mitigating circumstances as has been outlined by staff, including the additional provisions that the Port has filed in its response.

My plan is to walk through each of the eight

questions, but if there's questions throughout I'm happy to respond to those. And before I go into the questions, I think it's worthwhile pointing out that with the governor signing SB-100, the RPS target is now 60 percent by 2030. What that means is in a very short amount of time, over half of all the megawatt hours that's for retail sales in the state are going to be subject to this RPS program, and it has to be from RPS eligible resources. And so if there are issues with the program, if it's inflexible, if it's unfair, it could have a significant impact on the state's economy. particularly, given the complexity of the regulation, complexity of the statute, the difficulty in developing renewable resources and all the challenges that can come up with that, the Energy Commission needs to ensure that its regulation is fair to the POUs and the communities that they serve, it's transparent in how it's applied, and that it's applied consistently.

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So for the first questions, I'll take question one and two together. And the first question is, what are the elements of the cost limitation and delay of timely compliance revision, and then what are the facts that support those conclusions? And I think staff has done a good job of walking through the elements. I think we generally agree with that. I will note there is one

initial legislative issue is that the cost limitation statute has changed significantly from the -- what was in place during the first compliance period to what is in place now. I think the appropriate standard is to look at the statute as it existed during the first compliance period, but for practical purposes I don't think that there is an actual impact to the compliance determination between the original and current statute on that. As staff has discussed, the POUs are authorized to adopt a cost limitation and delay of timely compliance revision, pursuant to Public Utilities Code section 39930 D, subparagraphs 1 and 2 -- or 2 and 3, and those cross reference a need to be consistent with the relevant provisions under the CPUC section, Public Utilities Code section 39915, subdivision B, C, and that's what's applicable to IOU's, CCA's, and ESG's. Those provisions were the implemented by staff and the regulations, and then in the staff evaluation, which is Exhibit 2005, staff identifies each of the elements and then walks through their assessment of where it's performance was at.

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Generally, we agree with the way that the elements are characterized in the evaluation, and so I'm just going to walk through each of those elements and discuss them. And the first one under cost limitation is that

the cost limitations were adopted in a Procurement Plan or Enforcement Program. And this is one where I think there's a slight disagreement. That is the way that it was implemented in regulations, but if you look at the actual statutory language there is the -- only the obligation that it be adopted. And there's actually a lot of confusion around this concept of a Procurement Plan and Enforcement Program and it's probably just due to the drafting of the statute, and I think we needed to, and staff needed to come up with some reasonable implementation of that to make the regulations make sense, but I do not believe there is an actual requirement that a cost limitation be adopted in a Procurement Plan and that any adoption would satisfy that element.

As far as the facts that support that, the Port has acknowledged that there was no express adoption of an Enforcement -- of a cost limitation or delay of timely compliance provision by the Port Commission. However, throughout this period from 2010 through 2013, the Port was regularly updated on the RPS activities of staff so that the development of the solar project, the initial solar project, subsequent development of the solar project, there was a publicly noticed meeting where there was extensive discussions on the RPS procurement

activities of the Port. And that included discussions of economic conditions, the need for competitive rates, the clarification that they needed to maintain rates below PG&E's, comparison to PG&E's rates, analysis of cost impacts of future procurement decisions looking forward to 2013 and 2014. There were also regular meetings with individual customers, and the Port is fairly unique in this regard because they have a small number of customers that are tenants of the Port, and so they have a very close relationship with them. And around this time in 2012, there were regular meetings with customers because there were issues related to rate changes that were being discussed at the time and as part of those individual meetings with customers, the RPS procurement strategies were discussed.

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For the second element of the cost limitation is that the cost limitation needs to be set at a level that prevents disproportionate rates. This is really the key most important element of the cost limitation. As far as the Port's demonstration on this, they showed that there was clear direction from the Commission that in order for the Port to continue to function as an electric utilities -- moving forward as an electric utility, it needs to beat PG&E's rates and they needed to be in a healthy financial condition. I think it's a real risk

that if those things were not true for any extended period of time, the Port would seriously consider not operating an electric utility anymore, and that has been made clear throughout the entire operation of the Port as an electric utility.

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As staff has mentioned, the Port does serve an economically disadvantaged area. It's a key driver for bringing jobs to the community. There's high unemployment, high poverty, it's within a disadvantaged community as acknowledged in the CalEnviroScreen 3.0, and then the Port's customers are unique in that they are able to relocate to other Ports. There's other Ports that the Port of Stockton competes with, and because of the nature of the customers, they are more able than typical industrial and commercial customers to relocate on short notice.

For the third element of the cost limitation, that's that certain information was considered, including the plan, cost and building of resources, potential for delay.

The fourth element must be that -- the cost limitation must be reported in a dollar amount and also the reporting of what would have been required to be in full compliance.

The fifth element being that the POU must apply all

of it's expenses towards the cost limitation.

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And then the sixth element being that they can't count indirect cost towards the cost limitation.

In the staff's evaluation, they determined that the Port met those requirements. I think maybe there's -- I didn't understand when staff was describing that the Port only partially met those. I believe the actual language in the evaluation throughout is that, but for the fact that the Port did not formally adopt, and then it says the Port addresses these requirements. So I took that to mean that the staff's assessment was that, other than the requirement for full adoption, that staff's assessment was that the Port had fully met each of those elements.

The final element for cost limitation is that the Port would specify the actions to take if they met or exceeded their cost limitation. In the implication of exceeding the cost limitation is that there's no longer an obligation to procure additional resources for that compliance period, the Port, after the failure of the first and then the delay and expenses for the second solar project, the Port turned its focus towards the second compliance period and as was described by staff, the Port is in full compliance with the second compliance period requirements and is also on track to meet the third compliance period requirements.

And as I mentioned earlier, so SB 350 substantially changed the cost limitation statutory requirement. I do think there is some value in the legislative history of that in the implication being that, I think its elements three through six of what I described, were eliminated. And so it substantially streamlines the cost limitation and clarifies that the real focus is on the disproportionate rate impact.

2.3

For the elements of delay of timely compliance, again, the first element identified by Staff is that it described an enforcement program or procurement plan. We agree that it must be adopted, but again, I don't think that there's clarity in the statute that it must be described and in place in an enforcement program.

The second element being that the POU demonstrated that it would have satisfied the RPS procurement requirement that it if had not encountered the delay.

The size of the facility and the portion that would have been attributable to the Port was that is has to exceed the amount that would have been required for them to meet their first compliance period requirements, and if it had been on target, it would have been online in time for those deliveries to help to meet the first compliance period requirements.

The third element being the POU prudently managed

risks, including a sufficient number of projects. And for a utility the size of the Port, I don't think it's reasonable to anticipate that they would have multiple projects in the development pipeline at the same time. That's something that makes sense for larger utilities. And if you look into the provision, you know, within the -- for the large IOUs, that makes sense, but it's simply not possible for a tiny utility to have multiple projects being developed. The cost of it would be unreasonable, and then the output that they would get from the multiple projects would far exceed what they would need.

Element 4 is that the POU sought to develop its own projects, transmission, and energy storage. Obviously, here that is what the Port attempted to do was develop its own project.

Element 5 is that they procured at a level above to compensate for foreseeable delays. Again, this is something more tailored to larger utilities that can balance out multiple projects. Here, it's a single resource that they would have been relying on. And so there wouldn't be an ability to procure above what would be needed; and also to secure contracts for energy that they might not need, would be cost prohibitive, as well.

And then the sixth element being that the POU took

reasonable measures to procure DG and unbundled RECs. They did, after the initial project failed, looked to a 1.5-megawatt facility, which would have been, I think, considered distributed generation. And then they did purchase unbundled RECs in the amount that actually exceeded what was allowable under the Energy Commission Staff interpretation.

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So question 3, is what is the legal standard that you used for determining whether the Port's actions constituted substantial compliance? As the Commission staff stated, there's a great deal of case law on this. I think, that as the Port previously cited, Downtown Palo Alto provides good guidance for this case, and the statement is that, "Unless the intent of the statute can only be served by demanding strict compliance with its terms, substantial compliance is the governing task." It goes on to state that, "In the absence of express language, the intent must be gathered from the terms of the statute construed as a whole, from the nature and character of the act to be done and from the consequences which follow from the doing or failure to do the particular act at the required time."

So as we go through and evaluate this, I think what we need to look at is, what is the intent of the RPS program as a whole? What is the intent behind the cost

limitations, specifically, and delay of timely compliance, specifically. And then look at the nature of the requirement for there to be adoption for those elements. And then finally, what are the consequences that flow from the failure for there to be this formal and express adoption.

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As far as the RPS as a whole, Public Utilities Code Section 399.11, provides for findings and declarations and identifies a number of goals for the RPS program. Subdivision b identifies procurement goals, to include increasing the diversity of resources, reducing air pollution, meeting GHG reduction targets, providing stable electric rates, meeting resource adequacy requirements. And then there's a key provision in Subdivision e, paragraph 1, which provides that, "Supplying electricity to California end-use customers that is generated by eligible renewable energy resources, is necessary to improve California's air quality and public health, particularly in disadvantaged communities identified pursuant to Section 39711 of the Health and Safety Code, and the commission" -- here they're referring to the Public Utilities Commission -- "shall ensure rates are just and reasonable and are not significantly affected by the procurement requirements of this article."

I think, restating that, the clear purpose of the RPS, overall, is to increase the amount of renewable generation that's serving Californians with a particular emphasis on generation that would be located in, or would have an impact on disadvantaged communities, it needs to be done in a way that limits rate impact.

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On to the purpose of the cost limitation. So as I mentioned earlier, there's been this streamlining, and I think that that provides evidence that the key element is disproportionate rate impacts. There's not a lot of either legislative history or guidance on what they mean by disproportionate. I think the clear meaning and the obvious use of the term is that there shouldn't be any individual community, or group of rate payers, that's bearing the disproportionate burden or is disproportionately harmed by achieving the RPS.

You can see, from the POUs that have adopted a cost limitation, that there's a pattern to the types of things that they look to. One of the key ones is economic conditions. So whether there is high unemployment or high poverty, on the theory that those customers would be more impacted by rate hikes. They also looked at financial challenges for either the utility or the governing organization that the utility is a part of; structural limitations on things like how they compete

with the local IOU; and then customers. So if they have one very large customer, or if the customers who are more mobile are able to leave, so that if there was a rate hike there would be this -- a loss of customers that could threaten the operations of the utility. That's another common factor.

As far as the delay of timely compliance, I think the purpose of that is relatively straightforward from the terms. Developing renewable resources, particularly in California, is a challenging thing to do, and there's a lot of elements as far as the inner connection process. Transmission — if transmission needs to be developed; the permitting process; local governments that may prohibit or create restrictions for that make it so that a lot of things can happen. So the project can fail due to no fault of the utility that's trying to develop it.

And it serves a very important purpose, because if a utility is fully to blame if a project fails and they face financial penalties, even if they've done nothing wrong, even if they've used their best efforts, that would send, I think, the opposite incentive to utilities in California. And they would move -- instead of trying to develop resources that are close to low, or in disadvantaged communities, or even possibly within the state, they would be more likely to favor resources that

are out of state where maybe permitting processes are simpler or they would rely more on existing resources rather than procuring new resources. So without a well-functioning delay of timely compliance rule, I think it would send the opposite incentive of the overall intent of the RPS.

So as far as the character of the act, the RPS is implemented through a comprehensive regulatory structure adopted by the Energy Commission for the POU. The RPS is not primarily implemented through adoption by public utility — a POU governing board. There's the tension that exists in a lot of statutes between the local control that's made by local governing boards and what role the Energy Commission has. And it seems IRP, there's one balance, and in energy efficiency, there's a difference balance. But I think it's clear in RPS, that's probably where the Energy Commission has far and away most complete control of the highest degree of regulatory authority over POUs.

The thing that's in contrast if you look at -- an example would be net energy metering. There is no comprehensive regulatory structure for net energy metering that is subject to the Energy Commission. And so the idea of adoption and how that is adopted is essential for the net energy metering program, because

that is the only public process where those customers would be able to participate in the development of that program.

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For the RPS, that was developed -- the absolute regulations were implemented pursuant to the Administrative Procedures Act reviewed by OAL. There is a filing of compliance reports, there's public reports issued by the Energy Commission. And so this is not something that is purely within the -- it's not something that is purely implemented through adoption at the local level.

It's also clear that the RPS itself is not primarily about public disclosure; that's not the primary intent of it. And there actually is a relevant regulation that achieve that goal, and that's the power source disclosure requirements implemented and provided to customers through their power content label. That is the primary regulation that provides customers with information about what their utility has as far as resource mix. And to some degree, it approximates RPS so it's not because of differences in how it's reported. It doesn't give you an exact understanding of it.

And I think one of the things that's useful to think of is when you're looking at the CPUC's process, they have sort of a similar structure where there's the

regulations are adopted through the decisions of the CPUC, and you have, in some degree, parallel organizations. So you have Community Choice Aggregators, which like POUs, are public entities. And all of the same concepts would apply as far as their rate payers, their governing boards. But if you look at these two elements, delay of timely compliance and cost limitations, those are implemented through the CPUC. And there's no requirement that a CCA adopt a delay of timely compliance rules or adopt a cost limitation provision in order for them to argue that they'd be able to exercise those rules.

As far as the consequences, here, I think there is a need for customers to be informed. But it's not clear to me what the harm to the Port's customers is and what the harm to customers would be without the express and formal adoption. As long as the customers understand the strategy that their utility has and that it is through a public process that this is being elected, the lack of opportunity to comment on that doesn't seem to lead to any harm.

Whereas conversely, if a large penalty was applied to those customers, essentially everything that the Port has argued as far as the delay of cost limitation, would now be -- it would be subject to those penalties; they

would have a large potentially rate spike to cover that cost. So the purpose of the -- the opposite of the purpose of the cost limitation would be (indiscernible).

The same with delayed of timely compliance; it would send a chilling effect to utilities that are trying to adopt this because of fear that there's -- any technical violation or the Energy Commission would strictly apply and not provide access to that delay of timely compliance rule.

And so one final note, Staff mentioned the requirement in the -- or the description in the complaint, that they used the rule of reason with respect to regulations. And they referenced that it was only the nonstatutory requirements. And that's helpful because it wasn't clear to me on reading that what that was limited to, what the standard they applied was.

But in that actual section, they say that, "While the Commissions' regulations include other requirements, such as deadlines for filing specific reports issuing public notices," and then they say, "and adopting plans and programs." And so it's not clear to me, because they reference the adoption of plans and programs, but they state that it's only regulatory and not statutory requirements that are in there, there are requirements in statute for a number of these elements. So a better

understanding of how they are drawing that distinction, what the standard they're applying, and why there's a difference here.

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So the fourth question is applying the facts and the record to the standard. So first, with the purpose of the RPS, the generating resource that the Port attempted to build in its service territory, I think clearly meets the goal of the RPS. It would have supported a diversified portfolio; help meet GHG targets; reduce air pollution; it was located in a disadvantaged community; it's located in a local capacity area, to my understanding, so it would actually have an increased RA value; and it's exactly the type of resource that the RPS should be encouraging utilities to develop.

As far as the purpose of the cost limitation, the Port has demonstrated that if they would have had to have come into full compliance and pay the additional cost, that would have led to a rate spike, which would -- especially at that time in the first compliance period when they were still recovering from the financial downturn -- it would really threaten the viability of the utility as an operation.

They've also demonstrated that they -- the local economic conditions and the types of customers they have justify the application of the cost limitation. And it's

really the type of utility the cost limitation, I think, was intended to protect.

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As far as the purpose of delay of timely compliance, they attempted to develop a resource; there were actions outside of their control that led to that not being developed, and so I think it's exactly what the delay in timely compliance was trying to encourage.

As far as the nature of the action that wasn't taken and then the consequences that flow from that, well there wasn't an express adoption that used the terms "cost limitation" or "delay of timely compliance". These were both publicly and privately discussed; the concepts behind them were publicly and privately discussed at length. The Commission had regularly developed — directed its Director to operate the utility in a way that maintains rate competitiveness and get the utility back into financial health. The customers were aware and likely, if given the small number of customers and the regular relationship they had with the utility, they were probably more aware than most POUs about what their utility's RPS plans are and what their strategy was for compliance with the RPS.

And so it's clear that the customers were informed about the RPS and the strategy; not clear what additional value would have been achieved by formal adoption.

And the negative consequences that would result from a financial penalty would be the opposite of what the intent of the RPS is and of these two provisions.

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Based off that, I think the Port has demonstrated that it substantially complied with the intent of the RPS.

So I'm ready to go on to the mitigating factors, unless there's any questions. All right.

Regarding question one -- and Staff has provided their response that they've -- my recollection from the opening was that as far as the economic condition and of the consequences for the Port, that they agree with those provisions. There was the objection to the delay in the actual request for information. I think, I mean, just the concept of a statute of limitations exists for the very reason that over time evidence becomes stale; well, the Port hasn't alleged that we would have been able to obtain certain evidence. It did actually hinder quite a bit our ability, because we were asking people to recount conversations they had over five years ago. Some of the staff that had worked on this had retired. And so there has been an extensive period of time since this occurred; so we're five years past the end of the compliance So that has been a real impediment to the Port period. in this proceeding, and I think that it would be

reasonable to have this implemented within a few years.

And I know that Staff mentioned the fact that there's certain requirements in the regulations. It's worth noting that the regulations were in effect October of 2013. And so that didn't leave a lot of time for there to be a rush to strictly follow, particularly where the regulations themselves deviate or get more specific and prevent more detailed requirements than what's in the statute.

As far as the factors that are addressed in question two, I think the Staff's discussion of that is correct.

I think that's something that maybe we could provide more response to in written comments.

And I think we've already discussed -- so in question three, it's referenced as rule of reason. I still think it would be helpful to understand how that standard is actually applied. I think one concern that I have is there were forty plus utilities. There's this assertion that maybe other utilities were out of compliance with certain requirements, but there was a standard that the Staff applied to that. And I'd like to know what that standard is; how it differentiates from when we've gone through the substantial compliance analysis. Is it the same? Is it different? Is it the mitigating circumstances? And so to ensure that this is

consistently applied and transparently applied, I think it would be valuable for Staff to provide more information on that.

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And then finally, for question four, I think this is a big issue, whether the Energy Commission has this authority. I think this is the first time this is being considered. There's a second part to the question about what would be provided to ARB if the Commission dismissed this due to mitigating circumstances.

I think the easy question to that is that nothing would be submitted; I think that would actually be inconsistent with the sort of what was discussed by Staff earlier about needing to limit administrative burden and follow what I think is the obvious structure of the statute. And so there would be no need to transmit anything to Staff -- to ARB, if there's a determination that the complaint should be dismissed due to mitigating circumstances.

I think it's helpful to think about the rules of statutory construction. There's a wide number of cases to provide guidance. I think one that would be useful is City of Costa Mesa, which describes the following rule that "statutes must be given a reasonable and common sense construction in accordance with the apparent purpose and intention of the lawmakers -- one that is

practical rather than technical, and that will lead to wise policy, rather than mischief or absurdity. In ensuing the statute, the courts may consider the consequences that might flow from original interpretation."

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Additionally, there's a wide range of cases that discuss the degree of deference that's given to an administrative agency in a penalty proceeding. One example would be Hanna v. Dental Board of California. It says that, "The administrative agency's exercise of discretion as to the discipline to be imposed will not be disturbed unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown. This rule is based on the rationale that the court's pay great deference to the expertise of the administrative agency in determining the appropriate penalty to be imposed."

And as we're thinking about this question, I think it's useful to consider why we have this somewhat unusual structure where the penalty in violation of the determination is bifurcated between ARB and CEC. I think it's obvious that it's not the legislature's opinion that ARB is somehow superior in its ability to consider this, or it somehow has a better ability to assess whether there has been a violation and what the penalty would be.

This goes back to 2008, I believe with SB 14, when

this language first surfaced, and the obvious consideration is that the Energy Commission did not and still does not have a comprehensive penalty structure in place that would be sufficient for the RPS program.

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Whereas, ARB does have that penalty authority over POUs under AB 32. And so instead of creating a new and complex regulatory system to give this authority to the CEC, that the legislature instead relied on this existing authority that ARB had. So the -- I think as Staff has described well, the Energy Commission is the one that has developed the regulations, they reformed the verification, they're in contact with Staff; the Energy Commission oversees this process, gathers the facts, considers the mitigating circumstances. So I think the Energy Commission is obviously in the best position to determine if a proceeding -- if a complaint should be waived due to mitigating circumstances.

I think it is only if the CEC determines that there may need to be financial penalties, then that gets referred to ARB and then ARB, as the Staff stated, ARB has indicated they don't want to read adjudicate this. They would be relying on the findings of fact and the record that had been installed by ARB.

And so I think, to interpret this correctly, it would be unreasonable if the Energy Commission were to

refer every violation, even if they determined that there was mitigating factors that excused the noncompliance, and it won, it would be the burden on the agencies. And so ARB would have to regularly receive these even if there was a determination that no penalty would be necessary.

Additionally, that would put a burden on the utility. So specifically for Port of Stockton, which is an extremely small utility, if you added financial costs, legal costs of going to yet another agency for another proceeding, it would be significant. On top of that, there's the potential penalty that's sort of hanging over the Port's head on this, and that is in inhibiting their ability to procure future resources. And we're already five years out. This is the first time we're doing this.

The ARB has not adopted regulations that would govern this penalty process. I've worked on that for quite some time. And so it's not clear when that process would actually take place. And so if there were to be potentially years more delay on when the Port would find out if it has — would have to pay a penalty, could have very significant impacts for their ability to comply with future RPS requirements and particularly given the significant changes that occur in 2020.

I think that already what the Staff has articulated

is that there's a reasonableness and a flexibility that they take in approaching compliance. And so they've, I think, indicated that for some POUs, if there's a deadline that was missed or if something was not included, that was determined reasonable. And I think the same concept flows through to the (indiscernible) Commission, that there needs to be a degree of reasonability and what is actually considered and what is relayed.

And so if you took a very narrow and strict interpretation of these requirements, you could have, you know, the Energy Commission having to refer a POU to ARB for a missed deadline on a filing. And I think that for the entire structure of the program, needs to be implemented in a reasonable way, particularly, as I mentioned from the outset that this is such a huge part of the way that POUs operate. It's essential that this function properly.

HEARING OFFICER: Thank you, both. You each have a little bit of time for reply comments if you would like to make them. I know that Commissioner Hochschild has a question that he would like to ask, and I have one or two clarifying questions, as well. So why don't we do that first and then you can decide if you want to make reply comments.

Commissioner?

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MR. HOCHSCHILD: Thank you, everyone, for your presentations and comments. And Justin, really for you, I guess my main question, given that we have 44 publicly owned utilities in the state, a number of them also serving disadvantaged communities and towns, what is it that makes this circumstance different from the other POUs that were able to be in compliance that are also serving similar communities? I mean, that's really what I'm trying to get my hands around.

MR. WYNNE: Well, I think a number of the particularly smaller POUs that serve disadvantaged communities did use a cost limitation in the first compliance period, and so I think there's consistency there.

There is also a significant element about the customer structure. And so if you have largely residential customers, there's a stability in that rate base that makes it easier for slight increases. And it's really this -- I think there's a handful of POUs that are in a similar situation. And I believe most of the them use the cost limitation where you have either a disproportionately large individual customers that really the utility is relying on and those customers having the ability to leave. That's just something that's fairly

narrowly applicable to the Port.

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Also, this is the first compliance period, and so many of the POUs were ramping from zero to 20 percent. It think you saw a pretty significant drop in the number of POUs that used compliance -- cost limitations for the second compliance period. And there's going to be an even greater drop for the third compliance period.

So partly, it was just responding to a new requirement, and something that even though the statute didn't come into place until after the first year of the compliance period. And so I don't think that purely the fact that a disadvantaged community is being served would necessarily be sufficient justification. You would have to look at what the rate impacts were and the rate impacts in comparison to the surrounding utility. A number of the POUs that serve disadvantaged communities have rates that are much lower than the surrounding IOU, and so I think that's the reason why a number of them were able to remain in compliance is because they were still labeled (indiscernible).

And then there's also just the preferences of those communities. I think there's -- across California there's widespread support for increasing renewable. And I think if customers understand what the rate increases are for, I think it supportive.

MR. HOCHSCHILD: Okay. Thank you.

**HEARING OFFICER:** Commissioner Douglas, do you have any questions?

(No audible response)

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HEARING OFFICER: I have one or two follow up.

They're mostly in the nature of clarification. Staff, I wasn't quite certain that I understood exactly what you were saying about Commission findings and ARB. If the Commission were to find, for example, that the noncompliance — that Stockton was not in compliance, but that that noncompliance was waived or excused somehow, you referenced findings. Would those findings be forwarded to ARB, or would you recommend that the proceedings stop with the Commission's decision?

MR. HERRERA: Caryn, can you repeat that again? I'm sorry, I was focusing on something you said earlier, and missed the critical point there. I apologize.

HEARING OFFICER: That's fine. If the Energy

Commission were to determine -- there were to be a full

Commission decision that said, yes, there was

noncompliance on the part of the Port of Stockton, but

that there were mitigating circumstances that either

excused or waived -- and I don't think we need to get

into the distinctions between those terms, but there was

something that resulted in the noncompliance being

waived, the Commission would issue some sort of a decision-making findings. I didn't understand what you said about whether or not that would be forwarded to ARB or not. Are you suggesting that if that happens, that the end of the proceeding is when the Commission issues its Decision?

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MR. HERRERA: That's correct. In that case, the proceeding would end when the Commission rendered its decision. I would suggest that one thing the Commission could do would be, in this situation, to forward a copy of its decision to the ARB for its information only, not for its action.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. Thank you. I have a factual question that may be better provided -- may get answered, I suppose, when the Staff provides the additional authentication of its exhibits. And that's the question of when the Port first claimed the delay of timely compliance, when I went through the information that's been provided so far, the earliest reference I could find was January of 2017. If we -- if it's possible to answer that question by the time the hearing ends today, that would be great. If not, I think that we can -- I think it will be clear in the additional information that Staff provides about the exhibits that is already submitted.

And then parties have to have time to provide reply comments. I would be happy to hear from Staff if they want to address the confusion that the Port of Stockton expressed about both the reasonableness standard and the question of whether or not all of the elements, other than formal adoption were met by the Port. But we'll begin with Staff, if you have reply comments that you'd like to make, this is the time.

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MR. HERRERA: Great. Thanks. So Staff counsel addressed your question. I just want to clarify a few points. First of all, as our papers made clear, we do not think that Stockton was a bad actor in this case. In fact, Stockton made a bona fide effort to procure renewable resources. They played by the rules, and they procured a lot more than some of the others. However, many of the POUs, as counsel indicated, also used the optional compliance measures, and many of those, the majorities -- in fact, I believe the vast majority, used the cost limitations measure. And all of them -- all of them managed them to follow the rule that requires that they be adopted.

Counsel said public disclosure is -- and correct me if I misinterpreted this -- is not the primary purpose of the RPS. That may or may not be true; I don't know.

However, public adoption by POUs affords the public and

various stakeholders the opportunity to come in and say, hey, wait a minute, we think that's a bad idea. We think you ought to meet the twenty percent, and you're saying you're coming in at one, or two, or five, or nineteen, and we think you should go the whole way. So whether it's the primary purpose of the RPS, it's for others to judge, but it's certainly an important part of it.

And finally, I would just say that one of Staff's concerns here is that logically extending this argument that well, we kind of -- we almost -- we admit -- and you heard counsel admit more than once, that they didn't adopt the rule as required. It would be like saying, well, you came in at seventeen percent and seventeen percent is close to twenty and it's almost there, and therefore, Staff would be empowered to say, we find that you're substantially in compliance, and move on. So we just -- we worry that some of these rules are very clear and we think this is one of them. I think counsel has a few comments to make, as well.

MS. BADIE: So just to add to that adoption requirement, I think it's being downplayed as a procedure requirement. Now, I don't think anyone in this room would disagree that the RPS is very important. And the regulatory framework does leave a lot of discretion and decisions to the POUs. Adoption requires consideration,

and approval, and action at the highest levels of governors of each POU. So RPS takes planning; meeting RPS takes planning. Deciding that you can't meet the RPS and you need to do other things such as the allowable off ramps takes planning. And that planning should happen at the governor's level of the POU. And so adoption does guarantee that public consideration, consideration, approval by the highest governing body of the POU, as well as transparency and public participation in those decisions.

MR. HERRERA: Chiming in on that point, as well, you know, the concept of kind of adopting some rules after the compliance period ends is really kind of an end-run around the statutory framework the legislature set forth. You give the POUs authority. Nobody else can adopt these rules for them; they need to do it. Unlike, say, retail sellers or community choice aggregators or the CPC sets cost limitations. Here, the governing body of the POU sets the rules, right?

Allowing them to set the rules on cost limitations after the compliance period ends is a way for POUs to make an end-run over the requirements. So it avoids the need for planning because why plan in advance and adopt rules that allow you to procure less than you're required to procure and still satisfy the RPS requirement, when

you can wait to see how you do and then after the compliance period ends, then you can gather some documents and information that suggest you thought about this stuff in advance, and then you now adopt rules after the fact.

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That's not the way this should work, and the statute clearly gives the governing bodies of the POUs the authority to adopt rules that excuse them from meeting the RPS procurement requirements. They should be adopting those rules in advance during the compliance period and applying them in a meaningful manner. Not doing so after the compliance period ends to justify their procurement shortfall.

On the point of rule of reason, what I said, or hopefully what I intended to say, was that there were a number of requirements -- some of them regulatory that required submission of information or action by a certain date. Now, staff didn't hold POUs accountable to these dates because this was the first compliance period, and the regulations had just been adopted, and implementing them and requiring that the POUs satisfy the reporting date or the deadlines just didn't seem fair.

And so a rule of reason was applied with respect to some of these reporting requirements, but staff has not applying that rule of reason with respect to statutory

requirements like procuring an obligation in order to (indiscernible). These are things that are laid out in the statute. The statute's been in place since 2011.

The POU governing bodies know what the statue requires.

So applying a rule of reason to their situation, doesn't make sense.

I think those are my only points that I need to make on that.

HEARING OFFICER: Did you want to address the issue that the Port raised about whether or not the cost limitation elements were met in full except for the formal adoption? I believe the Port expressed some confusion about the Staff's position on that.

MS. BADIE: Thank you. Sorry about that. Okay, so just to clarify, the Staff evaluation found that the first requirement for cost limitation was not met. Now, the other requirements were partially satisfied in relation to the Port's general rate cap and reserve policy, but since that was not a cost limitation, meeting the RPS regulatory requirements, those requirements could not be fully satisfied.

**HEARING OFFICER:** Thank you. Port, did you want to take the opportunity to provide some reply comments?

MR. WYNNE: Yes, thank you. So -- and I think we'll take the opportunity to reply more fully in written

briefs, but I think this concept that utilities will be able to use this as an end-run around the RPS, I don't think aligns with the reality of how the RPS is implementing it. The fact that we have POUs -- and this idea that there'd be this bad faith conspiracy so that you would wait until the end to see if you could use a cost limitation, doesn't make any sense because you could just set out the cost limitation, which is why they've been done. And I think to some extent, there was fairly consistent approach and to be frank, a lot of that was become some of the POUs coordinated and so they had a consistent approach. The Port wasn't a part of the group that coordinated and so that's part of the reason why their approach didn't align with some of the other POUs.

And additionally, as far as the opportunity for customers -- so a customer would not be able to come in and say, you shouldn't use delay of timely compliance or cost limitation, you should fully comply when something's at the end of a compliance period. So when the -- (indiscernible) of reporting to -- in the procurement plan and subsequent discussions, that was near the end of the compliance period. They had already -- the Port had already expended significant amounts of money. They did not have the ability to get into compliance. And so the customer wouldn't be able to say, we disagree with you

taking advantage of this provision which would exempt you from penalties; we think you should get in compliance.

Essentially, what the customer would be arguing for is, I think you should take penalties, which I don't think would make sense.

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And it's also not necessarily about the actual I think the way it is described is, you can application. adopt the rules. So you basically set the framework for delay of timely compliance and for cost limitation. the framework for delay of timely compliance is specified in the statute, so I don't see what the additional value of having a -- essentially what you would have, and this is what's done if you look at procurement plans. I have worked on a number, is you just repeat what's in the statute and you put in a procurement plan. And so that's not necessarily providing the public with a real opportunity to scope what these rules looks like. There's a little bit more discretion in the cost limitation, but fundamentally you have to show that there's a disproportionate impact.

As far as the integrity of the program, any time you're out of compliance, there's a significant risk.

And the penalties that a POU could face are great. And so there is no incentive to skirt the rules, especially here for adoption. There's no value in avoiding

adoption; there's no intentional reason why you would do it. There's things that are adopted all the time, and this could be adopted on a consent agenda. And so the POU isn't gaining anything by not going through formal adoption. And there's no reason, especially now that the rules are well understood, have been implemented, and haven't just been in place a few months, I think across the board, if you look at cost limitations as they exist today, they're adopted ahead of time and they're following procedures.

And as far as the comment on the RPS being about planning, the planning did happen before the Commission. So this was a large project and a large expenditure, and I think we could revisit the record, but the actual planning for the RPS was done before the Commission subject to the input from customers. And so the customers were extensively involved and extensively aware.

And the actual solar facility would have been located on the roof of the warehouses with the Port. I mean, this was very much connected to and very much a part of the Port -- the customers. I don't think that it's correct to say that the Port didn't involve the customers or didn't provide their customers with a -- of an opportunity to discuss the planning for the RPS

(indiscernible).

I think that (indiscernible).

HEARING OFFICER: I would like to now turn to what the briefing schedule would be. We already have a date for Staff to provide the additional foundation for its exhibits. I'll leave it up to the parties. One option would be to say briefs — opening briefs are due two weeks from this Friday with reply briefs due two weeks later. Or if the parties think it's — they would like more time, we could do three weeks for the opening briefs and two weeks for reply. I leave it to you to offer your comments as to what works given everyone's time limitations and work schedules. Take your time and look at your calendars.

MR. HERRERA: If the Committee is willing to give us more time, we would certainly welcome it. We've got other things that we're working on. This hearing kind of snuck up on us, and the work we needed to do just to prepare for it. So looking over to Justin, I think he's -- Mr. Wynne, excuse me. I think he's certainly would welcome more time, but I'll let him speak to that.

MR. WYNNE: Yeah, I don't necessarily have a proposal. I mean, I think four weeks would be preferable. I don't know if that's consistent with what you're --

**HEARING OFFICER:** Four weeks for opening briefs?

2 MR. WYNNE: Yeah.

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HEARING OFFICER: So that would be opening briefs would be due on the -- is -- if I'm -- and I'm really bad at numbers, so people, correct me if I'm wrong -- the 19th of October. And then the reply briefs would be due the 2nd of November? Did I do the math right? Is that -- did I get the dates right?

MR. WYNNE: Yes.

HEARING OFFICER: I always do going from Fridays.

We could do it from -- we could split the baby, sort of, and do it from today. And then, in fact, it would be the 16th, and the 30th. Should we go with the 16th, and the 30th, and sort of split those? So it's three-and-a-half weeks from today.

MR. HERRERA: That certainly works for Staff if that's what we're directed to do.

HEARING OFFICER: Is that going to present a
hardship for the Port?

MR. WYNNE: No, that's fine; that works.

HEARING OFFICER: Okay. And I would ask that any factual assertions that are made in the briefs have citations to the record. We hope that by the time of the Staff filing next week, we'll have all of that cleared up so we that we don't have to -- we know what we're citing

1 to, and the people who are reading the briefs can go find And I will issue some sort of -- I don't know if it will be a formal notice or just a reminder afterwards, 3 that there will be briefs due on October 16th, opening 4 5 briefs and reply briefs due on the 30th. 6 Is there anything else, Commissioner? Would you 7 like to make some closing comments? 8 (No audible response) 9 **HEARING OFFICER:** I would like to thank the parties for their thoughtful presentations. I learned a lot 10 11 today. 12 Oh, that's right, we do need to take public comment. 13 Is there anybody in the audience who wishes to offer 14 public comment? Is there anybody on webex who would like 15 to offer public comment? 16 (No audible response) HEARING OFFICER: Well, then I guess I thank you 18 again for your thoughtful comments, and we look forward to seeing your briefs. 19 20 With that, this hearing is adjourned.

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(End of Recording)

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